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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this dissertation is to explore the connection between love and 
personal knowledge and what Jesus’ life and teaching reveal about the 
relationship between these. I want to distinguish that form of love or caring that 
makes relationships personal from those forms, like benevolence or compassion, 
where the concern is impersonal. It is commonly thought in contemporary 
Western culture that the autonomy necessary for mature moral agency or for the 
realization of one's unique personal identity is diminished by the influence of 
other persons. In contrast, I argue that the relational image of love, or agape, in 
the New Testament presents a conception of personal identity in which autonomy 
is found in and through intimate, personal relationships with God and others. Our 
identity is ultimately personal, that is, we are not fully who we are apart from 
being in relationships with others that are personal. A fresh examination of the 
New Testament image of love reveals a portrait of the self as one in which the 
capacities essential for personhood such as autonomy are not diminished 
through identification with God but instead are most fully realized. I argue that 
this identification involves a personal form of caring, one that is distinctly intimate, 
that when mutual constitutes a personal form of knowing. This personal 
knowledge is constituted by a particular pattern of engagement between persons 
and is more than the intellectual apprehension of propositions that are true about 
another person. I argue that directly engaging the New Testament as a part of
 xi 
philosophical project is justified, in part, because adequately describing the moral 
character of this love requires a narrative. Only a story or exemplar can image in 
depth the volitional, desiderative, and emotional qualities of this love as well as 
its relational character. Moreover, I argue that joy is an essential emotional and 
desiderative component of this love and is necessary for intimate, personal 
knowing. I argue that this kind of personal knowing is capable of addressing the 
existential problem of meaning. On this account the human hunger for meaning, 
or significance, is one that finds its satisfaction not in theoretical or explanatory 
knowledge but in intimate, personal engagement with God and, through God, 
with others.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
PERSONAL KNOWING: A BEGINNING 
Introduction 
The aim of this dissertation is to explore the connection between love and 
personal knowledge and what Jesus’ life and teaching reveal about the 
relationship between these. I want to distinguish that form of love or caring that 
makes relationships personal from those forms, like benevolence or compassion, 
where the concern is impersonal. It is commonly thought in contemporary 
Western culture that the autonomy necessary for mature moral agency or for the 
realization of one's unique personal identity is diminished by the influence of 
other persons. In contrast, I argue that the relational image of love, or agape, in 
the New Testament presents a conception of personal identity in which autonomy 
is found in and through intimate, personal relationships with God and others. Our 
identity is ultimately personal, that is, we are not fully who we are apart from 
being in relationships with others that are personal. A fresh examination of the 
New Testament image of love reveals a portrait of the self as one in which the 
capacities essential for personhood such as autonomy are not diminished 
through identification with God but instead are most fully realized. I argue that 
this identification involves a personal form of caring, one that is distinctly intimate, 
that when mutual constitutes a personal form of knowing. This personal 
knowledge is constituted by a particular pattern of engagement between persons
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and is more than the intellectual apprehension of propositions that are true about 
another person. I argue that directly engaging the New Testament as a part of a 
philosophical project is justified, in part, because adequately describing the moral 
character of this love requires a narrative. Only a story or exemplar can image in 
depth the volitional, desiderative, and emotional qualities of this love as well as 
its relational character. Moreover, I argue that joy is an essential emotional and 
desiderative component of this love and is necessary for intimate, personal 
knowing. I argue that this kind of personal knowing is capable of addressing the 
existential problem of meaning. On this account the human hunger for meaning, 
or significance, is one that finds its satisfaction not in theoretical or explanatory 
knowledge but in intimate, personal engagement with God and, through God, 
with others.  
Overview of Dissertation 
 In Chapter One I present the claim that we have a need for intimate, 
personal knowing. I present a broad range of personal testimonies and also 
recent empirical research from psychology and neuroscience that supports the 
view that joy-filled intimate relationships are a basic human need. This claim 
provides the occasion to surface the concern that intimate relationships, whether 
with others or God, involves a form of dependency that diminishes the autonomy 
necessary for mature moral agency and the realization of one's unique personal 
identity. I rely on the work of Ernest Becker to articulate this concern that forms 
one of the core problems this dissertation seeks to address. The New Testament 
presents a vision of the human person in which autonomy is rooted in intimate 
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relationships with God and others. Given that direct engagement with the New 
Testament is not a typical part of philosophic discourse I begin to provide 
justification for such engagement. I argue that questions about how to live and 
what constitutes a vibrant life do not fit neatly into one academic discipline. 
Answering these questions involves searching for images that depict a vision of 
“what we might do and be” that fit our deepest aspirations and experiences as a 
person.1 I introduce the idea that narratives, that is, stories and exemplars, are 
indispensable for moral discourse because such forms are capable of capturing 
moral insights and a vision of what constitutes a good life in ways that abstract 
theoretical writing cannot. 
 In Chapter Two I begin to identify a proper method, or mode of discourse, 
for exploring moral and personal knowledge as well as to identify a space where 
such discourse can occur. There is a need to make room for engaging images 
and exemplars that can appeal to aspirations of what we might do and be. This 
need for room arises because of the standard for examination and explanation 
that is set by the sciences. Some argue that science is the path to knowledge 
and that other efforts at securing knowledge are not merely substandard but 
irrelevant. I argue that this account shields us from some important limitations 
concerning scientific knowledge. I identify the limitations of the experimental 
sciences to address issues of ultimate concern such as the character of the good 
life or of life's meaning. These limitations are identified in order to help define the 
scope of the sciences; they are not presented as an argument against the 
                                                 
1
 Martha Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge, p. 29.  
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reliability of the sciences. 
 In this chapter I also examine another method of gathering knowledge that 
is employed by the sciences that is called an inference to the best available 
explanation or abduction. Philosophy also employs abduction in its efforts to 
discover and develop the best, or most fitting, explanation of the full range of 
human experience. Broad explanationism is the name philosophers give to the 
view that our fundamental explanatory goals should guide how we regulate our 
beliefs. This chapter argues for a form of modest explanationism. It is modest in 
that it emphasizes the important role of personal judgment in gathering 
knowledge about issues of ultimate concern. When it comes to differences 
between persons concerning such issues we cannot demonstrate which of two 
competing accounts is better than another merely by appealing to an account's 
explanatory power. I will provide the reasons for this while showing where there 
remains an important, though modest, role for explanatory power.   
 I also examine in this second chapter Tolstoy's religious writings to 
establish the significance of the limitations of both the experimental sciences and 
abduction. His testimony invites us to consider that we have a need for 
knowledge found within what Pascal identifies as the personal order. He gives 
witness to a hunger for something more than explanatory knowledge. Tolstoy, as 
do many people, wants to know what, if anything, matters. He writes of a 
haunting sense of insignificance, aloneness, and a demand for moral perfection 
coupled with a sense of moral failure. He testifies to finding within himself an all-
consuming demand to answer the question – Why do I exist? I argue that he is 
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seeking a kind of knowledge that neither the empirical methodologies of the 
sciences nor abduction can provide. In addition, I argue that his writing models 
the character of discourse or conversation that best fits these issues of ultimate 
concern. I return to these arguments and develop each more fully in Chapter 
Five. 
 In Chapter Three I explore further how reason, as an inferential process, 
cannot inform us of what it is important to know. I argue that reason is 
inescapably emotional because emotion is that which stands directly behind 
personal activity and determines the substance and direction of our actions. The 
impulse to act in accord with reality, that is, to be responsive to reality, is our 
impulse to rationality. It is an objective impulse. It is regularly overwhelmed by 
subjective impulses. For example, our anxiety and fear of pain often lead us to 
fabricate and embrace self-consoling fantasies, which in turn urge us to force 
reality to serve our own selfish interests. This struggle between the impulse to act 
in terms of the world and the impulse to favor self without regard to reality is one 
that is centered in emotion. This is not a struggle between reason and emotion, 
but rather one where one emotional stance or attitude is affirmed over another. I 
argue that apprehending the world involves learning how to act in terms of the 
world, that is, it requires exercising fidelity to reality. Given my aim to understand 
the character of personal knowledge I begin to assess what shape that 
responsiveness must take when the reality we are seeking to know is another 
person. 
 In this third chapter I take a modest step in furthering the case that our 
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identity is ultimately personal, that is, that we are not fully who we are apart from 
being in relationships with others that are personal. If we start with the idea that 
our identity is ultimately that of an isolated individual who when fully autonomous 
has no need for other persons, God or human, then we will never be able to 
conceive of dependence on, or need for, others in terms other than enslavement 
or diminishment. The concern that our autonomy tends to be diminished by the 
influence of others is at the center of Ernest Becker's concern which I presented 
in Chapter One. In contrast I argue that relationships with others that are 
personal are integral to our autonomy and that it is in and through such 
relationships that we can be autonomous. This preliminary analysis of autonomy 
lays the groundwork for its further development in Chapter Five.  
 In Chapter Four I argue that narratives can convey normative content that 
exceeds that which can be presented discursively as a list of normative 
principles. Conversation, or discourse, about what constitutes the good life will be 
inadequate to meet the demands of our lives if it fails to take into account our 
need for stories or exemplars. When conceptual analysis is employed to distill 
normative guidelines from a narrative it inadvertently diminishes the character of 
volitional, emotional and desiderative elements central to that vision of the good 
life that may be describable discursively but that require narratives to portray 
their full character or “depth.” I argue that the moral quality of an action is 
dependent on the character of these elements. I engage Soren Kierkegaard in 
his Works of Love to illustrate how his effort to account for the normative 
character of agape results in a diminished account of its normative character. In 
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addition I argue that narratives do more than image normative content. 
Narratives can speak not only to our sense of moral obligation but also to our 
aspirations – they show us not only what we must “do” but also what we might 
“be”, that is, they can portray a life, or a way of being, that addresses concerns 
like Becker's of how to live a vibrant life. These features of narratives provide us 
with grounds for engaging the New Testament directly to explore how it portrays 
the good life including the character of love and personal relationships. 
In Chapter Five I present the New Testament portrait of intimate, personal 
knowing in terms of the relational image of agape that is central to it. This 
narrative presents two primary images of that love. The first is the pattern of 
engagement between God and Jesus that constitutes their love for one another. I 
use the term intimate identification for this pattern.2 The second is the manner in 
which God and Jesus seek to draw human persons into a relationship with God 
and others that shares the same character. I will analyze this love, or intimate 
identification, in terms of its volitional, emotional, and desiderative character. I 
argue that the distinctive quality of these elements can only be fully portrayed 
through narrative imagery or exemplars. The New Testament presents intimacy 
as a form of personal knowing that is a shared activity between persons that 
involves an ongoing encounter of their genuine selves. I argue that joy is an 
emotional and desiderative element of agape that shapes its moral character and 
is necessary for intimacy. Love for another as that other involves taking joy in 
                                                 
2
 I discovered the term “intimate identification” in Bennett Helm's “Love, Identification, and the 
Emotions”, pp. 5-6. Though our accounts of love differ we both use this term to distinguish 
personal from non-personal forms of love. I first came across the concept of personal love as a 
form of identification in W.F. Halliday's Reconciliation and Reality, pp. 162 -163 and 170-175. 
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that other, that is, it involves wanting to be with that other and to enjoy that other 
as the particular other that they are. Joy is both the result of, and a condition for, 
intimacy.  
 This account of agape addresses Becker's concern that fidelity to another, 
in particular God, diminishes a person's autonomy. This narrative presents a 
portrait of the self, or person, as one in which the capacities essential for 
personhood such as autonomy are not diminished through intimate identification 
with God but instead are most fully realized. Personality is an attainment. 
Humans can engage with God and one another in less than personal ways. 
Participating in an intimate, personal relationship with God requires an 
identification with God that, given God's character, requires and nurtures the 
development of our autonomy. Jesus, in his unparalleled capacity to engage God 
and others in a personal manner, is presented as the portrait of how to live a 
vibrant life. His identity is not diminished or obscured, but instead finds its unique 
expression, in identification with the God he calls Father.  
 I argue that this activity of intimate identification constitutes a kind of 
personal knowing that is capable of addressing the existential problem of 
meaning or significance which Tolstoy helped identify in Chapter Two. On this 
account the human hunger for meaning, or significance, is one that finds its 
satisfaction not in theoretical or explanatory knowledge but in intimate, personal 
engagement with God and, through God, with others. Significance is found in 
being significant for Another, that is, in being loved by One who is worthy of our 
fullest love. Leo Tolstoy's religious testimony will be engaged to help support this 
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view. This contributes further to the view that our identity is not found in isolation 
from God and other persons but is most fully realized through participation in 
intimate, personal relationships with God and others. At this point it is important 
to begin developing an account of our need for intimate, personal relationships 
and what constitutes personal knowing. 
Our Need for Intimate Personal Communion  
Our lives are inescapably intertwined with the lives of others. Interpersonal 
relationships, for good or for ill, form its very fabric. Daily we are faced with 
choices, and the effects of our own past choices, regarding how we are going to 
relate to the particular people we encounter in our world. We are also profoundly 
affected by the choices of others. Indeed, during the earliest years of our lives we 
were completely dependent on the choices of others. In spite of this, many of us 
walk through life with little or no personal knowledge of others. This is often the 
case even toward those whom we think we should know the best. It is not 
unusual to feel we have only touched the surface of those closest to us and 
sense a lack of knowing anything more deeply personal about them.   
 Norman Maclean, in his autobiographical novella A River Runs Through It, 
recounts his father’s words, “It is those we live with and love and should know 
who elude us.”3 This can become uncomfortably clear especially in trying 
circumstances such as the extended physical suffering or death of a loved one. 
Here our distance from others, our lack of intimate connection, is exposed.4 It is 
                                                 
3
 Norman Maclean, A River Runs Through It, p. 104. This story takes place in Montana in the 
early 1900’s.  
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not uncommon to feel that we don’t know loved ones who are suffering well 
enough to actually “be” with them and offer them some measure of comfort in 
their pain, or in the case of death, to feel awkward and disconnected from those 
around us who may also be grieving. Daily life confronts us with the fact that who 
people are, and what they need, is often hidden from our understanding. 
   Leo Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina opens with the line: “All happy families are 
alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.”5 This observation puzzles 
me. My experience indicates that unhappy families are all too similar to one 
another. The comment above from Maclean's father intimates the reason for this. 
Our greatest sorrows are personal. Within our families they stem from our 
inability to achieve, or to sustain, intimate personal connection with one another. 
As W.F. Halliday writes, 
The deepest sorrows of life are personal, and are relative to the 
attitude of persons to persons. They come from the sense of 
personal injury or through personal loneliness; thus their source is 
lack of fellowship. The deepest instinct of the human soul is for 
fellowship against isolation... Our truest joys all spring from 
fellowship or are a condition of it.6  
 
Similarly, Hugh Black writes, “…while nearly all our sorrows come from our 
                                                                                                                                                 
4
 It is important to note that the concept of intimacy, as I use it throughout this dissertation, refers 
to a quality of a relationship and not a class of relationships. Our family relationships are 
sometimes referred to as “intimate” because of the close association that is shared among those 
who live together and have extensive shared histories. However, it is not uncommon for parents 
to be estranged from their children or spouses to be estranged from one another and for those 
relationships to lack intimacy. The familiarity that people have of one another due to such shared 
histories does not by itself amount to intimacy. Such relationships may be in fact anti-intimate.   
 
5
 Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, p. 1. 
 
6
 W.F. Halliday, Reconciliation and Reality, p. 10. 
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connections with others, nearly all our joys have the same source.”7 Joyful 
families are alike in their moments of joy, unhappy ones in their unhappiness. 
Given the personal nature of both our joys and our sorrows Tolstoy's opening line 
seems at best half right. Both our sorrows and our joys, in their fullest measure, 
appear to hinge on the same thing. 
 Our lack of success at establishing and sustaining relationships that can 
rightly be called personal extends beyond our family relationships. Cicero 
believed that friendship and the joy that comes from it is a need that is rooted in 
human nature, yet he emphasized its extreme rarity.8 Many others emphasize the 
same point. Emmanuel Mounier writes, “Personality is an eagerness for 
friendship... and yet communion is rarer than happiness, more fragile than 
beauty.”9 The depth of our need for personal knowledge as found in loving 
communion is as staggering as our failures to obtain it. Mother Teresa who cared 
for some of the poorest of the world’s poor regularly made this same point. As 
one familiar with the debilitating physical suffering of the poor she didn’t point to it 
as being the most painful kind, but instead observed that “The most terrible 
poverty is loneliness.”10 She repeatedly remarked that more than food, shelter, or 
clothing the greatest need of the poor is to be wanted. She recognized that even 
their physical suffering was the manifestation of a deeper, more personal 
                                                 
7
 Hugh Black, Friendship, p. 91 and pp. 66-67. 
 
8
 Cicero, De Amicitia, see especially chapters 8, 9, and 13-15. 
 
9
 Emmanuel Mounier, Personalism, p. 24. 
   
10
 Malcolm Muggeridge, Something Beautiful for God, pp. 22, 73, 98. 
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rejection by other persons. It is this personal rejection and the loneliness it 
engenders that constitutes the greatest suffering. In addition to this wide range of 
testimonies concerning the importance of intimate personal relationships is a 
growing body of empirical research from the fields of neuroscience and 
psychology that offers support for their observations. 
Personal Knowing and Joy – Aristotle and the Neuroscientists  
 In the Nichomachean Ethics when Aristotle seeks to describe the 
character of that love that exists in friendship, not just in any friendship but 
friendship he takes to be of the highest kind, he turns to the image of a mother 
who takes joy in her baby.11 (1159a10-35) He maintains that the “delight mothers 
take in loving” indicates that the characteristic virtue of friends “seems to lie in 
loving rather than in being loved.” In addition to this, a part of this phenomenon’s 
appeal for Aristotle is supplied by cases where a mother has to give up her infant 
because it’s in the best interest of the baby. Where the mother cannot both love 
and be loved in return, a loving mother chooses the baby’s interests over her 
own. Aristotle is not alone in his awareness that something profound and worthy 
of exploration is going on when a mother delights, or takes joy, in her child.  
This joy, as observed not only in the gaze between a parent and its infant 
                                                 
11
 Based on 1155b30-1156a5 some argue that Aristotle's conception of friendship can be 
captured in the definition that two people are friends provided: 1) they have goodwill for each 
other, and 2) each is aware of the other's goodwill. While these conditions are necessary for 
friendship Aristotle clearly thinks them insufficient to capture its intimate character. He writes, “But 
such men may bear goodwill to each other; for they wish one another well and aid one another in 
need; but they are hardly friends because they do not spend their days together nor delight in 
each other and these are thought the greatest marks of friendship.” (1158a5-9) In 1166b30-
1167a20 he argues that goodwill by itself, even when mutual, is not identical with friendship 
because it does not amount to intimacy. For further explication of this point see my section 
“Affective Normative Content Requires Narrative Imagery to Portray It Fully” in Chapter Four. 
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but also in an infant’s apparent delight in, and capacity for, seeking such 
engagements, has become a significant area of modern research.12 Concerning 
the mutual gaze between an infant and his primary caregiver, Daniel Stern of 
Cornell University Medical School, writes: 
The immediate goal of a face-to-face play interaction is to have fun, 
to interest and delight and be with one another. During these 
stretches of purely social play there are no tasks to be 
accomplished… There is nothing even that has to be taught. In fact, 
if the task is to teach the infant something, he won’t be able to learn 
what the play experience might hold for him. We are dealing with a 
human happening, conducted solely with interpersonal “moves,” 
with no other end in mind than to be with and enjoy someone 
else.13 
 
It appears that infants unabashedly delight in being delighted in. One interesting 
finding is that infants, at a certain stage in their development, learn how to initiate 
and regulate such pleasurable engagements with their primary caregiver.14 Stern 
likens this face-to-face engagement to a dance and writes that the infant is a 
“virtuoso performer in his attempts to regulate both the level of stimulation from 
the caregiver and the internal level of stimulation in himself.”15 The mother too is 
“a virtuoso in her moment-by-moment regulation of the interaction” yet it takes 
both to create their intricate patterns of engagement.  
                                                 
12
 See: Robert Karen, Becoming Attached; Daniel Stern, The First Relationship and The 
Interpersonal World of the Infant; Daniel Siegel’s The Developing Mind: Toward a Neurobiology of 
Interpersonal Experience; and Allan Schore’s Affect Regulation and the Origin of the Self: The 
Neurobiology of Emotional Development. 
  
13
 Daniel Stern, The First Relationship, p. 91; italics mine. This is similar to Gilbert Meilaender’s 
account that one of the central elements of love is “the desire to enjoy the other person in a 
reciprocal union of affections.” He argues that without this desire to enjoy the presence of the 
other and be so enjoyed by that other love would be impersonal. See Friendship, pp. 48-49. 
 
14
 Ibid. See chapter 4 for some of the research on which these claims are based. 
  
15
 Ibid., p. 133. 
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 Neurologist Allan Schore argues that the infant’s facial expression of joy 
that results from this mutual regulation between the infant and the caregiver in 
face-to-face “gaze transactions” is one facet of “a visual dialog,” that is, an 
intense, yet preverbal form of communication.16 Moreover, his research indicates 
that the visual stimulation embedded in these mutual gaze transactions directly 
affects the development of specific structures in the baby’s brain that are critical 
for the future socio-emotional development of the child.17 The mother’s 
“emotionally expressive face” is the “most potent source” of visual stimulation for 
the infant’s developing nervous system.18 The loving gaze from parent to child 
not only stimulates the baby physiologically; the baby learns to reciprocate (or 
initiate) a loving gaze back to the parent, which in turn causes endorphin levels to 
rise in the parent.19 His research shows that “we are born to form attachments, 
that our brains are physically wired to develop in tandem with another's through 
emotional communication, beginning before words are spoken.”20 Stern’s 
research offers additional empirical support for the importance of these facial 
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engagements. He reports on an experiment where mothers were asked to 
alternate between normal active “alive” facial and vocal behavior and going 
deadpan and silent while gazing at the baby: “The infants’ main reaction was one 
of distress and aversion to the deadpan face.” He writes that before the infants 
“turned off” they did many fascinating things in an effort to get them to “behave”, 
that is, to get them to re-engage with them.21 It is this mutual engagement, 
sometimes characterized as a “dynamic interactive system,” along with its 
corresponding neurological affects, that fosters a solid emotional connection 
between parent and infant.22  
Close attention to this phenomenon reveals that this love is not merely 
some form of disinterested altruism – the loving parent thrills at the capacity of 
the baby to respond as well as to initiate engagement. The parent engages her 
infant with the hope of developing a mutual emotional connection or relationship. 
The parent hopes her child responds to her initiations with joy. It is interesting 
that it is this image of delight that Aristotle reaches for when he seeks to describe 
the joy that exists in the highest, or most personal, form of friendship. This image 
is powerful and modern day observers underscore its power by helping us to see 
more clearly the mutual character of the engagement between parent and infant. 
In addition, research indicates that not only do infants need joy but that intimate 
relationships continue to be an important factor in brain function and other facets 
                                                 
21
 Stern, The First Relation, p. 39. 
    
22
 Ibid. I do not like the description in quotations, as it sounds mechanistic. However, it is 
important in underscoring the reciprocal character of the phenomenon not only on the 
interpersonal plane but also on the biological one.   
16 
 
of our well-being throughout our lives. For example, studies examining the 
relationships of married couples provide a growing base of evidence that links 
“relationship intimacy to better health, including stronger immune systems” and 
“high conflict (anti-intimate) marital relationships” to weakened immune systems 
and increased vulnerability to disease.23 Empirical studies are increasingly 
demonstrating that we are “hardwired” for close attachments, or emotional 
connection, to other people.24 This research supports the observations of people 
throughout history like Cicero who believed that intimate relationships, like 
friendship, and the joy found in them is a need that is rooted in human nature. 
Intimacy and Autonomy – A Conflict?  
 The cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker comments: “All that religious 
and psychoanalytic genius has to tell us converges on the terror of admitting 
what one is doing to win his self-esteem.”25 Becker writes of our mythic longing to 
be heroic, the ache to be found special in some cosmic sense, and the relentless 
desire to “stand out”.26 Interestingly, he concludes that this esteem is not 
something an individual self can obtain on its own but is a sense of significance 
that can only be conferred by another. It is a hunger for what appears to be a kind 
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of personal knowledge - a knowing that comes through and is embodied in some 
type of interpersonal engagement. Satisfying this hunger for significance makes 
us dependent on others in a way that seems to conflict with the autonomy 
necessary for mature moral agency and for the realization of one's unique 
personal identity. In this section I will describe the character of this desire along 
with the conflict it seems to raise for our need to be autonomous. The following 
description of this desire is not intended to provide a demonstration of its 
existence from uncontroversial bits of evidence but the beginnings of an account 
that I think helps make the best sense of many features of my own experience as 
a person.    
  Sebastian Moore identifies the relational, or interpersonal, nature of 
the desire for significance in this way: 
The very concept of ‘feeling significant’ appeals to another or others 
for its meaning. I may want to feel ‘happy’, or ‘good’, or ‘high’, or 
‘content’, or ‘peaceful’, or ‘secure’: these are states of myself, which 
do not necessarily imply that anyone else comes into the act. But 
when I say I want to feel significant, I am talking about a state of 
myself which looks to others in some way. The need for 
significance is the need for acceptance.27 
 
He writes that “We all desire to be desired by one we desire.”28 This echoes 
Richard of St. Victor who in the 12th century observed that it is inherent in love “to 
wish to be loved much by the one whom you love much.”29 C.S. Lewis refers to 
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this ache to be found special, along with the fear he experiences in admitting this, 
as his “inconsolable secret.”30  He writes that the beauty of the universe as a 
material and impersonal reality is not enough to satisfy this ache. Concerning his 
experiences of beauty he writes, “Beauty has smiled but not to welcome us” and 
in our encounter with it we discover “we are but mere spectators.”31 This 
spectatorship stands in sharp contrast to the longing to be noticed. These 
experiences underscore for him that, “We have not been welcomed, accepted, or 
taken into the dance.”32 We do want to enter into such beauty, yet we find it does 
not acknowledge us; it is indifferent to us. In a world that is impersonal through 
and through there is no one to whom we matter – in such a universe we are 
“treated as strangers.”33 And, even more to the point, he writes, “Nobody marks 
us.”34 In contrast to that he writes that he desires to be “delighted in as an artist 
delights in his work or a father in a son.”35 These observations fit with Moore's 
comment that “As I mature, I need to be significant for another. I need to count in 
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another’s life, to be the enhancement of another’s life.”36 Remarking on his 
experience he writes that the desire for self-worth is the desire to “be myself for 
another.”37  
   Pascal also writes extensively on this feature of the human condition. He 
thinks our hunger for significance or “glory” is one of our defining characteristics. 
By glory he means the good opinion, or esteem, of others. He thinks we desire 
this esteem more than life itself. Pascal states that we would “even die gladly 
provided people talk about it.”38 He remarks that “All the happiness of men lies in 
this esteem.”39 Though prone to overstatement due to his stylized use of 
hyperbole I do not think we should dismiss Pascal's testimony. Of course he 
cannot speak for all people however, he is aware of an overwhelming hunger 
within himself to secure the good opinion of others and is aware that this drive 
holds for others with whom he is familiar. Based on his experiences and 
observations he would concur with Becker who views humans as being 
possessed by “a screaming for glory” that can be as “uncritical and reflexive as 
the howling of a dog.”40 Pascal finds this quest both “the vilest feature of man” 
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and yet, tellingly, that which “most clearly shows his excellence.”41 How does this 
quest, though vile, reveal the excellence of human beings?  
 Pascal observes that regardless of a person's possessions, privileges, or 
wealth, that he “...is dissatisfied unless he enjoys the good opinion of his 
fellows.”42 Our excellence lies in our awareness that persons, and what they think 
of us, ultimately matters more than possessing impersonal things. It is likely that 
Pascal, like Moore and others, holds that our significance is found in being 
significant for others, God included. Moreover, this feature of our condition is vile 
not because we need an esteem that can only be conferred by others but 
because we seek to gain that esteem in ill-fitting or unjust ways. He argues that a 
person's need for others has been corrupted into a desire that “leads him to 
make himself into a God” and be at “the centre of everything.”43  He describes 
humans as being possessed by a disastrously distorted form of self-love.44 These 
efforts to secure the significance we need decrease our capacity for intimate, 
personal relationships. 
 Whether or not we are aware of this hunger to belong, or desire to be 
desired, Pascal thinks that our behavior reveals that we are convinced that the 
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acceptance of others is needed to gain the significance we desire. He observes 
that  
… nothing can deflect him from this desire, and this is the most 
indelible quality in the human heart. And those who most despise 
men, and put them on the same level as beasts, still want to be 
admired and trusted by them, and contradict themselves by their 
own feelings….45 
 
He is not alone in this observation. Cicero observes:  
Even if one be of so rude and savage a nature as to shun and hate 
the society of men… he yet cannot help seeking some one in 
whose presence he may vomit the venom of his bitterness.46  
 
We need others even if only as an audience to denounce our need for others. 
Similarly, Gabriel Marcel writes that this, “craving to be confirmed from outside, 
by another” is a “paradox, by virtue of which even the most self-centered among 
us looks to others and only to others for his final investiture.”47 Thus, while we 
might not consciously be aware of this desire, and possibly even deny its 
presence or importance, our unguarded emotional responses and many of our 
behaviors seem to be best explained by a yearning to be understood, taken into 
account, or known by others. 
 This need for communion or intimate, personal fellowship leads to a 
problem. How do we each become the person who we truly are, or possibly are 
meant to be, if that involves some kind of dependency on another? If our 
                                                 
45
 Pascal, Pensees, no. 470; italics mine. 
  
46
 Cicero, De Amicitia, chapter 24. 
 
47
 Gabriel Marcel, Homo Viator, p. 16. 
 
22 
 
significance is dependent on being significant for another, or for others, this 
seems to interfere with the autonomy and self-determination we need to develop 
and exercise to be ourselves. Ernest Becker states that the “only real problem of 
life” is our need to “win a degree of self-realization without surrender to complete 
spiritlessness or slavery.”48 Needing to be significant for another seems to 
constitute such a surrender. Framing the problem in its cosmic dimension he puts 
it this way “How does one lean on God and give over everything to Him and still 
stand on his own feet as a passionate human being?” He thinks this is no mere 
“rhetorical question” but a “real one” that goes right to the heart of the problem of 
“how to be a man.”49 Many years earlier John Oman addressed this problem and 
sought to show “…how absolute moral independence and absolute religious 
dependence are not necessarily opposites but one and indivisible.”50 Like Becker 
he points out that we must be careful to avoid characterizing our autonomy, or 
moral independence, “as though we could ride over reality” or our dependence 
on God “as though reality could simply ride over us” because this moral 
independence “is the vital and distinguishing characteristic of a moral person” 
and if that is lost “man is no longer a person but is a mere animate creature.” 
Throughout the dissertation I will refer to this apparent conflict between intimacy 
and autonomy as “Becker's Concern.”  
 Becker's Concern helps us to surface several important issues that 
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revolve around what we can call identification, or dependence, and personal 
identity. First, if it is the case that we are seeking our significance from someone, 
from whom are we seeking this? Second, how are we seeking to gain that 
significance that comes from belonging? Third, what is the cost of belonging? As 
Becker rightly realizes there are ways that a person can seek to belong to 
another that diminishes their capacity for autonomy and self-determination. Thus, 
the cost of some forms of engagement is the diminishment of one's identity. With 
this in mind Becker's Concern can be reframed in this way: Is there anyone I can 
belong to that enhances rather than diminishes what it means to be the human 
being that I am? (Or: Who can I belong to who can help me to discover and 
become the person I need to be?) Moreover, what is the manner of such 
belonging that leads to the enhancement of our individual personal character and 
capacities? In the chapters ahead I argue that the New Testament narrative 
provides a way to address Becker's Concern. Participating in an intimate, 
personal relationship with God requires an identification with God that, given 
God's character, requires and nurtures the development of our autonomy. Our 
capacity for intimate, personal engagement with God and others increases as our 
capacity for autonomy increases. Our identity is not diminished or obscured, but 
instead finds its unique expression, in and through loving relationships with God 
and others. At this point I begin to provide justification that it is philosophically 
acceptable to directly engage the New Testament narrative as a part of ethical 
discourse. This effort will continue in Chapters Two through Four. 
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The Broad Scope of Ethical Inquiry 
 As a person I’m confronted with the phenomenon of Jesus' life as given in 
the New Testament narrative – it is part of the field of experience I inherit as a 
person. As such I cannot escape making choices about what to do with it. I find in 
it a portrait of love that is intimate and personal as well as connections between 
that portrait and personal knowledge. The narrative image of Jesus' life and the 
love that is central to it addresses the twofold character of Becker's Concern 
about intimacy and autonomy and what constitutes a vibrant life, that is, what he 
describes as “how to be a man.” This desire to probe the connection between 
love and personal knowledge, and what Jesus’ life and teaching reveal about the 
relationship between these, may evoke the response: “But is this philosophy?” 
Or, its counterpart: “Isn’t this theology?” These are important, possibly 
inescapable, questions. In formulating an initial response to these I am lead to 
ask another question: When we ask - “How should I live my life?” - does this 
question belong to theology or philosophy? Martha Nussbaum argues that this 
broad, inclusive, and human question “presupposes no specific demarcation of 
the terrain of human life” nor does it fit neatly or securely into one single 
academic discipline to the exclusion of the rest.51 In order to answer it we search 
“…for images of what we might do and be…” from literary, philosophical, and 
religious texts.52 And as we search, she writes, we “look for a fit between a view 
                                                 
51
 Martha Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge, p. 25. 
  
52
 Ibid., p. 29. 
 
25 
 
and what is deepest in human lives.”53 
 Nussbaum's approach, which I am advocating, fits with what Robert 
Nozick claims is the original motivation for studying or entering philosophy. He 
writes that philosophical inquiry is motivated by “...puzzlement, curiosity, [and] a 
desire to understand”54 Moreover, he adds that the “... philosophical goal of 
explanation rather than proof not only is morally better, it is more in accord with 
one’s philosophical motivation.”55 As I seek to understand how to live my life I’m 
confronted with the phenomenon of Jesus' life. It provides an image of what we 
might do and be. We are justified in engaging this narrative, as Nussbaum writes, 
to see if it fits with what is deepest in our lives. The philosophic goal of such an 
exploration is to discover how well it illuminates and enlarges our understanding 
of the human condition. In addition, not only must our search for ethical 
understanding transcend academic categories for the reasons mentioned above, 
but also because as we begin such inquiry we find ourselves already morally and 
epistemologically midstream.  
 It is an uncontroversial, though important, claim that each of us is living 
our own life in a way that already embodies certain assumptions about who we 
are, how we should live, how we can have knowledge and much more. 
Moreover, even once you begin to examine these assumptions you are still 
                                                 
53
 Ibid., p. 26.  Even then David Ford reminds us that the effort to answer the question – What do 
we most want to be and do? - faces complications. This is so, at least partly, because, “What we 
actually desire may be very different from what we think we ought to desire.” See The Shape of 
Living, p. 51. 
 
54
 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, pp. 5 and 13. 
 
55
 Ibid. 
26 
 
making commitments to certain beliefs about how best to live your life – 
including, if you’re philosophically inclined, that it is valuable to examine these 
assumptions. We are constantly having to decide on the basis of our experience 
of the world how we should live in that world well before we have had a chance 
to reflect on all our beliefs that are involved in doing just that. Even in the 
reflective life of the philosopher this element of decision and commitment cannot 
be eliminated. Pascal and Montaigne spoke lucidly about this very feature of 
philosophy. A brief look at their thoughts might help us to see this feature more 
clearly as well as to understand more fully what it is we are doing when we are 
doing philosophy. 
 “We never try to find out whether the roots are sound. We argue about the 
branches,” writes Montaigne in 1569.56 He observed that in studying 
philosophers we argue about what they meant by what they said, rarely if what 
they said was true. To ascertain their truthfulness requires examining their 
“roots.” Whether these roots are called first principles, postulates, assumptions, 
axioms, or “the given” Montaigne recognizes that if you work back from the 
conclusion of an argument you eventually reach the initial premises from which it 
began. He realizes that the chain of reasoning that leads from the premises to 
the conclusion cannot establish the soundness of the initial premises themselves. 
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Montaigne concludes that since reason is not capable of demonstrating the 
rationality of our starting points that it should not have the exalted status that 
philosophers give it. Instead, each of us must decide, or judge, for ourselves 
what we will accept as our first principles or as evidence for our first principles. 
These starting points are not given to us by some natural power of reason that is 
common to all men.57 Reason does not provide us with a neutral vantage point to 
which we can all retreat to find the truth. Thus, to philosophers he states, “… let 
them abandon their professional intention, which is to accept nothing and 
approve nothing except by following the ways of reason.”58 Whether or not this is 
the professional intention of philosophers, Montaigne incisively points out the 
limits of reason and chooses to philosophize in a way that acknowledges those.  
Pascal, unlike Montaigne, did not embrace skepticism even though he 
shared many of Montaigne’s views. Regarding our inability to rationally 
demonstrate first principles, Pascal states “We know the truth not only through 
our reason but also through our heart. It is through the latter that we know first 
principles, and reason, which has nothing to do with it tries in vain to refute 
them.”59 He realizes, along with Montaigne, that reason has its limits. These 
limits entail that not all of our knowledge is rationally demonstrable, however it 
does not entail that we do not have knowledge. Speaking to skeptics, and 
rationalists who employ skeptical arguments like Descartes, he states “We know 
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that we are not dreaming, but however unable we may be to prove it rationally, 
our inability proves nothing but the weakness of our reason, and not the 
uncertainty of all our knowledge.”60 Pascal argued that if we are to be successful 
in deepening our understanding of ourselves and our world we must avoid the 
dangers of both dogmatism and skepticism. The dogmatists fail to realize our 
incapacity for proving anything, while skeptics fail to realize that we have 
knowledge that no amount of skepticism can overcome.61 An accomplished 
scientist Pascal recognized that even the empirical knowledge provided by the 
experimental sciences rests on first principles that are themselves not 
demonstrable. 
 Both Montaigne and Pascal help us to see that in our search for 
understanding, or truth, we cannot escape an element of decision and 
commitment. When we take up philosophical inquiry we are already morally and 
epistemologically midstream, that is, we begin with convictions about who we 
are, how we should live, and how we can have knowledge already in place. John 
Cottingham, in his reflections on Pascal, draws attention to this feature of our 
lives. He calls it “the primacy of praxis”.62 Though he initially describes praxis as 
a feature of the spiritual life in order to distinguish it from contemporary 
philosophy, which he characterizes as having become merely the “intellectual 
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business of evaluating propositions”, he concludes his reflections by 
acknowledging that such praxis is unavoidable in all endeavors where the goal is 
some form of understanding.63 He writes,  
From within a given framework, we cannot jump outside to gain 
some final and definitive assurance that all is going well. But neither 
can we ensure a detached external stance by remaining outside 
that framework, for any human stance is necessarily one 
conditioned by pre-existing frameworks of understanding, 
structures of belonging and commitment and dependency. If that is 
a problem, it is a problem for the human condition in general, not 
for religious frameworks in particular… the primacy of praxis is in 
some sense a feature of the whole human condition...64  
 
Like Pascal and Montaigne he recognizes that our philosophic inquiry is not 
conducted from some neutral vantage point but is one that involves emotional, 
volitional, and intellectual commitments. These commitments are inescapable. 
This is not to dismiss knowledge claims – whether they be scientific, 
philosophical, or theological - as “merely” subjective. At issue is the 
demonstrableness of our knowledge, not whether or not we have knowledge. 
This reasoning underscores the point made earlier. Ethical inquiry does not 
belong to a single theoretical discipline, or academic domain, but is personal and 
human. We cannot shed our commitments before we begin our inquiry. What is 
at stake when we engage an image of what “we might do and be” is not whether 
that view is theological or philosophical, but whether it fits with, or helps explain, 
what we find to be deepest in our lives. The philosophic goal of such an 
exploration is to discover how well it illuminates and enlarges our understanding 
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of the human condition. This provides further support for engaging the New 
Testament narrative.    
  Pascal and Montaigne are part of a tradition that reaches back to 
Aristotle. In the Posterior Analytics he too identifies the significant limitations of 
reason. The observations of these thinkers helps us to see that if philosophy is 
going to be about the business of living and not merely that of evaluating 
propositions, then we cannot overlook these practical starting points and their 
implications for ethical inquiry. They recognize that we are practically staking our 
lives on something – committing ourselves to a particular course of action - even 
as we inquire about what it is best to stake our lives upon. This is so even though 
what we consider to be the most reasonable framework around which to interpret 
our experience and commit ourselves cannot be conclusively demonstrated as 
such to others.65 Philosophy can be practiced in a way that ignores or diminishes 
these observations. Philip Hallie was familiar with the attitude that maintained: 
 … it is simply tender-minded, to be dismissed by a sweep of the 
hand, to suggest that giving ‘guides for living’ (a phrase some 
philosophers of my acquaintance dismiss with an open sneer) has 
anything to do with philosophy as it is now being done. Especially in 
current Anglo-American philosophizing, we leave the bigger 
morsels, the vague, broad problems, to our wives...66   
 
Theoretical knowledge can be sought without regard to the broad questions of 
personal and practical import. Albert Borgmann, who shares similar concerns 
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with Hallie, argues that contemporary American philosophy has become 
increasingly technical and focused on ever smaller targets and is regularly 
practiced like a game.67 He remarks that these philosophical games are engaged 
in “mostly for the pleasure of playing.”68 They differ from games like chess in that 
there are no definitive winners though they provide occasion to display grace, 
intelligence, and ingenuity in “executing more difficult and varied moves.”69 
However, it is clear that a commitment to such open-ended intellectual 
gamesmanship would constitute a way of living that does not fit the reality of our 
lives. 
 The inescapability of our need to act forces us to make judgments about 
how it is best to live. Even those who judge that it is best to postpone answering 
this question make a decisive commitment to what they deem is the best way to 
live. Moreover, we may reflect extensively upon the ethical theories of Aristotle, 
Kant, or Rousseau, but all of what we know about their thoughts cannot decide 
for us how we should choose to live our lives. Thus, we cannot escape making 
judgments about the broad ethical problems. About this feature of our experience 
Iris Murdoch astutely observes, “Moral philosophy cannot avoid taking sides, and 
would-be neutral philosophers merely take sides surreptitiously.”70 Similarly, 
Borgmann writes, “The question of the good life... cannot be left open. What 
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remains is not whether but how we will answer it.”71  
 It should be apparent that this feature of our condition puts us in a position 
where exercising trust is inescapable. We already have entrusted, and are 
entrusting, ourselves to someone or something for insight in answering this 
question even as we continue to ask it. It may be that we entrust ourselves to 
some media personality like Oprah, or science, or religious traditions, or maybe 
just our own selves. There are a tremendous number of “voices” that compete for 
our allegiance and fidelity. Who, or what, is worthy of this trust? If a part of 
learning what constitutes a morally admirable life comes through “wanting to be 
like certain persons and not like certain others,” as Linda Zagzebski argues, then, 
we should ask: Who is worth imitating?72 Who should we entrust ourselves to for 
the insight we need? Who or what am I entrusting myself to now?73 This trust 
may be informed by observation and experience. It may also be corrected by our 
experiences as when we discover we have misplaced our trust. The New 
Testament narrative presents Jesus not only as an exemplar, that is, as one 
worthy of imitation, but also as someone we should seek to know and trust. A 
                                                 
71
 Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life, p. 178. From here on referred 
to as TCCL. He observes that “…the reflective care of the good life has not withered away. It has 
left the profession of philosophy and sprung up among practical people.”  See TCCL p. 201. 
 
72
 Linda Zagzebski, “The Admirable Life and the Desirable Life”, p. 14. In this paper Zagzebski 
explores the role of moral exemplars in moral learning and states that research and experience 
suggests that learning what a morally admirable life is comes through “…wanting to be like 
certain persons and not like certain others.” 
 
73
 See David F. Ford, The Shape of Living, p. 45 for a similar line of questioning. He states: “In a 
choice between regarding the universe as a brute fact or as created by and for love there can be 
no neutrality. No one on earth has an “objective” standpoint: that would require being able to 
stand outside it all in some way. For all the importance of being as intelligent as possible about 
our beliefs... it is hard to imagine any ultimately convincing argument one way or the other. There 
are huge issues here, but let me go straight to the crucial one: Whose testimony do we trust?” 
33 
 
person may have grounds to think he appears trustworthy but reflection alone 
cannot decisively prove that he is. Seeking to answer this question can only be 
done through commitment. The inescapability of praxis shapes the character of 
moral discourse. As we continue to explore how to conduct an inquiry into the 
good life, that is, as we take up the broad questions, we must take these things 
into consideration. The character of these limitations and the way they shape 
individual moral inquiry and public discourse about that inquiry will be the subject 
of Chapter Two on modest explanationism. 
Engaging Images: Moral Commitment and the Imagination 
 If the question of what constitutes the good life cannot remain open, that 
is, if we are always and already answering it even as we raise it, then we can 
also see from the previous reflections that we have already made a commitment 
to some image of what it is good to do and be. Even if that commitment is 
tentative, in the sense that it is open to revision, it still remains a commitment. An 
openness to new images may reflect one's awareness of a need for greater 
moral understanding. The images of the good life that we have committed 
ourselves to are worthy of exploration because it seems likely that they are 
closely linked to what we most deeply value.74 It seems plausible that what we 
commit ourselves to can be influenced by an image, or picture, of what it means 
to be a man or woman that captivates our imagination – a picture of life that we 
find admirable and worthy of pursuing to embody in our own life.  
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 Plato recognizes the link between what we admire and its consequences 
for how we live. It is nicely stated in The Republic where Socrates asks “Or do 
you suppose there is any way of keeping someone from imitating that which he 
admires and therefore keeps company with?”75 One of his criticisms of myth, 
story, or poetry is that it seduces us to admire, or identify with, images of what it 
means to be a good or just person that turn out to be inadequate. This admiration 
leads us “to give ourselves over to following” flawed images that undermine the 
soul by strengthening its baser parts.76 As we identify, or keep company with, 
that which we admire in some sense it shapes our identity, that is, the kind of 
person we become.77 Iris Murdoch writes, “Man is a creature who makes pictures 
of himself, and then comes to resemble the picture.”78 And Walter Kaufmann 
laments that in spite of its brilliance “modern philosophy has not yielded any 
remotely acceptable picture of man” nor has it produced “a conception of man 
that would even tempt us to assent.”79 We seem to search out and attach 
ourselves to images of what we aspire to do and be in the world.80 Novelist Leif 
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Enger writes that this search involves “deciding who and whose you will be in this 
world.”81 And, as Zagzebski points out, this search forces us to “distinguish 
between those persons and behaviors that are worth imitating and those that are 
not.”82 These observations provide an opportunity to resurface Becker's Concern: 
Is there anyone or anything that we can give ourselves over to, or intimately 
identify with, that will enhance rather than undermine the autonomy necessary for 
the realization of our unique character as individual persons? The importance of 
his concern seems clearer given the feature of the moral life described here.  
 This seeking after trustworthy pictures or models to emulate, fashion 
ourselves after, or entrust ourselves to, seems to be a part of the normal process 
of seeking to answer the question “How should I live?”83 History provides us with 
many examples of different images of what it is to be a vibrant person that have 
been put forward for us to consider. In the midst of the bloody religious wars of 
his day Montaigne appears captivated by an ideal of man and knowledge that 
might halt the bloodshed.84 Bacon appears captivated by an ideal of man and 
knowledge where knowing is imaged as that which enables humans to dominate 
physical reality by bringing it under their control.85 Descartes appears captivated 
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by an ideal where man as Archimedean Knower is capable of moving the world 
from the fixed point of his indubitable knowledge. Bertrand Russell, in “A Free 
Man’s Worship”, eloquently presents his ideal of man as one who defies the 
universe through his reason. According to Russell scientific knowledge makes 
man superior to the universe even while it simultaneously informs him that it will 
snuff him out. His free-man bows down to reason alone in order to heroically 
arise and shake his fist in the face of that reality which will ultimately crush him 
and all his aspirations. 
 One of the most vibrant pictures of what it is to be a person and a 
philosopher is found in Plato’s dialogs. It is in these that the personal character of 
Socrates is made evident through his active engagement with others. Numerous 
people have been captivated by Socrates, including Plato himself, and have 
sought to pattern their life after him. Concerning Plato, Kaufmann remarks, “it 
was the image of the ideal man that marked the beginning of Plato’s 
philosophy… It was the personality and life of Socrates no less than his teaching 
that suggested to Plato what man might be like.”86 Plato, in Socrates, provides us 
with a picture of what we might do and be.  
 Interestingly, none of these pictures present the human knower as one 
that is primarily interested in intimate, personal knowledge. Each presents an 
account of knowledge as something that is not satisfying in itself but provides 
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satisfaction through the goods it secures. This knowledge is of instrumental 
value. This sharply contrasts with the picture of human beings as persons who 
find their most secure, and potentially most satisfying, knowledge in personal 
fellowship with others. John Macmurray perceptively writes about how personal 
knowledge finds its satisfaction in the person known and not in some other good 
that is procured through that knowing. He writes,  
When you love anyone you want above all things to be aware of 
him, more and more completely... You want to see him and hear 
him, not because you want to make use of him but simply because 
this is the natural and only way of taking delight in his existence for 
his sake... you are appreciating and enjoying it for itself, and that is 
all you want.87 
 
This kind of knowing serves no other purpose than the “glad awareness” of the 
other who is known.88 However, it is not a morally flaccid love, that is, it does not 
ignore the need of the one loved to grow morally. Loving another involves being 
committed to helping him become what he needs to be because as he grows 
morally his truest self can shine forth. In George MacDonald's words, as he 
grows he will be “yet more the person” we love.89 Love is a form of “intimate 
identification” in which wanting to know a particular other as that other involves a 
commitment to the identity of that other as that particular other.90 In this way, the 
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love necessary for personal knowing is one that is creative of distinction.91  
Looking At and Overlooking Personal Knowledge 
 Personal knowledge is a form of knowledge that is found in, and 
constituted by, engagement in a particular kind of relationship with another 
person. It results from a mode of learning, interpersonal learning, that differs from 
that which leads to the mere intellectual apprehension of an object or thing. 
Nussbaum nicely states, “…that knowledge of love is not a state or function of 
the solitary person at all, but a complex way of being, feeling, and interacting with 
another person.”92 Knowledge of a person involves an encounter, or an 
engagement, of a certain sort. When we want to know a person we want to know 
him, not merely about him. He is not loved for his usefulness to me or for how he 
can serve some purpose of mine but is loved for his own sake. Personal life, in 
contrast to social life, involves being in a kind of relationship where there is no 
other purpose for being together than the sharing of our lives.93 If two people are 
associated merely for what they can get from one another, it would not be 
personal in this sense. Social life on the other hand, for example, our work 
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relationships, necessitates the limiting of this full expression in order to reach 
some lesser, though still important, goal. In social relationships something other 
than the relationship itself provides us with a reason for being together. To 
emphasize the importance of personal knowing over theoretical knowledge is to 
image the character of life differently. Due to the kinds of demands it places on 
us knowing other persons involves difficulties at least as great as that which is 
involved in securing other kinds of knowledge.94 
 This tendency to overlook the character of intimate, personal knowledge in 
favor of other kinds of knowledge is quite common. Paul Wadell notes, 
contemporary reflection on morality and ethics tends to neglect, and in large part 
overlook, the “relational quality of our lives.”95 He is not alone in this judgment. 
Carolinne White recently remarked that friendship is “an area of ethics which is 
not of central concern nowadays, especially when regarded as a relationship of 
affection between members of the same sex.”96 Similarly Gilbert Meilaender 
writes, “It would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a contemporary ethicist – 
whether philosophical or theological – who in writing a basic introduction to ethics 
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would give friendship more than a passing glance.”97 And John Cooper observes 
that the subject of personal relationships, in particular friendship, has “not much 
engaged the attention of philosophers and philosophical scholars.”98 The 
tendency to overlook the relational quality of our lives, where the human knower 
might be more accurately imaged as a knower of persons, is not only common it 
is also not new. 
 Thomas Aquinas’ efforts to put friendship at the heart of Christian thought 
and life were also overlooked. Liz Carmichael persuasively argues that “The 
voice of Thomas on friendship… was scarcely heard… he was valued for his 
philosophy and speculative theology… (while) his moral teaching with its 
distinctive development of caritas was largely ignored.”99 For Christian theology 
caritas, or agape in Greek, is the most perfect kind of love; it is the love 
characteristic of God. Over the centuries defining the character of that love has 
often proven controversial. Aquinas weighs in by defining caritas (agape) in 
terms of friendship (amicitia). He states that, “Caritas signifies not only the love of 
God, but also a certain friendship with Him: which implies, besides love, the 
mutual return of love, together with a certain mutual communion.”100 This is a 
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love which contains within it a hope of reciprocity – a longing that the person 
loved would gladly enter into relationship by responding with self-giving to, and a 
joyful reception of, the one loving. This conception of caritas stands in sharp 
contrast to the notion of Lombard’s dominant at that time of “love of God for 
himself, and of neighbor for God and in God” that emphasized ordinary legal 
obligations based on the Ten Commandments.101 Love on Lombard’s account 
involves the fulfillment of certain moral duties or obligations; it does not involve 
the development of a mutual relationship that has characteristics of an intimate 
friendship. Aquinas’ rich relational conception of love - as friendship with God 
and then through God friendship with others - was quickly “banished into the… 
specialized realm of mystical theology” and its fundamental importance to the 
ethical life was diminished or overlooked.102 There is ample room to challenge 
this tendency and to redirect our attention to personal relationships. 
 The New Testament narrative provides an account of love as intimate, 
personal knowing that is worthy of engaging. This is so for several reasons. Its 
account of the Father-Son relationship between God and Jesus as well as Jesus' 
relationships with other persons provides a vibrant relational image, or picture, of 
love. This relational account of agape addresses Becker's Concern that fidelity to 
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another, in particular God, diminishes a person's autonomy. I argue that the New 
Testament presents a portrait of the self as one in which the capacities essential 
for personhood such as autonomy are not diminished, but most fully realized, 
through intimate identification with God. Participating in an intimate, personal 
relationship with God requires an identification with God that, given God's 
character, requires and nurtures the development of our autonomy. Moreover, 
Jesus, in his unparalleled capacity to engage God and others in a personal 
manner, is presented as the portrait of “how to be a man”, that is, of how to live a 
vibrant life. His identity is not diminished or obscured, but instead finds its unique 
expression, in identification with the God he calls Father. The character of this 
relational picture of love will be explored in greater detail in Chapter Five. There I 
argue that it provides an illuminating account of how intimate, personal knowing 
can be a source of autonomy and how that intimacy can satisfy the existential 
hunger for meaning or significance. 
 Given our need for understanding, especially our need to understand how 
we should live, I argue that the New Testament narratives should be engaged as 
a possible source of insight and wisdom even if they lie outside what might be 
considered typical philosophical discourse. In Chapters Two through Four I 
present an argument for this engagement. As we have seen Nussbaum argues 
that literature should be incorporated into philosophical reflection as part of our 
effort to deepen moral understanding.103 She argues that it can provide us with 
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moral knowledge in ways that abstract theoretical discourse cannot. Iris Murdoch 
argues similarly. She writes that it is “impossible to discuss certain kinds of 
concepts without resort to metaphor” and that these images are “not merely 
peripheral decorations... but are fundamental forms of our awareness.”104 These 
images cannot be reduced by analysis into “non-metaphorical components 
without the loss of substance.”105 In Chapter Four I show that narrative imagery, 
that is, a story or exemplar, can convey normative content that exceeds that 
which can be presented discursively as a list of normative principles. It will 
become clear that the character of agape in the New Testament, a love that is 
central to its conception of personhood and personal knowing, requires a 
narrative to adequately image it. Lastly, the importance of broadening our search 
for images of what we might do and be is heightened given the nature of 
personal knowledge. Its interpersonal character makes us dependent on others 
for such knowledge and this dependency invites us to be open to being 
addressed personally - from outside ourselves - in our efforts to grow in our 
understanding and experience of personal knowledge.106  
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Conclusion 
  My aim in this dissertation is argue that the New Testament narrative 
offers a relational image of love, with an attendant conception of personal 
identity, in which autonomy is found in and through intimate, personal 
relationships with God and others. Our identity is ultimately personal, that is, we 
are not fully who we are apart from being in relationships with others that are 
personal. A fresh examination of the New Testament image of love reveals a 
portrait of the self as one in which the capacities essential for personhood such 
as autonomy are not diminished through identification with God but instead are 
most fully realized. I will engage the New Testament, along with other sources, in 
order to identify the character of personal love that constitutes intimacy from 
impersonal forms of love. I argue that joy is an essential emotional and 
desiderative component of the love that is necessary for intimate, personal 
knowing.  
  To help reach the overarching aim of this dissertation I began this chapter 
with the claim that we have a need for intimate personal knowing. This kind of 
knowing is also sometimes referred to as communion or personal fellowship. I 
relied on the personal testimony and observations of others such as Cicero, 
Mounier, and Mother Teresa to briefly testify to the existence and character of 
this need. Along with their testimony I offered recent empirical evidence from 
psychology and neuroscience that supports the view that joy-filled intimate 
relationships have a dramatic effect on a person's physical and psychological 
well-being. The neurologist Allan Schore has provided extensive evidence that 
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reveals that the organization of the developing brain in a child occurs in the 
context of a relationship with another self. Moreover, this relational context can 
be growth-facilitating or growth-inhibiting depending on its emotional character. 
To the degree that physical and psychological health are taken as characteristic 
of proper human functioning this evidence supports my claim that intimate 
personal relationships are a human need.   
  In contemporary Western thought there is a common intuition that intimate 
relationships involve a form of dependency or identification with another person 
that diminishes the autonomy necessary for mature moral agency and the 
realization of one's unique personal identity. I rely on the work of Ernest Becker 
to draw attention to this concern. For the sake of simplicity I refer to this as 
Becker's Concern. The concern is that this dependency will interfere with living a 
vibrant human life and will result in some form of spiritless enslavement to 
another or others. The nature of the demands that intimacy places on us will 
lessen our significance as the particular individuals that we are rather than be a 
source of it. This concern forms one of the core problems that I think the New 
Testament is capable of helping to address. Given that direct engagement with 
this narrative is not a typical part of philosophic discourse I turn to providing 
preliminary justification for such engagement. I begin to develop an argument, 
with the help of Nussbaum and Murdoch, that will ultimately support the position 
that questions about how to live and what constitutes a vibrant life do not fit 
neatly into one academic discipline. Such questions are neither distinctively 
philosophical nor theological, but are existential and personal. Answering these 
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questions involves searching for images of what we might do and be that fit our 
deepest aspirations and experiences as a person. I introduce the idea that 
narrative imagery, that is, stories and exemplars, can convey the character and 
content of love – including normative content – in a manner that a discursive 
account cannot. Thus, narrative imagery or exemplars of the moral life are 
indispensable for moral discourse. And because their power is at least partly 
dependent on the character of our emotional life and our individual aspirations it 
appears that these personal elements also are an inescapable part of moral 
discourse. Arguments to support engaging the New Testament narrative form the 
middle chapters, Two through Four, of the dissertation.  
  The shape of our discourse concerning the good life and life's meaning is 
also affected by the fact that we are unable to conclusively demonstrate that one 
account is superior to another. If this is so, is there some other way to rationally 
establish which image, or portrayal of the good life, is preferable to another? 
Possibly there is a way to overcome the limits of philosophical argumentation and 
our dependence on individual personal elements that will enable us to put moral 
discourse on a more secure footing. In the following chapter I will explore 
whether the experimental and explanatory forms of the modern scientific 
enterprise provide a mode of discourse that can help us. Some argue that it 
renders philosophical and theological discourse irrelevant. As a part of this effort 
I will provide an account of abduction, also called explanationism, as one of the 
central methods we regularly employ to gather knowledge of our world. Given our 
desire to have the best explanation of the full range of our experience of the 
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world, including ourselves, it is possible that abduction will provide a way to 
rationally adjudicate between competing accounts of the good life. This 
exploration will clarify further the character of discourse that best fits the subject 
of personal knowing and the good life.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
MODEST EXPLANATIONISM:  
 
PERSONAL KNOWING AND THE LIMITS OF EXPLANATORY POWER  
 
Introduction 
 One of the primary aims of this dissertation is to explore the connection 
between love and personal knowledge and what Jesus’ life and teaching reveal 
about the relationship between these. I am especially interested in understanding 
what the character of love must be in order to make our fellowship or communion 
with God and others personal. I want to distinguish that form of love or caring that 
makes relationships personal from those forms, like benevolence or compassion, 
where the “concern for particular others” is impersonal.1 In particular I will explore 
the relationship between joy and personal knowing. It appears that joy – the 
longing to be with the other as that other – is a feature that makes love both 
personal and morally robust.2 I argue that the relational image of love in the New 
Testament narrative presents a conception of personal identity in which 
autonomy is found in and through intimate, personal relationships with God and 
others. This will enable me to address Becker's Concern that the autonomy 
necessary for mature moral agency and for the realization of one's unique
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personal identity is diminished by the influence of other persons. These aims are 
a part of a broader ethical one. This exploration also forms part of a response to 
the question - How should I live my life? And, as in all reflective enterprises, there 
is debate about what constitutes a proper method for approaching and answering 
such questions. This chapter, along with the two that follow it, seeks to make the 
case that directly engaging the New Testament narrative is acceptable, even 
desirable, for ethical discourse.   
 In Chapter One I argued that our questions about what constitutes the 
good life are neither distinctively philosophical nor theological, that is, they do not 
belong to one academic discipline to the exclusion of the rest. These questions 
are existential and personal. In asking how should I live I am asking what is 
worthy of staking my life on, that is, what is worth attending to and acting upon.3 
By caring about what I attentively and actively commit myself to I am caring 
about myself, or my existence, in particular ways. To care about what one should 
do and be in this world is to care about one's identity.4 l also argued that in order 
to orient ourselves in the world, that is, to gain moral insight into how we should 
live, we need to make room for engaging images that depict a vision of “what we 
might do and be.”5 Narrative imagery or depictions of the moral life are 
indispensable for moral discourse because such forms are capable of capturing 
                                                 
3
 This notion of “staking one's life on” will be developed more fully in the pages ahead. 
 
4
 Helm, “Love, Identification, and the Emotions”, p. 16. The question How should I live my life? is 
not merely an abstract or theoretical question that is looking for a satisfying intellectual solution. 
Unlike a math problem or other theoretical problem answering this question inescapably involves 
me and what I am willing, or not willing, to stake my life on in a manner that the others do not. 
 
5
 Martha Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge, p. 29.  
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moral insights in ways that abstract theoretical writing is not.6 Theoretical ethics, 
though important, is not adequate for articulating the good life in its fullness.7 
However, as I seek to develop a mode of discourse fitting for an exploration of 
personal knowing, the appropriateness and value of this effort is brought into 
question by another discipline. Some think that the experimental and explanatory 
forms of the modern scientific enterprise constitute a mode of discourse that 
makes other forms, like moral and religious discourse, substandard and 
irrelevant. 
 In this chapter I identify the limitations of the experimental sciences to 
address issues of ultimate concern such as the character of the good life or of 
life's meaning. I also argue that abductive, also called explanationist, approaches 
to gathering knowledge as employed by the sciences and other disciplines like 
philosophy yield a species of descriptive knowledge that fits into the theoretical 
category. It too faces important limitations. These limitations are identified in 
order to help define the scope of the sciences; they are not presented as an 
argument against the reliability of the sciences. I will examine Tolstoy's testimony 
that such knowledge cannot meet the existential demands he finds within 
himself. His testimony invites us to consider that we have a need for knowledge 
found within what Pascal identifies as the personal order. His life gives witness to 
a hunger for something more than explanatory knowledge. Many people want to 
know what, if anything, matters or has worth. This might be called orienting, or 
                                                 
6
 I will provide a detailed argument for this position in Chapter Four. 
 
7
 See Albert Borgmann Real American Ethics, pp. 25-30; and also Philip Hallie Tales of Good and 
Evil, Help and Harm, pp. 6; 85-86; including the foreword by John J. Compton.  
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existential, knowledge in contrast to explanatory knowledge. Tolstoy testifies to 
finding within himself the need for forgiveness coupled with a demand for moral 
perfection, the need for significance, and the need for personal fellowship. I 
argue that he is seeking a kind of knowledge that neither the empirical 
methodologies of the sciences nor abduction can provide. In addition, his 
testimony models the character of discourse that best fits these issues of ultimate 
concern. In the following section I will present the first of two important limitations 
that the sciences face. 
Science and the Problem of Significance 
 The eminent biologist E.O. Wilson writes, “The crux of the empiricist view 
is its emphasis on objective knowledge.”8 The implication here is that science, 
unlike other intellectual endeavors, provides us with real knowledge in contrast to 
speculation or mere opinion. The Nobel Prize winning physicist Steven Weinberg 
is described as scornful of those who think science is just one way among many 
of finding truth.9 Science is the path to truth. Some philosophers refer to this view 
as replacement scientism.10 Concerning the value of philosophy Weinberg 
remarks, “I know of no one who has participated actively in the advance of 
physics in the postwar period whose research has been significantly helped by 
the work of philosophers.”11 Given the cogency, or compelling character, of 
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 E.O. Wilson, “The Biological Basis of Morality,” p. 54. 
 
9
 Douglas O. Linder, “Steven Weinberg on Religion and Science,” p.1. Retrieved on Feb. 22, 
2009 from http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/weinberg.html. 
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 Paul K. Moser, Dwayne H. Mulder, and J.D. Trout, The Theory of Knowledge, pp. 29-32. 
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 Steven Weinberg, Dreams of a Final Theory, pp. 168-169. He writes, “The radical critics of 
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scientific demonstrations and explanations, one might wonder if there is room left 
for meaningful moral discourse.  
 Questions of ultimate significance or concern, like questions about what 
constitutes the good life or life's meaning, appear hopelessly contestable in ways 
that scientific ones do not. The discourse surrounding them is notable for its 
inability to compel consent. Albert Borgmann writes, “The final obstacle to proper 
moral discourse is the most difficult. When it comes to examination and 
explanation, science sets the standard.”12 The obstacle arises because the 
discourse we use to explore and evaluate scientific modes of explanation does 
not display the same degree of cogency as those scientific practices under 
scrutiny. If we judge moral or philosophic discourse by the standards of 
mathematics and the experimental sciences, which compel nearly universal 
assent, they appear weak in contrast.13 Given this it may appear either naïve or 
arrogant to explore and specify the limitations of scientific explanation. However, 
the picture of science presented by scientists like Wilson and Weinberg shields 
us from some important facts concerning scientific knowledge. The assent it's 
explanations compel is very specific – narrow in important ways - and fails to 
                                                                                                                                                 
science seem to be having little or no effect on the scientists themselves. I do not know of anyone 
who takes them seriously.” See p. 190. It is not a criticism of science – and surely not a radical 
one - to point out that science has some important limitations as I do in this chapter. Specifying 
these limitations does not discredit the scientific knowledge that we have. 
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 Albert Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life, p. 174. This book will 
be referred to as TCCL throughout the remainder of the chapter. 
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 Concerning deductive-nomological forms of scientific explanation Borgmann argues that the 
“assent that is exacted by scientific cogency is as narrow as the explanation.” This assent is 
“limited in scope because in general it cannot disclose to us how it gets underway, i.e., how its 
laws are discovered and how something emerges as worthy or in need of explanation.” See 
TCCL, p. 179. 
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address other features of our experience as humans that demand our attention.14 
This obstacle – the impression that all forms of discourse must match the 
characteristics and success of science - must be addressed in order to show 
where there is room for moral discourse. This leads us to the first limitation of 
scientific discourse. 
  One important characteristic, or limitation, of scientific discourse is that 
science cannot tell us what is worthy of explanation, that is, it cannot inform us of 
what it matters to know. Another way of putting this is: science cannot tell us 
what we should learn.  It assumes that the kind of knowledge that we need is 
explanatory and descriptive and that the important questions are ones that seek 
such explanations. The judgment that the kind of knowledge that the 
experimental sciences provide is the kind that we most need is not one that is 
reached by employing scientific methodologies. There is no scientific method that 
enables us to judge what phenomena are significant to explain or know.15 
Regarding this aspect of science Leo Tolstoy writes,  
Science has always been, and always will be, not the study of 
'everything', as today's scientists naively believe... for there is an 
incalculable number of objects subject to inquiry... but is merely a 
study of those things put forward by religion.16  
 
Something other than science must inform us of what is worthy of our attention. 
                                                 
14
 Concerning the empirical sciences Leo Tolstoy accurately observes that the more clear and 
precise the explanations they offer the less applicable that knowledge is to questions we raise 
about how we should live. See “A Confession” in A Confession and Other Writings, pp. 35-38. 
See also Chapter 6 “The Scope of Scientific Explanation” in Borgmann's TCCL, pp. 22-26. 
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 See Borgmann, TCCL, pp. 22-29; 68-70; and 179-181. I distinguish here between explaining 
and knowing because there are important kinds of knowing that are not explanatory in form. 
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 Tolstoy, A Confession and Other Religious Writings, from the essay “Religion and Morality”, p. 
138. 
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Given the common characterization of science and religion being natural 
enemies Tolstoy's remark provides an interesting twist on their relationship. He   
construes religion broadly to mean that which we judge worthy of devoting 
ourselves to. He argues that it is this fundamental orientation to the world that is 
provided by one's ultimate values that guides scientific and philosophic inquiry. 
These values are not given to us by science nor can they be established 
themselves through scientific methods. Tolstoy remarks that scientific 
investigation cannot tell us “what man should know and why.”17  Moreover, he 
states that “it is impossible in philosophy or science to use mental effort in order 
to determine the direction in which such efforts should be made, and yet all 
mental effort is inevitably performed according to a given direction.”18 Our 
reflective efforts are guided by what we think it is important to know yet those 
same efforts by themselves cannot establish what is important to know. This 
inability to inform us of what it is that is worthy to know or pursue knowing is the 
first limitation of scientific discourse that is important to identify. It is one Tolstoy 
applies broadly to include philosophy. 
 When someone judges that science provides us with the kind of 
knowledge we most need they are making a claim that has an important and 
ineliminable personal element in it. Regardless of the discipline, whether we are 
scientists or philosophers, the knowledge claims we make are based on choices 
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 Ibid., from the essay “What is Religion and of What Does Its Essence Consist?”, p. 108. 
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 Ibid., from the essay “Religion and Morality”, p. 138. The inevitability that Tolstoy draws 
attention to here is akin to the one John Cottingham describes in Chapter One as “the primacy of 
praxis.” 
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we have made concerning features of the world and ourselves that we consider 
significant either to explain or to know.19 Science involves personal judgments, or 
evaluations, about what is significant to know and what kind of knowledge it is 
significant to obtain. These judgments may be widely shared by the members of 
that discipline yet that consensus does not diminish that they are personal 
judgments made by individuals. The discipline itself is incapable of either making 
or establishing the accuracy of such judgments. This is to say that all of our 
modes of learning, including the practice of science, require personal judgments 
that are not affectively neutral. Science as a family of methodologies for gaining 
knowledge of the world cannot establish by those methodologies that scientific 
knowledge is the kind of knowledge that is really worth seeking. This is not a 
claim about the reliability or accuracy of scientific claims; it is merely a claim 
about the scope of science – science is unable to determine for us what it is 
important to know.20 This limitation conflicts with an important feature of the 
human condition. 
 It is a fundamental feature of the human condition that human beings are 
creatures that both want to, and do, stake their lives on something that they 
judge to be significant. Thus, the practice of science cannot escape several 
important interrelated personal elements. These elements include one's 
emotions, one's moral evaluations, and one's personal identity. Bennett Helm 
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 There are modes of knowing, or apprehending, reality that do not take the shape of an 
explanation. For example, when I want to get to know another person better, my wife for example, 
I am neither wanting a theoretical explanation about her nor mere facts about her. 
     
20
 Tolstoy argues that this question, along with important others, is beyond the scope of science. 
See A Confession and Other Religious Writings, pp. 35-40, 108-110, and 137-140. 
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writes, 
To be a person is, roughly, to be a creature with a capacity to care 
not merely about things or ends in the world but also about yourself 
and the motives for action that are truly your own. To care about 
yourself in this way is to put yourself at stake in your engagement 
with particular things, projects, ends, etc. - things that you thereby 
value... This is, in effect, to define the kind of life it is worth your 
living and so your identity as this particular person.21  
 
When we decide that some range of phenomena is worthy of explanation or that 
science is that approach to reality we must employ in order to discover significant 
truths, we are making a statement regarding what we value and think worthy of 
our care. This ability to evaluate what is worthy of staking our lives on along with 
the capacity to successfully stake ourselves on that which has been so judged is 
an important facet of our well-being. Concerning this Helm writes, 
The well-being of a particular person as such, therefore, is not 
merely a matter of her physical and psychological health; rather it 
crucially depends on her identity: on whether she has upheld the 
values constitutive of her identity and consequently on whether she 
has succeeded or failed to live the kind of live worth living for her.22 
 
When it comes to assessing what is significant to explain we discover that it is 
inextricably linked to issues of moral worth or value and existential issues, that is, 
issues of personal identity. This surfaces a problem that the sciences as such 
cannot resolve. 
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 Helm, “Love, Identification, and the Emotions,” p. 16; the italics are mine for the phrase “ to 
put...at stake” while the other words in italics are his. 
   
22
 Ibid. Helm argues that our well-being is dependent on the relation between our values, our 
emotions, and our identity. If we fail to live up to those values that form the core of our identity 
then our failure to live out this identity will result in the emotion of shame. To feel ashamed is to 
feel degraded for failing to live up to, or for trampling upon, one's values. See p. 17.  
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 Helm calls this problem the problem of import.23 He argues that persons 
are agents that do not mechanically pursue goals but that “they find certain goals 
to be worth pursuing and pursue them because they are worth pursuing.”24 
Human desire is distinguishable from mere goal-directedness in that to desire 
something is to find it worthwhile. He writes, “to desire something is not merely to 
be disposed to pursue it as an end; it rather involves the sense that this end is 
worthy of pursuit: that it has import.”25 The problem of import arises because our 
commonsense notion of desire presupposes import. We do not say something is 
worthy of pursuit because it is desirable. Helm rightly asks, “But if desire does not 
account for import, what does?”26 What accounts for worth? For some person or 
thing to have import for you it must be judged by you as worthy of your attention 
and action. This means that a consistent pattern of attending to this object of 
import and acting, or being prepared to act, on its behalf is required if it is to be 
intelligible that it has import to you. He describes this attentiveness as a kind of 
vigilance for what happens or might happen to the object of import. To care about 
one's health, for example, requires not only a vigilance for healthiness but also a 
preparedness to act so as to maintain it. Our finding something to have worth or 
import does not solve the problem. The problem, as Helm states it, is that “import 
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 See Helm's “Emotions as Evaluative Feelings,” pp. 4-8. 
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 Ibid., p. 4. 
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 Helm, “Emotional Reason – How to Deliberate About Value,” p. 9. Nussbaum, in her chapter 
“Emotions As Judgments of Value” in Upheavals of Thought, makes a similar argument about the 
character of emotion. She writes that “the intentional perceptions and the beliefs characteristic of 
the emotions… are concerned with value, they see their object as invested with value or 
importance.” See p. 30. 
  
26
 Helm, “Emotions as Evaluative Feelings,” p. 5.   
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as a kind of worth, does not seem to have a place in nature as conceived by 
science, which seems to have no place for worth.”27  
 Tolstoy may have voiced this problem most thoroughly, and perhaps most 
forcefully, in his essay A Confession. There he argues that science cannot 
demonstrate through scientific means that which we should stake our lives on, 
that is, science cannot inform us what is worthy of our attention and action. He 
states that  
…a person who sincerely asks how he ought to live cannot be 
satisfied with an answer advising him to study the infinite 
complexities and mutations of an infinite number of particles in the 
infinity of space and time.28  
 
Tolstoy wants to know what, if anything, he should stake his life on, that is, he 
desperately wants to know if there is a way “he ought to live.” He writes, “If a man 
lives, he must believe in something. If he did not believe that there was 
something he must live for he would not live.”29 He intimates that his identity is 
dependent on finding some something of worth to identify with. He feels within 
himself the demand to care for something worthwhile, the demand to invest his 
life in something of value, and being informed that the purpose of life is to study 
so as to come up with better explanations of material reality doesn't fit the shape 
of the demand that Tolstoy experiences within himself.  
 Tolstoy argues that when the experimental sciences advise him to study 
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 Ibid. 
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 Tolstoy, A Confession and Other Religious Writings, from the essay “A Confession”, p. 37; 
italics mine. 
 
29
 Ibid., p. 54. 
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the mutation of infinitely small particles and claim that “When you understand the 
laws of these mutations you will understand why you live” they completely miss 
the import of his question.30 In offering such responses scientific investigation 
evades “the essential question demanding an answer” that he finds 
inescapable.31 For him that question is: What is the meaning of my own life?32 
Sometime he phrases this as – What am I? Or, Who am I? Or, Why do I live (or 
exist)? Or, What must I do?33 To answer, as do the sciences, that “you are that 
which you call your life; you are a temporary, incidental accumulation of 
particles... a randomly united lump of something... [that] will disintegrate... 
together with all your questions” constitutes a failure to reply to the question.34 He 
says that this answer “not only fails to give it [his life] any meaning, but eliminates 
any possible meaning.”35 Meaning requires purposes and purposes require 
persons and persons and their purposes do not fit in a web of material causation 
and material phenomena. There is no room for meaning in the scientific picture of 
nature.36 Though he finds the experimental sciences “very interesting and 
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 Ibid., pp. 37 and 36. Tolstoy states the problem for the experimental sciences is that “the 
answer [they provide] does not relate to the question.” Though expert at assessing “the sequence 
of cause and effect in material phenomena” it turns into “nonsense” when it attempts to answer 
this question. See p. 38. 
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 Ibid., from the essay “What is Religion and of What Does its Essence Consist?”, p. 108. 
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 Ibid., from the essay “A Confession”, pp. 29-39. 
  
33
 Ibid., p. 36-38. 
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 Ibid., p. 39-40. He states that the sciences cannot answer otherwise than this if they adhere 
strictly to their principles. 
  
35
 Ibid. 
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 This appears to be the form of an implicit argument within Tolstoy's religious essays. To act 
60 
 
attractive” he observes that their “precision and clarity” is “inversely proportionate 
to their applicability to questions concerning life” - “the more they try to provide 
solutions to the questions of life, the more obscure and unattractive they 
become.”37  He states that he can “find no house” for himself, or his question, in 
the experimental sciences because “the clearer the knowledge was, the less I 
needed it, and the less it answered my question.”38 He concludes that when the 
experimental sciences seek to answer these questions they end up giving 
answers “beyond their scope.”39 
 In questioning the meaning of his own existence, as well as through his 
critique of science and philosophy, Tolstoy testifies to a hunger for something 
that is more than merely an explanation. Life's meaning is describable 
discursively – it can be talked about in propositions – yet that meaning is not 
capable of being experienced and known merely through an intellectual 
apprehension of a set of propositions that are true. This becomes clear as he 
argues that if certain views of reality are true, then human life is meaningless. A 
correct picture of reality is not adequate - by itself - to provide life with meaning; 
in fact, it may force us to conclude the opposite.40 In Chapter Five I will argue that 
                                                                                                                                                 
purposefully involves a form of agency or causation where an event is initiated by a being 
capable of doing so in order to bring about a particular purpose or end. In contrast, the sciences 
study material phenomena that are constituted by a form of causation where an event is caused 
by a series of physical events that preceded it – no purposeful action is necessary to initiate or 
cause any event in the natural world as science pictures it. 
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 Tolstoy, A Confession and Other Religious Writings, from the essay “A Confession”, p. 36. 
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 Ibid. p. 39. 
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 Ibid., p. 37. See also pp. 35-40 and pp. 137-140 in the essay “Religion and Morality”. 
 
40
 Ibid., p. 30 and pp. 34-41. 
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for Tolstoy the meaning of life is constituted by personally engaging a God who 
has sought to find him and love him and whom he must obey. Meaning is found 
in a particular kind of personal interaction with a personal reality. Though Tolstoy 
does not use Pascal's terminology we will see later in this chapter that his life 
gives witness to the division between what Pascal considers the personal order 
of the heart and the order of the intellect.  
 The explanatory approaches of the sciences are unable to identify what is 
worthwhile or significant to explain because this involves a prior decision about 
what constitutes the good life.41 For example, if we say scientific knowledge is 
significant because it allows us to prevent and cure disease, its significance is 
established relative to some other value. Here the value is the prevention and 
cure of disease. And if we ask why that end is valuable, there are different 
responses that could be given. One person might be motivated to cure disease 
as a way of loving others whereas another might be motivated by financial gain. 
The value of those ends cannot be provided through science. If we judge 
scientific knowledge of certain features of our world to be significant it must be 
done on grounds other than that which science provides and its value will be 
derivative from these other ends.42 Someone might agree that science is 
incapable of telling us what is significant to know or explain yet argue that the 
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 Tolstoy also makes an argument for this point in his essay “Religion and Morality.” See A 
Confession and Other Writings,” pp. 137-140. 
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 There is a gap between scientific explanation and moral insight. This is readily apparent in the 
field of medical technology. Our capacity to manipulate and control the material world, our bodies 
included, gives us no guidance for how or whether we should assert such control. Bioethics is rife 
with problems of insight where our technological knowledge outstrips our ability to explain with 
the same degree of cogency whether or not we should use that technology.  
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accumulation of scientific knowledge itself is significant. If this is so, science did 
not reveal this to us. Science may be able to explain the material character of the 
world but it lacks the resources to orient us morally, that is, existentially, in that 
world. It cannot tell us why it is important to accumulate such knowledge.43  
 Tolstoy is not a radical critic of science and scientific knowledge. He holds 
a deep respect for the experimental sciences. However, he makes two important 
observations about the sciences. One, they are guided by values that are 
themselves prescientific or religious. Two, they lack the resources to adequately 
address his deepest questions about life. In other words, there are questions that 
reach beyond their scope. He rejects as profoundly misguided the advice that he 
should study the material universe in order to answer his questions. He is 
emphatic that developing clearer and more precise descriptions of material reality 
will only take him farther away from the understanding he seeks. His identity as a 
person demands something more significant to attend to and act upon than the 
kind of descriptive or explanatory knowledge the sciences provide. It cannot 
inform him how he should live or of life's meaning. His testimony invites us to 
consider that finding something that one judges worthy to stake one's life on is an 
indispensable part of the good life. How we decide what is worthy to stake our life 
upon is not only a decision we cannot avoid but it is also one that requires 
something other than scientific modes of understanding and explanation. Thus, 
this limitation that Tolstoy helps to identify is one of scope and does not call into 
doubt the well grounded character of scientific claims that fall within the purview 
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 Tolstoy, A Confession and Other Writings, from the essay “A Confession”, pp. 30; 34-41, and 
the essay “What is Religion and of What Does its Essence Consist?”, 108-110. 
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of the sciences. This leads us to the next limitation of science that it is important 
to explore.  
Science and the Problem of Evidence 
 Another limitation of science is found in a common objection to views like 
Wilsons and Weinberg's. The view that science alone provides us with objective 
knowledge appears to be self-defeating, that is, it advocates doing what it says 
should not be done. Its claim that scientific explanations alone constitute 
knowledge is not itself a scientific claim established through scientific 
methodologies but a claim about science and about knowing. Science consists of 
those practices that aim to describe the organization and structure of the physical 
universe. It does not consist in making claims about the character of knowledge 
and knowing. When we step back from science to reflect about it and about what 
constitutes knowledge we are practicing philosophy. Moreover, if we ask which of 
the sciences are reliable and should regulate the theories we form to explain the 
evidence, this requires utilizing a standard that exists independently of the 
sciences.44 Thus, when considering the full range of our experience of the world 
the methods of science not only are unable to inform us of what is significant to 
know but also are unable to demonstrate how we should seek that knowledge. It 
is not a scientific claim to say that science is the only trustworthy way we can 
learn about ourselves and the world. The empirical methodologies of the 
sciences cannot tell us what constitutes evidence or when we should assent to 
the evidence we have. This illustrates that when it comes to deciding how it is 
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best to seek knowledge of our world, as with our decision regarding what is 
significant to know, we are not affectively neutral. We must decide what 
approaches fit the knowledge that we seek. Pascal argues that how we know will 
be determined in part by the character of that which we seek to know.45  
 To understand more clearly why the affective elements of emotion, desire, 
and volition play such a central role in human knowing it will prove helpful to 
continue the discussion, began in the first chapter, on the character of proof. In 
Chapter One it was shown that when we reach the foundational premises of a 
deductive argument, what I referred to as our starting points, we encounter a 
stopping point for argumentation. These premises are not conclusions that have 
been established by inferences from other premises. Argumentation cannot 
substantiate these premises. Experience is that which ultimately grounds these 
starting points and subsequently the conclusions based upon them. It is our 
experience of the world, and I mean this in the broadest possible sense, that 
provides us with evidence about the world. This includes our experience of 
ourselves and others. Another term for such experience is phenomenal reality. It 
is the knowledge we have of reality by acquaintance with it. This knowledge 
cannot serve as a premise because it is not propositional. And because it is not 
propositional we do not say of such phenomenal experience that it is true or 
false. Instead, experience is either veridical in that it matches the objective 
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 Pascal argues that different orders of reality call for different modes of response in order to 
know the members of that order. He argues that personal knowing is different in kind from the 
knowledge of material reality given by the sciences. For example, when I want to get to know a 
person better, like my daughter, I am neither wanting a theoretical explanation about her nor 
mere facts about her. Moreover, it would be out of place to employ the methods of science or 
mathematics in an effort to know her (though they could give me knowledge about her).   
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situation or it is non-veridical in that it does not. We can contrast ordinary 
perceptual experience with a hallucinatory experience to see the difference. In 
the former perception matches up with the objective situation and in the latter it 
does not. We then develop propositions to express the data provided by 
experience. One important implication of this that an argument is only as good as 
its starting points. It is at the start where we either get it right or get it wrong. 
Whatever is unloaded at the end of the tracks of a sound argument depends 
upon what was put on board at its starting point. 
 Our experience provides us with a wide array of features that can serve as 
evidence for our beliefs about the world. Some examples include: an awareness 
of actions as either morally right or morally wrong, the seeming reliability of 
perceptual experience, and the sense of being able to freely choose some of 
one's actions. Though our experience provides us with evidence for our beliefs 
we are faced with a problem. We must choose what we will count as evidence 
from the wide range of our experiences of ourselves and the world. The question 
about what constitutes evidence surfaces dramatically, as Tolstoy illustrates, as 
we seek answers to issues of ultimate concern. Questions about the meaning of 
one's own particular life and how one ought to live that life go beyond the scope 
of the sciences. If we cannot rely on scientific standards of evidence and inquiry 
what then do we rely on? To illustrate this difficulty I will compare how two 
different individuals, the biologist E.O. Wilson and C.S. Lewis, a scholar of 
Renaissance literature, handle the evidence that is presented to us in moral 
experience. Both think that our moral experience must be attended to and 
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explored because how we view it will determine how we live. However, each of 
these individuals chooses to respond to, or handle, their moral experience in 
decisively different ways. They illustrate how the inescapability of exercising 
personal judgment when it comes to issues of ultimate concern can lead to 
radically divergent accounts of what we take to be the “facts of experience”, that 
is, of what constitutes evidence for their beliefs. 
 Wilson and Lewis, as do most persons, recognize that our moral 
experience is worthy of our attention. Moral phenomena matter and are 
something we should seek to understand. In our daily lives we find ourselves in 
situations that present us with an awareness of moral strength and others with an 
awareness of moral frailty. For example, Tolstoy thinks it is a feature of the 
human condition to be aware of our responsibility for our own actions and to 
know that at times we have acted badly and could have acted better.46 What are 
we to make of such experiences? What are they awarenesses of? Lewis and 
Wilson offer strikingly different responses to these questions. Lewis aligns 
himself with the likes of Plato and Aristotle who thought that “our judgments of 
value were rational judgments... [and] that what they discovered was objective.”47 
Morality on this view is something that we discover, not create. In this sense our 
moral experience is something that at times can be veridical, that is, our 
experiences sometimes match, or are an awareness of, some moral reality that 
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really exists.48 E.O. Wilson, on the other hand, sees these experiences as 
“products of the brain and culture” that are “no more than principles of the social 
contract that have hardened into rules and dictates.”49 Our experience of 
morality, or moral sense, arose because it “contributed to survival and 
reproductive success.”50 These moral imperatives that guide how we should 
behave are “the translation not of human nature but of the public will” and may 
need to be rejected or refashioned in light of their biological and material basis.51 
Because morality is malleable in this way – it is shaped according to the 
consensus of society – the authority of morality resides within the human 
community.52 For Wilson, understanding the biological and material basis of 
morality is that which will provide human beings with the knowledge to “fashion a 
wise and enduring ethical consensus.”53 
 Both of these men are clear that we are faced with a decision regarding 
what to make of these experiences of moral value. Wilson says the choice 
between these competing views of morality “makes all the difference in the way 
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we view ourselves as a species” and that this choice “will be the coming century's 
version of the struggle for men's souls.”54 In a manner that highlights the 
difference Wilson refers to above, Lewis rather boldly states, “Either the maxims 
of traditional morality must be accepted as axioms of practical reason which 
neither admit nor require argument to support them... or else there are no values 
at all.”55 If moral values are merely socially or biologically conditioned feelings, 
argues Lewis, then we could be conditioned to feel otherwise and morality itself 
would change since it simply is such feelings. He thinks that to admit this is to 
admit that there are no moral values that exist as such, that is, that there is no 
transcultural standard that could evaluate the moral worth of an action or attitude. 
  It is important to note that Wilson's conclusion that empiricism is the only 
reliable source of objective knowledge has neither been reached through, nor 
substantiated by, an empirical method.56 He fails to recognize that he is choosing 
decisively to trust the experiences of his senses and give them primacy over his 
experience of moral values. But more than that - he infers that sense experience 
provides us with the only path to knowledge of reality. This is one of his chosen 
starting points. The evidence of his sense experience did not logically entail this 
inference. Moreover, if we should only take as objective knowledge that which 
can be demonstrated empirically, then we do not have objective knowledge that 
empiricism is the only path to knowledge because we lack the empirical evidence 
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to support such a claim. He could choose to trust as veridical the data gathered 
by his senses and those provided by his moral experience. Or he could restrict 
the scope of his claims and refrain from commenting on the status of moral 
experience. By claiming that the empirical methods of the biological sciences 
provide objective knowledge, with his explicit inference that our moral experience 
does not, he fails to make clear what establishes the trustworthiness of 
knowledge claims gathered through experimental methods from those arrived at 
by other means. By his own account his claims about what constitutes objective 
knowledge and morality are suspect and should be considered untrustworthy.  
 All beliefs rooted in knowledge by acquaintance face the same difficulty. 
The person faced with evidence provided by experience has to decide what to do 
with it. Lewis and Wilson's response to our moral experience illustrates this. The 
need to exercise personal judgment, that is, to make a decision regarding 
whether or not to take an experience as veridical, cannot be avoided because 
our experience of the world does not decide for us what constitutes evidence. 
Even if it seems to us that our moral experience is as real and reliable as our 
perceptual experience and that both can serve as evidence for our beliefs, we 
still will not be able to establish their reliability through an argument that others 
are logically obligated to accept. How then do we decide that an experience is 
veridical or that it is not? We apparently need a standard, or tool, that will enable 
us to correctly judge whether or not an experience is veridical. A trustworthy tool 
will enable us to avoid making arbitrary decisions about these experiences. For 
example, if we had the right tool we could decide whether Wilson was right about 
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our moral experience and Lewis wrong or vice versa. But, if we need a reliable 
tool, we also need to know whether an experience is veridical prior to using that 
tool in order to be able to gauge, or evaluate, that tool's accuracy. Montaigne 
states the difficulty this way, “We register the appearance of objects; to judge 
them we need an instrument of judgement; to test the veracity of that instrument 
we need practical proof; to test that proof we need an instrument.”57 Today we 
call this the problem of the criterion. As we try to resolve it, Montaigne says, we 
discover, “We are going round in circles.”58 Some consider this to be the most 
significant problem in philosophy. 
 One response to this difficulty is to argue that experience itself is decisive, 
that is, that there is self-intimating evidence that reports to us that it is to be 
considered rightfully as evidence. We don't need a criterion. This is akin to 
Pascal's position that there are just some things that we know. Recall his jibe at 
Descartes that “We know that we are not dreaming, but however unable we may 
be to prove it rationally, our inability proves nothing but the weakness of our 
reason, and not the uncertainty of all our knowledge.”59 However, the view that 
we have experiences of self-intimating evidence faces the same difficulty 
encountered by all beliefs that are rooted in knowledge by acquaintance. The 
person faced with an experience of evidence that is self-intimating still has to 
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decide what to do with it. Moreover, even if there are such experiences, there is 
no way to demonstrate the veridicality of such experiences to another. Someone 
could always respond by saying, “Yes, that appears to you to be that way but to 
me it does not.” The need to exercise personal judgment, that is, to make a 
decision regarding whether or not to take an experience as veridical, has not 
been removed. Even if it seems to us that our moral experience is as real and 
reliable as our perceptual experience and that both can serve as evidence for our 
beliefs, we still will not be able to establish their reliability through an argument 
that others are logically obligated to accept. We cannot provide an argument to 
conclusively demonstrate the reliability of our perceptual or moral experience 
without begging the question. What then can guide our choice between 
competing theories?  
  One way to evaluate our choices regarding what to consider as evidence 
and what to assent to as such involves asking questions about self-referential, or 
logical, consistency. Do the claims we make about reality based upon our 
experiences logically fit together and support each other or do they contradict 
one another? For example, if one claims that there is no moral reality that binds 
people to certain attitudes and actions and then argues that there are certain 
behaviors that everyone is morally obligated to follow, then those claims would 
be logically inconsistent. One cannot deny morality in one breath and then 
prescribe moral behavior in the next. Wilson does something of this sort. After 
explaining that our experiences of good and evil are merely instincts that are 
either ratified or rejected by social consensus and hence subject to change he 
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ends his essay with the remark: “However the process plays out [i.e., the 
competition between the two views of morality], it demands open discussion and 
unwavering intellectual rigor in an atmosphere of mutual respect.”60  
 What is the character of this demand Wilson appeals to? Is this a moral 
realm that we can apprehend and to which we must conform? Or, are we 
obligated to rigorously seek the truth and to do that in a mutually respectful way 
because the majority of the people in our society, or in that of our ancestors', 
have decided that is the right thing to do? This is problematic because 
throughout history the will of the consensus has ratified activities like slavery, 
apartheid, and genocide. What if our society or that of our ancestor's was wrong? 
It is possible to state that morality is nothing more than the will of the consensus 
yet find oneself regularly embracing the attitude that there are certain things that 
are right or wrong regardless of that consensus. Either Wilson is appealing to our 
ability to see, along with him, the goodness of open discussion and mutual 
respect or he's aligning himself with a consensus about these things that we too 
should align ourselves with. And though many of us would affirm the goodness of 
open discussion and mutual respect it is not at all clear that we should do so 
because these values have been established by consensus. However, it is 
important to note here that Wilson's apparent inconsistency does not establish 
Lewis' view as correct. And, even if a position of moral realism like Lewis' is 
correct, we are still faced with the difficulty of ascertaining which moral 
experiences are veridical given the existence of conflicting claims.   
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 Another way of approaching the evidence provided by experience is to 
examine it in terms of trying to find what provides the best explanation of a broad 
range of facts. It seems likely that Wilson is employing this approach in the way 
he handles moral experience. He takes what he considers to be the best 
explanation, which for him is some form of materialism, and seeks to explain our 
moral experience in terms of that broader explanation. Lewis may embrace the 
position that his moral experience is veridical because it helps him to make the 
best sense out of other features of his experience like his awareness of personal 
agency, of the interpersonal character of joy, of his aspirations to love and be 
loved, our intellectual capacity for rational insight, and the testimony of trusted 
others on these matters. This explanationist approach will be considered in detail 
below. On the other hand, Lewis may take the Pascalian position that there are 
some things we just intuitively know to be the case like the veridicality of certain 
moral experiences and personal agency. In either case, as Lewis recognizes, the 
conclusion that our moral experience is veridical cannot be established 
deductively or by the experimental methods of the sciences. 
Broad Explanationism and Its Limits 
 A common form of explanation that the sciences regularly employ to gain 
knowledge about the natural world is what is called an inference to the best 
available explanation. This practice of seeking explanations that give the best 
available account of a particular range of human experiences or natural 
phenomena appears to be quite common and quite fruitful. C.S. Pierce calls it 
abduction. Pascal employs abduction in his Pensees. In that work he describes 
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features of the human condition that he thinks are evident upon observation or 
reflection and then seeks to show how the Judeo-Christian narrative offers the 
best available explanation of those features. The fictional detective Sherlock 
Holmes, along with his real world counterparts, employs abduction when he 
seeks an explanation that makes the best sense of all the clues he has collected 
about a crime. Similarly, Darwin's theory of evolution is his effort to make the best 
sense of all of the facts he gathered from his extensive observations of the 
natural world.  
 The sciences regularly employ abduction to infer the existence of some 
unobservable entity, force, or process like atoms, gravity, and evolution. Since 
these phenomena are not directly observable does this mean we can have no 
knowledge of them? The biologist Kenneth Miller, like many scientists and 
philosophers, answers no. He argues that scientific knowledge about phenomena 
that we cannot observe directly or test through experimental methods occurs 
through a process that is “so ordinary that most of us take it for granted.”61              
Like Sherlock Holmes he knows that a “police detective would scoff at the notion 
that crimes can be solved only when they are witnessed directly.”62 He argues 
that through the many crimes that are solved each day we demonstrate that we 
have an ability to learn about features of our world that we do not directly 
observe “by applying good, old-fashioned detective work to the clues that have 
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been left behind.”63 Scientific theories of these kinds of phenomena may not 
meet the condition of being “absolutely certain” yet they are considered 
knowledge claims because they provide the best available explanation of the 
evidence at hand.64 When it comes to scientific knowledge Miller is clear that not 
just any story will do, but only that story that provides the best available 
explanation of the phenomena. To understand more clearly why we have 
confidence that such inferential processes provide knowledge we need to look 
more closely at abduction and the more general model of knowing called broad 
explanationism in which it is subsumed.  
 One of our goals as knowers is to have the best explanation of the full 
range of our experience of the world. Robert Nozick, as we saw earlier, maintains 
that the original impulse for engaging in philosophical reflection is not about 
“trying to get someone to believe something whether he wants to believe it or 
not…” but “…puzzlement, curiosity, a desire to understand….”65 The goal of 
philosophy is “explanation rather than proof” and this goal is morally superior, 
Nozick thinks, because “… it is more in accord with one’s philosophical 
motivation.”66 Nozick, like Wilson, helps point out that when we seek knowledge, 
whether we are a doctor, detective, philosopher or scientist, one of the primary 
things that we want is to make the best sense of the full range of our experience. 
Given that this form of explanation is so widely employed to meet our 
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epistemological goals, that is, given that it does not exclusively belong to the 
sciences, I will rely on the work of several philosophers to provide an account of 
it.67 This account of abduction will then provide the basis from which to reveal 
some of the limitations of explanatory knowledge when it comes to other goals 
we have as knowers. Prior to starting that it is important to note that I think this 
epistemological goal is reflective of more fundamental personal and existential 
goals. Our desire for truth is rooted in our care for our identity. I agree with Helm 
when he argues that we care about who we are and thus about how we decide 
what it is that we should find worthy of attending to and acting upon.68 We do not 
want to slavishly assent to the views of others or fall prey to what might be our 
own wishful thinking. Moreover, at our best we desire to be appropriately honest 
with others. Our identity has a built in need for, or dependence on, truth.  
  Though science regularly employs abduction, our desire for good 
explanations is not dependent on a commitment to any particular branch of the 
sciences. The commitment to abduction is rooted in more general intellectual 
values. Nozick, in his comments above, points to understanding as one of these 
more general or primary values. Abduction is also valued as a central method of 
gathering knowledge of the world, that is, as a means of meeting the 
fundamental goal of acquiring informative truths and avoiding falsehoods.69 
Another fundamental goal, that Nozick and Miller allude to above, is the desire 
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“to maximize the explanatory value of our belief system with regard to the world 
and our place in it.”70 Whether it is the experimental methods of the laboratory or 
the abductive process that leads to knowledge of phenomena that are not directly 
observable, Miller argues that science is guided by the more general value of 
finding theories that better, or more adequately, explain the evidence.71 Broad 
explanationism is the name philosophers give to the view that our fundamental 
explanatory goals should guide how we regulate our beliefs.72   
 One of the primary difficulties of, or limitations to, this process of inference 
to the best available explanation is that what is determined to be the best 
explanation of some range of phenomena or evidence can vary between 
persons. We can come up with many different stories to explain the same range 
of evidence. As Miller argues not just “any story” will do otherwise we would not 
be able to answer the charge that our explanations are merely “pure 
speculation.”73 Moser, Mulder, and Trout point out that in order to avoid such an 
“anything goes” approach to abduction “we must find some way rationally to 
constrain what counts as an explanation and what counts as a better explanation 
than some other explanation.”74  One difficulty here, which was raised also in the 
first chapter, is that when we begin to seek understanding we discover that we 
are already “epistemologically midstream,” that is, each of us is living our own life 
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in a way that already embodies certain assumptions about who we are, how we 
should live, and how we can have knowledge. And these commitments are able 
to orient “one's entire quest for knowledge” in a certain direction.75 Dostoevsky 
draws attention to this issue in a discussion about miracles. He states: 
...in my opinion miracles will never confound a realist [i.e., a 
naturalist]. It is not miracles that bring a realist to faith. A true 
realist, if he is a not a believer, will always find in himself the  
strength and ability not to believe in miracles as well, and if a 
miracle stands before him as an irrefutable fact, he will sooner 
doubt his own senses than admit the fact. And even if he does 
admit it, he will admit it as a fact of nature that was previously 
unknown to him.76 
 
We don't have to agree fully with Dostoevsky to recognize the difficulty he 
identifies. How do we determine whether our present explanatory commitments 
occlude our ability to apprehend phenomena accurately? For example, if reality is 
ultimately personal, the naturalist may fail to seek for evidence of that reality that 
is available upon the seeking of it.77 This difficulty about explanatory knowledge 
is one that the argument between Lewis and Wilson also illustrates.    
  Wilson would agree with John Searle that modern scientific theorizing is 
guided by a “bottom-up” conception of physical explanation where we explain the 
“surface features of a phenomenon” like the liquidity of water “in terms of the 
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behaviour of microparticles such as molecules.”78 This view of material reality is 
embraced because it provides the best available explanation of the evidence. 
However, it is regularly elevated to a central explanatory hypothesis used not 
only to explain features of the physical world but also of ourselves. Searle points 
out that if we adopt this broad explanatory framework, what I referred to earlier 
as replacement scientism, there is no room for personal agency, or freedom, as 
this would require some type of “self” capable of moving these “molecules in 
directions that they were not otherwise going to move.”79 In light of his 
commitment to a bottom-up explanatory approach he argues that our experience 
of freedom is not veridical; it is merely an “illusion” that we are “unable to give up” 
because material processes have built into the very structure of human behavior 
a sense of voluntary action.80 Thus, our understanding of morality will also be 
reconceived if we adopt this explanatory approach. Rather than being the result 
of an empirical methodology Wilson's conception of morality is the result of 
interpreting moral experience in light of his commitment to a bottom-up ontology.   
 According to Wilson our moral sense exists because it contributes 
positively to our survival and reproductive success. The moral imperatives that 
we experience have a biological and material basis and are nothing more than 
the expression of a social consensus. Along these lines the biologist William 
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Provine writes:  
Modern science directly implies that there are no inherent moral or 
ethical laws, no absolute guiding principles for human society... 
There is no way that the evolutionary process as currently 
conceived can produce a being that is truly free to make moral 
choices.81 
  
It is not clear that science directly implies that there are no moral laws. However, 
given a commitment to a naturalistic explanatory framework Provine, like Searle, 
recognizes that physical causation leaves no room for personal agency. John 
Bishop frames the difficulty succinctly, he writes, “From the natural perspective, 
all events have the status of happenings, and the problem is that the ethical 
perspective requires some events that are doings.”82 A human organism as a 
complex pattern of physical events is caused by a complex pattern of physical 
events that preceded its present arrangement and will itself issue forward in time 
as other physical events.83 These events are “happenings” in that there is no 
personal agent that initiates, or causes, a series of physical events to occur or 
that is capable of exercising control over the direction of any physical 
phenomena at its most basic level. Personal agency requires a being capable of 
exerting top-down control and there is no room for such a being in a causal 
network that only functions from the bottom-up. 
 Working within a bottom-up explanatory framework it can be argued that 
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our moral sense, like our sense of freedom, is just another illusion that we are 
unable to give up. In its denial of personal agency and morality Lewis, Tolstoy, 
Macmurray and others maintain that the explanatory mechanisms of physics do 
not provide the best available explanation of the full range of our experience as 
persons. This explanatory account of the full range of our experience transforms 
critical pieces of it into something less than it is. Personal agency is no longer a 
fundamental fact of one's experience but something that can be reduced to 
physical causality. This helps illustrate one difficulty with abduction. What one 
person judges to be the fundamental facts of experience can differ from what 
another person judges. The acceptance of one set of facts can act as a control 
on interpreting another set of “facts”. Given that our fundamental explanatory 
commitments play such a significant role in orienting our search for knowledge is 
there some way to rationally decide which of two competing explanations 
provides a better explanation than the other? 
 Some scientists, like Wilson and Provine, would agree with John Searle 
that the success of the sciences demonstrates that the bottom-up conception of 
physical explanation holds the key to understanding the full range of our 
experience of the world and of ourselves. All of reality that is knowable to us is 
constituted by this ontological structure. Thus, the sciences have a monopoly on 
what constitutes legitimate theoretical explanations.84  This view was represented 
earlier by physicist Steven Weinberg who claims science is the path to truth. 
Philosophers call it replacement scientism. It is the position that traditional 
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philosophic concerns about what constitutes knowledge or objective truth should 
be replaced by the methodologies and doctrines of the natural sciences. Its 
proponents maintain that one cannot make legitimate claims either prior to, or 
independently of, the sciences. On this account Wilson's explanation of the full 
range of evidence doesn't compete with, but replaces, Lewis' explanation.  
Earlier I stated that this approach appears to be self-defeating. Its claim that 
scientific explanations alone constitute knowledge is not itself a scientific claim 
but a claim about science. Moreover, if we ask which of the sciences are reliable 
and should regulate the theories we form to explain the evidence, this requires 
utilizing a standard that exists independently of the sciences.85 Moser, Mulder, 
and Trout argue that a basic concern for explanatory power and explanatory 
coherence, relative to the full range of evidence, provides the standard by which 
an explanation is evaluated.86 This standard is not dependent on a commitment 
to any particular branch of the sciences but is rooted in more general values such 
as the desire for understanding. 
Significant Truths and Explanatory Power 
 When faced with competing explanations, like Wilsons and Lewis', is there 
some way to rationally constrain which explanation counts as a better 
explanation than the other? One approach is to require that such broad 
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explanations lead us to significant truths.87 Significant truths are ones that 
provide better descriptions of the way things and people work. They provide 
greater explanatory power. Thus, some knowledge is “obviously more important 
than other knowledge” because it possesses this power and because of “its 
connection to other pieces of knowledge, its utility, and the insight into the world 
that it affords.”88 It is this basic concern for explanatory power and coherence, 
and not whether a claim is scientific or not, that should regulate which 
explanations that we consider best. As stated earlier this position is known as 
broad explanationism. In order to evaluate how much help this constraint 
provides in guiding us to the better of two competing explanations we need to 
look at an important question. 
 What makes a truth significant? The answer provided by Moser, Mulder 
and Trout is that a truth is considered significant relative to the attainment of 
some other more fundamental goal. They argue that explanatory truths are 
significant at a practical level because they give us the ability to predict and 
control our environment for the sake of survival and prosperity.89 And they 
suggest that an even more fundamental value is the intellectual value of 
understanding.90 Understanding is constituted by explanatory knowledge that 
gives more accurate and comprehensive descriptions of ourselves and our 
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environment. Thus, a truth is significant if it increases our understanding by 
providing us with a greater ability to explain the full range of our experience. A 
detective does this when he provides an explanation that reveals to us the 
relationship between various pieces of evidence that otherwise might remain 
unintelligible. Insight, on this account, is the intellectual capacity to see how the 
pieces of a puzzle fit together. The issue before us is whether this conception of 
significance will help us find a way to choose between competing explanations. 
And, importantly, does it provide those with competing explanatory frameworks a 
neutral vantage point that they can employ to determine which of the competing 
explanations makes the best sense of the evidence? Individually we may 
recognize our need and desire for explanations that provide the best available 
account of the full range of our experience, but can this approach be employed in 
dialog with others to disclose to all participants that one explanation is more 
reasonable to hold than another?  
 When it comes to broad explanations that seek to account for the full 
range of human experience we discover that deciding which explanation is best 
depends upon the evidence in question that needs to be explained. If we do not 
agree about what experiences are veridical, as is the situation between Wilson 
and Lewis, we cannot resolve the disagreement at the explanatory level by 
advocating theory selection based upon the standard of explanatory power. In 
other words, there is no method that will conclusively demonstrate which of these 
explanations makes the best sense of the phenomena because there are 
fundamental disagreements about the phenomena that need to be explained. 
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There is no affectively neutral explanatory power, that is, the power an 
explanation holds for a person will depend on judgments she has made about 
what constitutes evidence. At an individual level we may be guided by the goal of 
maximum explanatory power but we cannot resolve a dispute between those 
who have different accounts of the evidence in need of explanation by appealing 
to that. When we disagree about what needs to be explained then our focus will 
need to return to the phenomena in question; our discourse will not take place at 
the level of explanatory power.91 Before turning to the character of that discourse 
a few more things need to be explored regarding this conception of significance.    
 This conception of significance returns us to the issue we explored with 
Tolstoy at the beginning of this chapter. If we want significant truths, what can 
help us to identify what truths are significant? Our desire for truths that are more 
than trivial might lead us to judge that truths that give us greater explanatory 
power are themselves not trivial.92 However, this is problematic. The standard of 
explanatory power does not enable us to identify all that is significant to know. It 
assumes that the knowledge we need, and the insight associated with it, is 
explanatory in character. The full range of my experience as a human is great. 
There are things of incredible significance that I know by acquaintance that are 
not explanatory in character nor would an explanation of them come to hold more 
epistemological value than knowing those things themselves. The ones that 
come readily to mind are persons. I want to continue to know these persons and 
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to know them more intimately. This is not to deny the value of explanatory 
knowledge but to affirm that one can judge that knowing a person is more 
significant than knowing an explanation. In contrast, appealing to the standard of 
explanatory power as a general value that establishes what constitutes 
significance may obscure this need to exercise personal judgment and lend this 
approach a more objective air.93 As my section earlier on Tolstoy revealed 
neither the sciences nor philosophy can determine for an individual person what 
constitutes such significance. Tolstoy thinks that intellectually apprehending 
accurate explanations of material reality cannot inform us of what we should 
know and as such lacks the ability to address his most pressing personal 
questions. The question of significance is more personal - what do we decide is 
worthwhile to know?94 
 Tolstoy's point is that science and philosophy cannot reveal to us what we 
should focus our attention on but are methods of inquiry that are already oriented 
by evaluations that we have made about what matters. He reports that some 
things command his attention more than others and it is these he wants to 
understand. Tolstoy identifies several such features of his awareness that 
asserted themselves and forbade his escape. One is the “tormenting awareness” 
of his own moral failure.95 He reports that he willingly chose courses of action 
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with the awareness in place, at those moments of choosing, that he should not 
take them. He argues that our inquiry is focused by these kinds of things – the 
things that we find significant. He would say that these issues of significance are 
not the result of mere curiosity but are a response to the inner demand to 
understand how we should orient ourselves in the world. We are looking for 
something beyond the best explanation of the facts, though we should want a 
view that does provide that, we are looking for insight into how we should live. 
Thus, explanatory power is valuable relative to phenomena a person wants 
explained; the explanation derives whatever significance it has from the 
significance those phenomena hold for that person.96 Moreover, given our desire 
to know how we should orient ourselves in the world it is the case that the 
understanding we desire goes beyond theoretical explanations.  
 One might argue that greater explanatory power is an intrinsic value given 
that more accurate and comprehensive descriptions of some facet of reality are 
intellectually superior to ones that are less so. However, though it may be the 
case that one description has greater explanatory power relative to another that 
does not establish that greater explanatory power as such is significant. An 
important question remains - Why is it significant to have better or more powerful 
explanations? Answering this hinges on who we are as persons - as knowers – 
and what we value. And, interestingly, as persons we want to know what we 
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should value? To ask questions about the value of explanatory power, or of the 
other more fundamental values from which it derives its value, is to ask questions 
that have to do with morality and meaning. And as Tolstoy rightly saw theoretical 
explanations lack the power to give us insight into how we should live our lives. 
The kind of understanding the sciences and speculative philosophy provide is 
incomplete. It leaves our deepest questions unanswered.97 With this in mind we 
need to return to the relationship between how we decide what constitutes a 
better explanation and how we view ourselves as persons. 
  Moser, Mulder, and Trout maintain that how we settle this issue of what 
counts as a better explanation will bear on “our entire understanding of ourselves 
as knowers.”98 I would add that it goes beyond this. It also bears upon how we 
conceive of ourselves as persons. How we answer this bears on our identity or 
self-conception. If this is so, we can ask - What conception of ourselves fits with 
the manner of determining what counts as a better explanation by appealing to 
an explanation's ability to provide significant truths? This approach leads to a 
conception of the knowing person as inherently an explainer.99 Descriptive 
knowledge is the knowledge that something is the case, whereas explanatory 
knowledge is knowledge why something is the case. Explanation is a type of 
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descriptive knowledge in that it supplies additional descriptive information that 
answers a previously unanswered why question.100 Human knowers on this 
account “are primarily theorizers rather than simple fact-gatherers.”101 The 
understanding we seek is constituted by the kind of explanatory knowledge that 
allows us to understand our environment and ourselves, not merely predict and 
control it. It aims to satisfy our desire to know why things are the way they are. 
Without diminishing the value of theoretical knowledge, that is, the power of an 
explanation to make intelligible the relationships between a range of phenomena, 
we must still ask if the understanding we seek always takes the shape of such 
knowledge. It may be the case that our desire for understanding is a desire for 
moral or existential insight - we care about ourselves and we want to know if 
there is anything worth staking our life on, that is, we want to know if there is 
anything of such value in the world that we should attend to it and act upon it. 
Explanatory knowledge, as Tolstoy and Helm argued, cannot inform us of what is 
worthwhile to know. In order to explore this portrayal of a human knower we can 
contrast it further with an account of personal knowing that fits with Pascal's 
orders of reality. Before turning to that let me conclude this section with a 
summary of what has been covered so far.  
Explanationist Limitations and Ethical Discourse 
  Broad explanationism is the name philosophers give to the view that our 
fundamental explanatory goals should guide how we regulate our beliefs. Not 
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only should we be guided by the fundamental goal of acquiring truths and 
avoiding falsehoods we are interested in those truths that are significant or 
informative. Significant truths are ones that that possess greater explanatory 
power and coherence relative to the full range of evidence than other truths. In 
addition broad explanationism is also a form of discourse, that is, it constitutes a 
way for one person to rationally commend their viewpoint to another or to 
evaluate that other's view. Broad explanationism is faced with several important 
limitations.  First, it cannot tell us what features of the world or of ourselves are 
worthy of explanation; it cannot identify for us what is significant to know. When 
we disagree about what needs to be explained then our focus will need to return 
to the phenomena that move us to seek understanding and how it is that we are 
moved. Thus, our discourse will not take place at the level of explanatory power.  
This will be explored further in the following section. Second, it cannot tell us 
which explanation to choose when competing explanations for the same 
phenomena are presented. Third, as Wilsons and Lewis' reflections on morality 
illustrate we may agree on the phenomena that need explanation and yet 
disagree about the evidential character of those phenomena. In other words, 
when it comes to broad explanatory frameworks there are no volitionally neutral 
knowledge claims. This is especially important to acknowledge when it comes to 
issues of ultimate concern. Thus, explanationism is constrained by the necessity 
of personal judgment.  
 Given these limitations philosophical discussion must take the form of an 
invitation. We cannot always resolve disagreements at the explanatory level by 
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advocating theory selection based upon the standard of explanatory power. In 
other words, there is no method that will conclusively demonstrate which 
explanation makes the best sense of the phenomena because there are 
fundamental disagreements about the phenomena that need to be explained. As 
we have seen we already have broad explanatory commitments that orient our 
pursuit of knowledge. There is no affectively neutral explanatory power, that is, 
the power an explanation holds for a person will depend on judgments necessary 
at various stages in the explanatory process. For example, one of the first 
judgments to be made is about what experiences are veridical and constitute 
evidence. We may be guided by the goal of maximum explanatory power but we 
cannot resolve disputes between persons who hold different broad explanatory 
frameworks merely by appealing to that. The character of our discourse must 
shift to take these limitations into consideration. Exploring issues of ultimate 
concern with others requires giving witness to that concern – pointing others to 
some reality beyond one's explanations and inviting others to consider that 
reality.102 
 This chapter began as an effort to identify a proper method, or mode of 
discourse, for exploring moral and personal knowledge as well as to identify a 
space where such discourse could occur. In particular, it is part of an effort to 
provide justification for direct engagement with a religious text, the New 
Testament narrative, as a part of this discourse. This latter concern, the need for 
space, arises because of the standard for examination and explanation that is set 
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by the sciences. Some argue that science is the path to knowledge and that 
other efforts at securing knowledge are not merely substandard but irrelevant. I 
argued that this account shields us from some important facts concerning 
scientific knowledge which makes other forms of knowing appear unnecessarily 
weak. One of these is that science cannot tell us what matters; it cannot tell us 
what we should know. By itself science fails to orient us in the world. It cannot 
even make the case that we should seek knowledge. Another is that science 
cannot tell us how we should know. I also looked at how abduction, or inference 
to the best available explanation, as a central method of gathering knowledge 
employed by the sciences and other disciplines cannot tell us what it is significant 
to know nor provide a neutral method for selecting between competing 
explanations. Moreover, giving primacy to explanatory knowledge of this sort 
yields a narrow view of the human knower as primarily an explainer or theorizer. 
This conception fails to encompass other more fundamental goals we may have 
as knowers. Like Tolstoy many people want to know what matters or has worth, if 
anything, including theoretical knowledge. We want what might be called 
orienting, or existential, knowledge. We want to know if there is anything worth 
staking our lives on. We also want personal knowledge. Neither the empirical 
methodologies of the sciences nor abduction can provide us with this kind of 
knowledge. 
Pascal's Orders of Reality Considered   
 The evaluation of the limits of scientific discourse, including those of 
abduction, provides an opportunity to consider Pascal's distinctions about the 
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orders of reality. In order to make sense of the knowledge we do have in spite of 
reason's limitations, that is, in spite of our inability to demonstrate the soundness 
of our starting points, Pascal speaks of three separate orders, or levels, of reality 
- the heart, the intellect, and the body.103 Each order has its own kind of 
knowledge and its own characteristic path to that knowledge. His account of 
these orders provides a framework for distinguishing how the knowledge that 
comes through love differs from other kinds of knowledge. His highest order - the 
order of the heart - is marked by charity, or agape, which he believed is the kind 
of self-giving love that is essential to God’s nature and work in the world. For 
Pascal, the heart transcends the intellect, just as the intellect transcends the 
body. Human excellence in one order does not guarantee excellence in another. 
One may be great in physical exploits – the order of the body - yet lack 
intellectual acumen and greatness with the eyes of the mind does not entail that 
one loves greatly.  
 One effort to highlight the differences between these orders is found in 
Pensees no. 23: “Knowledge of physical science will not console me for 
ignorance of morality in times of affliction, but knowledge of morality will always 
console me for ignorance of physical science.” Pascal recognizes that our 
deepest sufferings are not allayed by a general knowledge that is merely 
apprehended by the intellect. There are areas of our lives where facts by 
themselves, that is, mere information, cannot provide the good that we need. For 
example, we can readily find instances where medical knowledge has alleviated 
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the physical suffering of an elderly person, yet not touched the deeper suffering 
that comes from their being abandoned in an empty room. Such suffering may 
only find relief in the assurance that someone desires to be with them. The 
hospice movement in its efforts to provide wholistic care seeks to address this 
need. H.R. Mackintosh implicitly acknowledges these different orders and the 
moral character of the personal order when he observes that in  
...a good many branches of knowledge... mathematics, chemistry, 
astronomy, and theology... a bad man might do first-rate work. He 
might score success quite irrespectively of the life he was living... 
[a] drunkard might do brilliantly in physics; a profligate in history...  
[these are] a kind of knowledge, in short, which may be gained 
altogether independently of the man's deepest moral purpose... but 
consider how the situation changes instantly when we are dealing 
with persons and endeavouring to know them as friends.104   
 
There are activities we must engage in and character traits we must develop if 
we are to know others intimately. These differ from the methods used to secure 
knowledge in the order of the intellect. Though Pascal doesn't use the 
terminology of personal knowledge this concept clearly fits in his order of the 
heart. Further evidence of this is found in his thoughts on knowing God.  
 Pascal identifies the distinctiveness of this knowledge of the heart in his 
reflections on knowing God though he fails to fully develop it. He argues that 
failing to find God through intellectual means should not hinder us from seeking 
God, because God is capable of being perceived with the heart.105 By talking 
about the heart he is not advocating irrationalism, but seeking to describe how 
                                                 
104
 H.R. Mackintosh, Sermons, p. 115.  
 
105
 See Pascal's Pensees nos. 380, 381, 382, and 427 for Pascal’s conception of the heart. 
 
95 
 
knowing persons differs from knowing about things. Different orders of reality call 
for different modes of response in order to know the members of that order. One 
of the simplest ways to distinguish between these orders is to draw attention to 
the fact that there are modes of knowing, or apprehending, reality that do not 
take the shape of an explanation. For example, we don't seek to know persons in 
the same way we seek to know nature. Knowing a person requires something 
other than the application of an experimental method or an inference to the best 
available explanation. To explain a person or have a theory about her is not the 
same as to know that person. The methods that result in explanations may give 
us knowledge about that particular person but not knowledge of her. Knowing 
another in a personal manner requires a mode of engagement with that person 
fitting of their reality as persons. There are no avenues to this kind of knowledge 
through intellectual methodologies. To seek to know her the way we seek to 
know things is to confuse these two orders.106 
 Though reason is not adequate to give us personal knowledge of God or 
other persons, any more than it can alleviate loneliness, Pascal argues that it still 
plays an important regulative role of the beliefs we hold. This is evident in his 
claim that: “If we offend the principles of reason our religion will be absurd and 
ridiculous...” which he balances with the additional claim that if we rely solely on 
what reason can discover our approach to God will be inadequate - “Two 
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excesses: to exclude reason, to admit nothing but reason.”107 For Pascal the 
personal order transcends, but cannot transgress, the intellectual order.  
 The methods of the experimental sciences can at most give us knowledge 
about a person or persons but not knowledge of that person or persons. 
Regarding this distinction Abraham Heschel writes, “Having an idea of friendship 
is not the same as having a friend or living with a friend, and the story of a 
friendship cannot be fully told by what one friend thinks of the being and 
attributes of the other friend.”108 In order to know a person as that particular 
person, Heschel writes, “…one must feel him, one must become aware of him 
emotionally.”109 The manner in which we apprehend persons, which have an 
interior that we can enter only as it is made available to us by them, differs from 
the manner in which we apprehend things. Pascal seeks to make room for 
acknowledging and exploring this with his conception of the orders of reality. 
 John Macmurray, like Pascal, distinguishes between these orders and 
seeks to show the relationship between the two. He argues that theoretical 
knowledge possesses instrumental value as it helps to promote and secure the 
conditions necessary for individuals to know others, including God, personally. 
He writes, “All meaningful knowledge is for the sake of action; all meaningful 
action is for the sake of friendship.”110 Regarding the character of that kind of 
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knowing that exists between those who love one another in a manner that is 
personal Macmurray writes,  
When you love anyone you want above all things to be aware of 
him, more and more completely... not because you want to make 
use of him but simply because this is the natural and only way of 
taking delight in his existence for his sake... You feel that it is good 
that it should be in the world... You want to know it, to know it better 
and better, and you want other people to do the same. In fact, you 
are appreciating and enjoying it for itself, and that is all you want.111  
 
This form of caring leads to, and constitutes, knowing another in a manner that is 
personal or intimate.112 As I've noted it is a mode of apprehension that differs 
sharply from a theoretical or explanatory mode. On Macmurray's account the 
conception of the human as knower is not primarily that of a reflective theorizer 
or explainer but as a friend – a person capable of knowing other persons through 
loving engagement or action. Macmurray shows how this form of knowing is 
motivated by a desire to encounter that person as himself and the knower finds 
satisfaction in that person that is known. Knowing here is not motivated by 
intellectual curiosity and the desire to find an explanation that solves a 
challenging and intriguing puzzle. It is grounded in a form of love in which taking 
joy in the one that is known – that is, in wanting to enjoy the presence of the 
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other as that particular other - is an essential component. Miall Edwards also 
emphasizes the importance of these affective elements in knowing another 
personally; he writes that, “…the intimate knowledge which friends have one of 
another is not the result of a process of reasoning or scientific research, but is 
based on mutual confidence and affection gained through practical experience 
and insight.”113 This type of knowing between persons, being dependent on the 
capacities of each to both give and receive love, is difficult to achieve and 
sustain. As Emmanuel Mounier writes such knowing may be “rarer than 
happiness” and “more fragile than beauty.”114    
 If we acknowledge the limitations of explanation for the personal order, 
while recognizing that whatever phenomena described at that order might 
transcend but cannot logically contradict the order of intellect beneath it, we can 
ask: What manner of discourse can be made at the level, from within it, of the 
personal order? Given the limitations of the intellectual order it may appear that 
we are left bereft of tools to discuss and evaluate claims about the good life. If 
not, where do we turn to find this orientation and how do we discuss it? In 
Chapter One I argued that we can begin by acknowledging that there is room to 
engage images that depict a vision of what we might do and be in order to gain 
moral insight into how we should live. In order to answer the question - How 
should I live my life? - Nussbaum writes that we search “for images of what we 
                                                 
113
 Miall Edwards, Philosophy of Religion, p. 210 as cited in Mackintosh's The Christian 
Apprehension of God, pp. 62-63. Mackintosh himself writes, “…the sympathetic and trustful 
insight which is a prerequisite of getting in touch with a person is not at all the same thing as 
intellectual perception.” See p. 58. 
   
114
 Emmanuel Mounier, Personalism, p. 24.   
99 
 
might do and be” and as we search we “look for a fit between a view and what is 
deepest in human lives.”115 In doing that we can also acknowledge that we are 
already committed in practice to some vision, inchoate though it might be, of the 
good life. We have already made decisions about what to stake our lives on, that 
is, decisions about what is worthy of attending to and acting upon, and thus we 
can give witness to what has moved us. Borgmann argues that when our 
discourse centers around a matter of ultimate concern, like the good life, we 
engage others “by inviting them” to consider and examine for themselves that 
which has moved us.116 In doing this we also speak not only of our own 
experiences and aspirations but invite our readers or listeners to search their 
own.117 It is a non-coercive form of discourse. However, it remains contestable 
because it points to some feature of reality, one believed to address those 
aspirations, that is publicly accessible.118  
Conclusion 
 Tolstoy's religious writings embody a model of discourse that can be 
called modest explanationism. It is modest in that it emphasizes the important 
role of personal judgment in the epistemological enterprise. When it comes to 
differences between persons concerning issues of ultimate concern, such as 
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ascertaining the character of the good life or of life's meaning, he recognizes that 
we cannot demonstrate to another person which account is better than another 
merely by appealing to a theoretical framework's explanatory power. This is so 
for several reasons. First, people may differ on the phenomena that they deem 
worthy of explanation. Second, if they agree on the phenomena worthy of 
explanation they may disagree about the veridicality of those phenomena. Third, 
even if they agree on the importance of the phenomena and their veridicality they 
may disagree about which explanation of that phenomena is best. However, 
there is still a role for explanatory power. An individual should assess the 
rationality of their own view on the basis of its ability to best explain the 
phenomena that that person judges to be the most significant to explain.   
 It is apparent that Tolstoy employs abduction, albeit in an implicit and 
modest manner, as he seeks to respond adequately to the phenomenon that is 
his own life. Within himself he experiences a question concerning his identity that 
demands an answer. He ultimately rejects the efforts of the sciences to answer 
this question because the explanatory commitments of the sciences leave them 
intrinsically unable to apprehend its character. In essence they judge the most 
assertive phenomena he experiences – the existence of his very self and the 
demand within himself for meaning – as a physical process or the product of a 
physical process, that is, as a feature of a thing, and not a person. As we will see 
even more clearly in Chapter Five the sciences, according to Tolstoy, leave no 
room for his aspirations for personal communion, significance, and moral 
goodness but rather explain them away. Ultimately, he judges these phenomena 
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as personal and cannot accept a view that holds no room for them as such. We 
will see that his question about his own life's meaning is not one directed at 
finding an explanation of how he came into existence or the material constitution 
of his being. Instead, he is looking for an answer that, if it is to be had, must take 
the form of an address. It is something that must be given by a Person. The 
significance he longs for is to be significant for Somebody.119 Though he does not 
use this terminology it is clear that he is looking for a kind of personal knowing. 
That is why he critiques the responses scientists give to his question as failures 
to understand its import.    
 Tolstoy is not primarily searching for an explanation. He is seeking to find 
that which will satisfy his hunger for personal communion, significance, and 
moral goodness. However, it appears that he thinks, at least implicitly, that the 
reality that is capable of addressing these is also that which would be able to 
provide their best account. It seems more accurate to say that he gives witness 
to a reality that he judges as one that fits, rather than explains, what he 
experiences to be deepest in his life.120 This reality affirms the centrality of these 
phenomena as he himself experiences them; it appeals to his aspirations. And in 
doing so it does also provide the best explanation of the phenomena that he 
deems most important. However, it would be misleading to emphasize that 
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theoretical goal as his primary concern because it makes it appear like he is 
merely looking for a conceptual solution to an intellectual puzzle. It must provide 
the best explanation – he is not interested in merely wishful thinking - but he finds 
within himself a demand for a kind of knowing that goes beyond explanatory 
descriptions. I argue that his writing gives evidence that he is longing for a kind of 
knowing that comes in a personal encounter.  
 Discourse about issues of ultimate concern does lack the cogency of 
scientific discourse, however that discourse cannot be replaced by scientific 
discourse. The broad explanatory framework of the sciences cannot tell us what 
is significant to know. Ethical discourse centers on things we should care or be 
concerned about and science cannot tell us what, if anything, matters. It is 
unable to inform us of what is worth pursuing as the world conceived by it has no 
room for worth. Moreover, deciding what constitutes the good life is an 
emotionally evaluative process. It is one that engages us affectively. We must 
decide what is worthy of our fullest care and concern. These decisions are not 
made from a stance of affective neutrality. In the following two chapters I will 
explore the emotional character of reason and how narrative imagery or 
depictions of the moral life are indispensable for moral discourse. Narrative 
accounts of the good life are capable of depicting qualities that speak to our 
aspirations in a manner that theoretical accounts cannot. These two chapters will 
provide further justification for directly engaging the New Testament narrative.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESPONSIVE RECEPTIVITY: 
  
THE EMOTIONAL CHARACTER OF REASON1 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I argued that theoretical reason, as an inferential 
process, cannot inform us of what it is important to know. I identified this as the 
Problem of Significance or the Problem of Import. In this chapter I argue that 
reason is inescapably emotional because emotion is that which stands directly 
behind personal activity and determines the substance and direction of our 
actions. The impulse to act in accord with reality, that is, to be responsive to 
reality, is our impulse to rationality. It is an objective impulse. It is regularly 
overwhelmed by subjective impulses. For example, our anxiety and fear of pain 
often lead us to fabricate and embrace self-consoling fantasies, which in turn 
urge us to force reality to serve interests of our own that can be considered 
selfish. This struggle between the impulse to act in terms of the world and the 
impulse to favor self without regard to reality is one that is centered in emotion. 
This is not a struggle between reason and emotion, but rather one where one
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from the person than colour, form and scent can be separated from a flower. We may abstract 
them in thought, but to forget that we have abstracted and to deal with them as independent is 
fatal relative to any true solution.” See p. 116 and pp. 31, 59-60, and 113-117. 
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emotional stance or attitude is affirmed over another. If apprehending the world 
involves learning how to act in terms of the world, that is, if it requires exercising 
fidelity to reality, then what shape does that responsiveness take when the reality 
we are seeking to know is another person or persons? Given my focus on what 
constitutes personal knowing this is an important question. 
 In this chapter I take a modest step in furthering the case that our identity 
is ultimately personal, that is, that we are not fully who we are apart from being in 
relationships with others that are personal. If we start with the idea that our 
identity is ultimately that of an isolated individual who when fully autonomous has 
no need for other persons, God or human, then we will never be able to conceive 
of dependence on, or need for, others in terms other than enslavement or 
diminishment. The concern that our autonomy tends to be diminished by the 
influence of others is at the center of Ernest Becker's concern which I presented 
in Chapter One. In contrast I argue that relationships with others that are 
personal (i.e., ones that are marked by a certain kind of caring and receiving of 
care) are integral to our autonomy and that it is in and through such relationships 
that we can be autonomous. I begin to explore the conditions necessary for 
autonomy through an analysis of reason and emotion and the relationship 
between them. The conclusions of this chapter make room for engaging the New 
Testament narrative in Chapter Five.  
Ethical Reflection and Personal Identity 
 As we saw with Tolstoy asking the question How should I live? is one of 
the most demanding questions a person can possibly face. It is a question of 
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great import that presses itself upon ordinary people from all backgrounds. As I 
argued in Chapter One this is a broad, inclusive, and human question that 
“presupposes no specific demarcation of the terrain of human life” nor does it fit 
neatly or securely into one single academic discipline to the exclusion of the 
rest.2 When I first felt this question press upon me I had the sense that in asking 
it I was asking what is worthy of staking my life on. It has since become apparent 
to me that by caring about what I stake my life on I am caring about myself, or my 
existence, in particular ways. To care about what one should do and be in this 
world is to care about one's identity. Tolstoy's testimony, which was examined in 
Chapter Two, invites us to consider that finding something that one judges 
worthy to stake one's life on is an indispensable part of the good life. And it is 
possible, as Tolstoy feared, that there might not be anything to devote oneself to 
that meets the demands that one finds within one's self. This possibility, as it 
seemed true to Tolstoy, evoked his deepest despair. Caring for our identity also 
involves caring about the reasons we have for deciding what is worthy to stake 
ourselves on. We want to reverence that which is worthy to be reverenced. We 
do not want to slavishly assent to the views of others or fall prey to what might be 
our own wishful thinking. Caring for the truth is an outgrowth of the desire for 
honesty, that is, the desire to be an honest person. This includes being honest 
with ourselves. 
 We have already staked our life on something that we take constitutes the 
                                                 
2
 Martha Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge, p. 25.  
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good life.3 Ernest Becker's question, that we looked at in Chapter One, can be 
profitably re-engaged at this point. Becker wants to know how we each can 
become the person who we truly are, or possibly are meant to be, if that involves 
some kind of dependency on someone or something beside oneself.  He states 
that the “only real problem of life” is our need to “win a degree of self-realization 
without surrender to complete spiritlessness or slavery.”4 Framing the question in 
terms of its vital ultimacy he asks, “How does one lean on God and give over 
everything to Him and still stand on his own feet as a passionate human being?”5 
In its broad contours this is a question about autonomy, authority, and personal 
identity and their interrelationships. It can be posed more broadly: Given the 
multitude of things we could care about and choose to stake our lives on, is there 
anything we can stake our lives on that will enhance and not diminish our identity 
as persons? Becker realizes that the answer to this question has a profound 
bearing on a person’s existence – nothing less than one’s identity is at stake – 
and the concern that is behind it is reflective of that and is not merely theoretical.  
 My effort in this chapter is directed at showing that the character of reason 
employed in addressing the question How should I live? is inescapably 
emotional. Deciding what is worthy of staking one's life on is an evaluative effort 
that requires emotion. The first section will seek to show that our efforts to 
                                                 
3
 Albert Borgmann, in TCCL, writes, “The question of the good life... cannot be left open. What 
remains open is not whether but how we will answer it.” See p. 178 and also pp. 86-88, 92, 171, 
and 173 in TCCL. 
 
4
 Ernest Becker, The Denial of Death, p. 82. 
  
5
 Ibid., p. 259. The urgency of his concern is evident in his remark that this is no mere “rhetorical 
question” but a “real one” that goes right to the heart of the problem of “how to be a man.” 
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apprehend reality are rooted in love. Knowing some things as they are in 
themselves, especially persons, requires a commitment to caring for them as the 
particular things that they are and not merely for how they can be used by me. In 
addition, our concern for truth or understanding is rooted in our care for our 
identity. In the second section I will seek to show that emotions are evaluative 
feelings. As such they are constituted by cognitive content and are not merely 
passive sensations or feelings. A person's emotions can serve as an “optical 
instrument” through which she becomes aware of the character of her own moral 
convictions.6 The final section will explore the relationships between the 
emotional commitment necessary to apprehend reality, the character of 
autonomy involved, and personal identity. It is possible that what we judge as 
worthy to stake our lives on, that which we take as authoritative, may diminish 
our identity as Becker worried.    
  I will argue that our identity cannot be adequately based on just anything 
that matters to us. We need to identify ourselves with that which will enhance the 
personal character of our existence. Assuming we are personal we can reframe 
Becker's question to ask:  What are the characteristics of, and conditions for, that 
kind of autonomy necessary to live a life that is personal, that is, to engage in 
relationships that are characterized by personal forms of caring? In addition, it is 
important to ask: Is there room for the requisite kind of autonomy if personal 
knowledge of another person requires some form of fidelity to that other as a 
reality that exists independently of us? Answering these questions is an 
                                                 
6
 See Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge, pp. 46-47 for the role of literature in this process. 
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important part of my argument that the autonomy necessary for the realization of 
one’s identity is found in and through intimate, personal relationships with God 
and others. Our identity is ultimately personal, that is, we are not fully who we are 
apart from being in relationships with others that are personal.  
Emotional Reason 
 Reason is directed by an evaluative perspective that is significantly 
emotional, that is, it is guided by what an agent deems to have import. It is the 
capacity to act in terms of the way things are, that is, to behave in terms of the 
nature of the object. John Macmurray argues that reason is “the capacity to 
behave consciously in terms of the nature of what is not ourselves”, that is, in 
terms of our knowledge of the nature of the world outside or of the true nature of 
a situation.7 It is the capacity to behave objectively, that is, the ability to allow our 
beliefs, feelings, and desires “to be fashioned by things outside us” in contrast to 
allowing these things to be fashioned by the vagaries of our subjective 
constitution or impulses.8 Similarly Daniel Day Williams writes that the reasoning 
person wants “to see what things are and how they go together,” that is, they 
want “to grasp reality” and this requires “allowing the object of knowledge ‘to be 
itself.’”9 Iris Murdoch also writes of reasoning as a “task” of coming “to see the 
world as it is.”10 I will take this view of reason as my starting point and argue that 
                                                 
7
 John Macmurray, Reason and Emotion, pp. 20-21; 26; and 29.  
 
8
 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
 
9
 Daniel Day Williams, The Spirit and the Forms of Love, pp. 284; 289. 
 
10
 Iris Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics, “The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concepts”, p. 
375.  
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it is rooted in an emotional or desiderative attitude that can be described, at least 
partly, as a “wanting to do justice” to reality.11 
 Our struggle to apprehend the world as it is and to act in terms of it, that 
is, the difficulty we face in exercising fidelity to reality, is often characterized as a 
struggle between reason and emotion. The common view is that reason and 
emotion are forces at odds with one another and “must be kept sternly apart” in 
order for our decisions to be rational.12 Irrational actions are taken to be the result 
of our emotions winning out over our reason. In contrast I will argue that 
emotions play an important role in the evaluative process of one’s practical 
ethical decision making. Regarding this Macmurray writes, “reason is primarily an 
affair of emotion” because emotion is that which “stands directly behind activity” 
and determines the “substance and direction” of our actions.13 Deciding on 
issues of import, that is, deciding what is worthy of attending to and acting upon, 
requires more than what can be provided through an inferential process. 
Theoretical rationality by itself, as we saw in Chapter Two, cannot tell us what 
matters. It is for reasons like the ones presented in that chapter that Macmurray 
concludes that “the real struggle” between our impulse to act in terms of the 
world and the impulse to act in favor of ourselves without regard to the world is 
one that “centres in the emotional field.”14 
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 David Ford and Daniel Hardy, Praising and Knowing God, p. 1. 
 
12
 Macmurray, Reason and Emotion, p. 16. 
 
13
 Ibid., p. 26 
 
14
 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
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Many thinkers point out the struggle we face in laying ourselves open to 
reality in order to know it.15 If we attend to our engagement with the world we 
readily find examples of this struggle. Mounier observed that the world of others 
“…is a perpetual provocation to self-diminishment or aggrandisement.”16 Our 
efforts to enter into, and maintain, meaningful relationships with others is often 
hampered by our readiness to present distortions of ourselves to others in order 
to gain their acceptance. This can also hold for our engagement with non-
personal reality. We can experience the world around us as “something alien” 
that possesses an “authoritative structure” that confronts us and that we “cannot 
take over, swallow up, deny or make unreal.”17 However, this does not mean that 
we stop trying to dominate or escape these structures. Murdoch points to the 
task of learning a language as an activity that progressively reveals reality as 
possessing a structure that exists independently of her. However, there are those 
who consider that same structure, the structure of grammar, as an illegitimate 
tyranny.18 Albert Borgmann writes of this pull to “rise above” or “escape” the 
claims or demands of the world, what he calls the “the regimen of reality,” and 
attributes it to our perception of these structures as “rigid and authoritarian.”19 
                                                 
15
 John Oman, Honest Religion, p. 1. Oman writes that, “In every sphere the failure is less in 
discovering little, than in not finding the attitude of mind and interest and service which could have 
discovered more.” 
 
16
 Emmanuel Mounier, Personalism, p. 18. 
  
17
 Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics, “The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concepts”, p. 373. 
 
18
 See W. Ross Winterowd’s The Contemporary Writer as quoted in Wendell Berry’s Standing By 
Words, pp. 26-27.  
 
19
 Albert Borgmann, Holding On to Reality: The Nature of Information at the Turn of the 
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These thinkers, along with Becker and others we will look at, express the 
common concern that conforming to a reality that is not of our own making will 
diminish our personal identity. 
 Macmurray attributes this struggle to apprehend and act in terms of the 
nature of the world to a conflict within ourselves. The human condition is marked 
by contrary impulses. The impulse to act in accord with reality, that is, to be 
responsive to reality, he calls our objective impulse. This is the impulse to 
rationality. It is regularly overwhelmed by other impulses that he calls subjective. 
Macmurray writes that overcoming this bias in our own favor is “rarely pleasant” 
or “flattering.”20 Our subjective impulses invite us to make ourselves “the central 
figure in the picture” and to believe that in various moral situations “life should 
make an exception in our favor.”21 In other words, our fear of diminishment may 
lead us to respond to others or the world in a manner that not only distorts our 
character but also the character of others and the world. Concerning these 
subjective impulses Iris Murdoch writes that our anxiety and fear of pain often 
lead us to fabricate and embrace self-consoling fantasies or illusions that act as a 
“falsifying veil which partially conceals the world.”22 This activity is reflective of 
what she calls our natural selfishness. This selfishness is characterized as an 
                                                                                                                                                 
Millennium, pp. 12-13; 23. 
  
20
 John Macmurray, Reason and Emotion, pp. 22-23. 
 
21
 Ibid. 
 
22
 Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics, “The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concepts”, pp. 364 
and 369. For an account of how we can embrace and nurture an emotion that can falsify our 
experience of the world see Max Scheler's Ressentiment.  
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effort to find consolation through fictions that inflate the self.23 Subjective 
impulses invite us to orient ourselves toward the world in a way to use it to serve 
the selfish interests of the self. Engaging reality in a way that enables us to think 
and act in terms of it, on the other hand, requires a pattern of activity that 
elevates the objective impulse and diminishes or appropriately restrains the 
subjective ones. Affirming the rational impulse requires the ability, or power, to 
conform ourselves to the character of the world.24 This internal conflict, or rift 
within the self, is often mischaracterized as a struggle between reason and 
emotion. This difficulty of learning how to act in terms of the world and the 
necessity of emotion for being appropriately responsive to it is one of the central 
themes in Wendell Berry’s work.    
Berry, a farmer and author, is someone who regularly and perceptively 
writes about this responsive attitude. Nearing 80 years of age he has much to 
say from his daily engagement with the concrete “claims of reality” he has 
encountered on his Kentucky farm. Typical of his thought, Berry writes, “If one 
wishes to farm well… then one must submit to the unending effort to change 
one’s mind and ways to fit one’s farm. This is a hard education, which lasts all 
one’s life, never to be completed….”25 To farm well requires that a farmer be 
                                                 
23
 Ibid., pp. 364-365. She writes that she cannot demonstrate through an argument that humans 
are selfish but instead that she assumes it as a starting point. 
  
24
 W.F. Halliday in Reconciliation and Reality similarly distinguishes between these impulses. We 
can exercise “supreme interest” in truth and let it “make its appeal to us,” that is, we can “let 
Reality speak to us” and to “respond to its appeal”, or we can respond to “selfish passion,” that is, 
our “irrational impulses,” and content ourselves with “pleasant self-delusion.” See pp. 114-117. 
 
25
 Wendell Berry, The Way of Ignorance, p. 46. 
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open to the particular character of his farm and respectfully adapt or conform his 
practices to it in order to promote its well-being. The farmer must “accept the 
place as an influence.”26 Fidelity is one of the terms that Berry uses for this 
enduring commitment to an affectionate, intelligent, and disciplined 
responsiveness. He writes, 
Most farms…are made up of different kinds of soil patterns... Good 
farmers have always known this and have used the land 
accordingly; they have been careful students of the natural 
vegetation, soil depth and structure, slope and drainage. They are 
not appliers of generalizations, theoretical or methodological or 
mechanical. Nor are they the active agents of their own economic 
will, working  their way upon an inert and passive mass. They are 
responsive partners in an intimate and mutual relationship.27  
 
Berry describes this relationship between the farmer and the land as a “sort of 
dance in which the partners are always at opposite sexual poles, and the lead 
keeps changing.”28 This responsivity should not be mistaken for some form of 
passivity. The farmer acts upon the farm and in turn allows himself to be acted 
upon by the farm. By carefully observing and attending to his farm over many 
seasons he learns how to protect and nurture the health of his soil. The soil in 
turn yields its crop. He must discover and cooperate with the integrity of the 
natural cycles that sustain it as a community of living beings. To keep this dance 
going the farmer must avoid damaging the land by imposing patterns of activity 
                                                 
26
 Ibid., p. 48. 
 
27
 Berry, The Unsettling of America, p. 87; italics mine. 
  
28
 Ibid., p. 8. For example, in one season the farmer acts as planter of seed and the soil as that 
which receives it and in a subsequent season the farmer is a recipient as the soil, through its 
crop, sheds the seed. Michael Pollan’s chapters on the grass farmer in The Omnivore’s Dilemma 
provide an excellent account of this complex relationship. 
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that are alien to those cycles. In this he practices an intelligent and disciplined 
responsiveness to the character of his particular farm.  
 Berry writes that the serious farmer maintains this “practical respect” for 
the “distinct individuality of their place and the neighborhood of creatures that 
lives there” as the “true discipline” of farming and its “most insistent and 
formidable concern.”29 Good farming is “particularizing work” where you “can’t 
deal with things merely according to category” but are required to consider “the 
uniqueness of a place or situation.”30 Fidelity is a practical outworking of an 
emotional investment – a glad respect or love – for the farm as a community.31 It 
requires being responsive to the limits and possibilities of a particular place. 
These limits are inescapable. He writes, “our acts are being measured by a real 
and unyielding standard that was invented by no human…” and that those 
actions which “are not in harmony with nature are inevitably and sometimes 
irremediably destructive.”32 If we use Macmurray’s terms we would say the good 
farmer diligently seeks to understand, be “fashioned by”, and “act in terms of”, 
the claims of reality on his particular farm. The confluence of Berry’s thought with 
Macmurray’s gives us a picture of rationality as a complex activity in exercising 
fidelity to reality.   
   Regarding our dependency on the earth Berry writes, “There is, in 
practice, no such thing as autonomy. Practically, there is only a distinction 
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 Berry, The Way of Ignorance, p. 45. 
     
30
 Ibid., pp. 48-49. See also Berry’s Sex, Economy, Freedom & Community, pp. 35-38. 
 
31
 Berry, The Art of the Commonplace, “The Whole Horse”, esp. pp. 240-241. 
   
32
 Ibid., p. 238. 
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between responsible and irresponsible dependence.”33 One of the fundamental 
features of our existence as living creatures is our dependence on good soil, 
clean water, and clean air. These things are necessary for the production of 
healthy food upon which our existence daily depends. In the simplest acts of 
eating and drinking we enact these dependencies every day. Though most of us 
are not involved in food production we each are faced with a choice of whether or 
not to buy food that has been produced responsibly. Berry argues that it is our 
desire to rise above these dependencies - particularly the significant demands 
they place upon us if we are to act responsibly - that lead us to embrace 
illusions.34 He writes that, “we have an inordinate desire to be superior… to our 
condition. We wish to rise above the sweat and bother of taking care of 
anything…” and to be free of “the obligations of stewardship.”35 When we act on 
this desire we impose our subjective impulses on reality.  
  It is interesting how when fidelity is eschewed, that is, when the 
responsibility of learning how to act in terms of the world is neglected, that such 
escapist behavior is considered free. Berry would agree with Iris Murdoch that 
what is often called autonomy is often nothing more than the “self-assertive 
movements of deluded selfish will.”36 Autonomy is often characterized as an 
                                                 
33
 Berry, The Unsettling of America, p. 111. 
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 We may also choose to avoid these demands through willful ignorance; we can choose not to 
know whether our food was produced responsibly or not. Those of us who are not willfully 
ignorant may still choose to perpetuate harmful forms of agriculture that produce food less 
expensively because we desire to retain our money for things that we consider more valuable. 
 
35
 Berry, The Hidden Wound, pp. 112-113. 
 
36
 Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics, “The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concepts”, p. 382. 
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absolute freedom that is incompatible with any moral obligation; an unfettered 
individualism.37 She writes, “Freedom… is not an inconsequential chucking of 
one’s weight about, it is the disciplined overcoming of self.”38 It is likely that 
Murdoch would agree with Berry when he says, “the ability to tender an 
appropriate practical regard and respect to each place in its difference is a kind 
of freedom; the inability to do so is a kind of tyranny.”39 This ability, he maintains, 
is rooted in, or constitutes a form of, love. It is not merely the application of 
“knowledge that involves affection” but is “a kind of knowledge that comes from 
or with affection” and that is not available to the unaffectionate.40 In its exercise it 
is a form of caring that involves a commitment to the identity and integrity of a 
particular place as a whole and not merely “to the powers and quantities to which 
it can be reduced” for the benefit of one's personal economic interests.41 Love is 
an integral part of fidelity to reality for “When one works beyond the reach of 
one's love for the place one is working in and for the things and creatures one is 
                                                 
37
 Borgmann observes that the freedom “we proudly or defiantly flaunt” is a morally unbounded, 
unconditional self-determination that is typically “…restricted to… the inconsequential area of 
consumption.” Moreover, our actions are deemed private and are guided by an “absolute freedom 
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  Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics, “The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concepts”, p. 378. 
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the freedom to love as God loves and this love includes love for our enemies. 
 
39
 Berry, The Art of the Commonplace, “The Whole Horse,” p. 243. 
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 Berry, Sex, Economy, Freedom, and Community, p. 24. 
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 Berry, The Art of the Commonplace, “The Whole Horse,” pp. 238-241. 
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working with and among, then destruction inevitably results.”42 Berry describes 
this love in terms of affection in order to emphasize its emotional character. It is 
not merely an instrumental concern that is given in order to secure some other 
desired end. Regarding the role of emotion in fidelity he writes,   
Our politics and science have never mastered the fact that people 
need more than to understand their obligation to one another and 
the earth; they need also the feeling of such obligation...  A nation 
of urban nomads, such as we have become, may simply be unable 
to be enough disturbed by its destruction of the ecological health of 
the land, because the people’s dependence on the land, though it 
has been expounded to them over and over again in general terms, 
is not immediate to their feelings.43   
 
Berry's work helps illustrate how a sense of import – an emotional sense that 
something is worth attending to and acting upon – is needed to be appropriately 
responsive to the world. 
 It is commonly believed that that reason and emotion are forces that are 
always at odds with one another and that they must be kept apart in order for our 
decisions to be rational. Berry’s work intimates that that the difficulty we face in 
exercising fidelity to reality, that is, that our struggle to apprehend the world as it 
is and to act in terms of it, cannot be rightly characterized merely as a struggle 
between reason and emotion. Emotion, on his view, plays an important positive 
role in fostering an ability to act in fitting ways with others and the world. Both 
Macmurray and Murdoch think similarly. As we have seen, Macmurray writes that 
“reason is primarily an affair of emotion” because emotion is that which “stands 
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directly behind activity” and determines the “substance and direction” of our 
actions.44 Thus, “the real struggle” between our impulse to act in terms of the 
world and the impulse to act in favor of ourselves without regard to the world is 
one that “centres in the emotional field.”45 Being rational involves cultivating and 
affirming one emotional impulse over another.46 Macmurray uses an example of 
loving another person to support his point. I can enjoy him and “feel his existence 
and his reality to be important in themselves” or I can enjoy him merely for “the 
pleasurable emotions which he stimulates in me.”47 Enjoying him – taking joy in 
that other as that other - constitutes loving him objectively, whereas using him 
primarily as an instrument to bring me pleasure (with little or no concern for him 
as that particular other) is at best a selfish form of self-love. He argues that it is 
this capacity to love objectively that “is the core of rationality” because it is this 
love that is “the ultimate source of our capacity to behave in terms of the 
object.”48 Berry calls this responsive love fidelity. Given her similar view of 
rationality it should be no surprise that Murdoch also reaches this conclusion. 
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 Macmurray, Reason and Emotion, p. 26. 
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 Why choose the rational impulse over the subjective one? We care about our identity as 
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She argues that in order to apprehend reality as it is we must “surrender 
ourselves to its authority with a love that is unpossessive and unselfish.”49    
 The neurologist Antonio Damasio, in light of evaluating some of the most 
recent neurological research, also argues for the positive role of emotion for 
practical reasoning. He remarks that the “widely held view” that reason and 
emotion do “not mix any more than oil and water” is not the complete view.50 
Emotion does wreak havoc in the processes of reasoning in certain 
circumstances. However, research indicates “that the absence of emotion and 
feeling is no less damaging, no less capable of compromising the rationality that 
makes us distinctively human.”51 Damasio presents evidence from brain-injured 
subjects that indicate that the rational decision making processes we rely upon 
for practical matters regarding our personal lives, including ethical ones, require 
an ability to experience emotion.  
 There are specific types of brain injuries that leave an individual’s capacity 
for abstract, theoretical rationality unimpaired though that individual’s capacity for 
emotion is absent or severely reduced. Individuals with these injuries are capable 
of reaching logically sound conclusions by employing rational thought processes, 
as evidenced through extensive cognitive testing, yet their ability to exercise 
reason in the practical, decision making circumstances related to their personal 
                                                 
49
 Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics, “The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concepts”, p. 372. 
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and social well-being was severely impaired.52 Typical of those with certain types 
of brain injuries are those who are “unable to reason and decide in ways 
conducive to the maintenance and betterment of himself and his family” and are 
“unable to decide properly… when the decision involved personal or social 
matters.”53 Without emotion, and access to the emotional learning of the past, the 
world presents itself as a “decision-making landscape… [that is] hopelessly 
flat.”54 In this emotionally flat landscape no course of action stands out as more 
significant and worthy of commitment than any other. It is a world without import.  
In this condition a person's ability to evaluate what is worth attending to and 
acting upon is impaired. This empirical research offers further support to 
observations like Berry’s that emotion plays an integral role in our ability to make 
rational decisions about what constitutes the good life.  
Emotions as Evaluative Feelings 
 Damasio's research fits well with the view of emotions as evaluative 
feelings that philosophers such as Macmurray, Nussbaum, Robert Solomon, and 
Bennett Helm espouse. Nussbaum describes the evaluative character of 
emotions as eudaimonistic. She writes, “The object of emotion is seen as 
important for some role it plays in the person’s own life.”55 A person’s emotions 
are concerned with the value of some object as it pertains to that person’s 
flourishing or well-being. However, she is careful to point out that this does not 
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reduce that object to one that only has instrumental value. She speaks of her 
emotion of grief at her mother’s death as centered upon her mother precisely 
because her mom is a valued part of her life. She did not value her mom in order 
to flourish but her flourishing existed in, or was animated by, her mom because of 
their relationship and the importance to her that it embodied. She loved her mom 
for “her own sake” and yet this is not contrary to having loved her as a valued 
constituent “of a life that is my life and not someone else’s.”56 In this way our 
emotions “insist on the real importance of their object, but they also embody the 
person’s own commitment to the object as a part of her scheme of ends.”57 Our 
emotional responses, like Nussbaum's grief, can make intelligible, or reveal, our 
eudaimonistic orientation, that is, what's at stake or matters to us in a given 
situation. 
 Bennett Helm's analysis of the evaluative character of emotion provides 
some additional conceptual tools and terminology that will be useful for my 
argument.58 Having already looked at the problem of import in the previous 
chapter we saw that Helm argues that for some person or thing to have import for 
you is for it to be worthy of your attention and action. This means that a 
consistent pattern of attending to this object of import and acting, or being 
prepared to act, on its behalf is required if it is to be intelligible that it has import 
to you. He describes this attentiveness as a kind of vigilance for what happens or 
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might happen to the object of import. To care about one's health, for example, 
requires not only vigilance for healthiness but also a preparedness to act so as to 
maintain it. If an individual never attends to the condition of their own health and 
chooses not to discover and do the kinds of things necessary to nurture it, then 
regardless of what that person says we would conclude that their health fails to 
hold import for them.   
Emotions are intentional mental phenomena. When we experience an 
emotion it is directed at, or about, several distinct objects. Helm illustrates this by 
exploring the emotion of fear. When we experience fear the target is that at which 
the emotion is directed, for example, a growling dog. What I am afraid of is the 
dog and its potential to harm me. The formal object is the kind of evaluation of 
the target relevant to the emotion, here dangerousness. And the focus is the 
background object that has import to the person having the emotion and whose 
relationship to the target makes intelligible the evaluation implicit in the emotion. 
In this case that focus is one's personal safety. We experience an emotion when 
we are committed to the import, or value, of its focus. In this example we 
experience fear when our personal safety, something we are committed to as 
worthy of our attention and action, is threatened by the dog. A “person-focused 
emotion”, such as Nussbaum's grief, is focused on, and hence commits one to, 
the import of a particular person as such; in this case, her mom.59 The emotions 
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an agent experiences are intelligible relative to those ends valued by that agent 
as part of their well-being, that is, they are eudaimonistic. Thus, our emotions are 
in some sense agent-relative, that is, they are normally reflective of our chosen 
ends or responsive to what has import for us. However, our emotions, like 
Nussbaum’s grief, are neither mere commitments to import nor are they mere 
phenomenal accompaniments to evaluative judgments - they are evaluative 
feelings.60 When we find something to be worthy of attention and action the 
relevant mode of attention and action is emotional.61 Emotions are intentional 
feelings of import that have a distinctive evaluative content.62 For example, the 
emotion of fear has a specific way of evaluating its object – to feel fear is to be 
pained by danger.63 To feel grief is to be pained by loss. The evaluative character 
of our emotions is part of a broader evaluative perspective of the world that 
includes evaluative judgments.  
 In finding something to be worthy of attention and action it is important to 
emphasize that the relevant mode of attention and action is emotional. As we 
saw in Chapter Two human desire is distinguishable from mere goal-
directedness in that to desire something is to find it worthwhile. Helm writes, “to 
desire something is not merely to be disposed to pursue it as an end; it rather 
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involves the sense that this end is worthy of pursuit.”64 We do not say something 
is worthy of pursuit because it is desirable. This provides support for the view that 
the moral quality of an action is dependent on its emotional character as it is the 
emotion that provides the motivational structure of that act.65 An illustration of this 
is found in Lawrence Blum’s Friendship, Altruism and Morality. He writes,  
An integral part of the good to Sue in Bob’s act of visiting her in the 
hospital is that he is thereby showing concern for her. We cannot 
envisage the act of visiting prompted by some other motive, while 
still preserving the good to Sue of that act. Suppose that Bob’s 
motivation in visiting Sue is not concern for her but a sense of duty 
towards her. His attitude is not one of concern for how she is doing, 
or of making her feel better by his visit. There is no direct desire to 
see her.66  
 
Without the emotional aspects of love his action is not as great a good to Sue as 
it could be. The character of Bob’s act itself is dependent on the character of the 
emotional evaluation that provides the motivational structure of that action. If the 
focus, or background object, that Bob finds worthy of attending to and acting 
upon is primarily being a morally good person, then Bob could find satisfaction at 
visiting Sue whether or not he was glad to see her. In fact, Bob could have a 
sense of self-satisfaction even if upon arriving at her floor the nurses said she 
needed rest and told him he could not see her. In either case he may sense that 
he has fulfilled his duty. However, notice how this shifts if Bob’s focus is Sue. In 
this case what is worthy of attending to and acting upon is Sue. She is the object 
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of Bob’s care and concern. What holds import for Bob is this particular person 
and not primarily his sense of moral goodness that comes from fulfilling his 
duties.67 In this situation we would expect Bob to be glad upon seeing Sue and 
disappointed if he was turned away. This provides support for the position that 
the moral quality of an act, at least in some cases, is shaped by its emotional 
content.  
 It is commonly thought that when there is a conflict between an evaluation 
provided by one's emotions and that provided by one's intellect through 
deliberation that the emotional one is the one that is faulty.68 However, our 
emotions can provide us with important evaluative information that our 
judgments, by themselves. If we consider Nussbaum's grief it is not the case that 
she first forms the judgment that her mom has value, that her mom's death 
represents a loss of that which is valued, and then has the corresponding 
emotion based on an evaluative judgment based on these things. She does not 
first make the judgment and then have the emotion.69 Rather, the evaluation, that 
is, the assessment of the full character of what has occurred, cannot be known 
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apart from her emotion – the grief reveals the value of that which is lost; it reflects 
the degree to which her mom was treasured by her. That treasuring of her 
mother, and of her relationship with her, is a measure of her import that cannot 
be expressed or recognized without the distinctive character of these emotions. 
Our emotions may reveal to us the depth of import a person holds for us, the 
depth of wanting to be with them, in a manner that an evaluative judgment 
without emotion could not. It is not the case that Nussbaum disinterestedly forms 
an evaluative judgment of how much her mom means to her and then has an 
emotional response that indicates that.  
 Damasio’s findings also offer empirical support for Macmurray’s 
observation that “a judgment of value can never be intellectual in its origin.”70 
Macmurray states that “there is one crucial thing that thinking cannot do” and that 
is to decide whether the thing that is revealed to it is “good or bad, beautiful or 
ugly, to be shunned or sought.”71 This is Macmurray's way of stating what I 
presented in Chapter Two as Tolstoy's Problem of Significance or Helm's 
Problem of Import. Inferential processes, by themselves, cannot tell us what is 
worthy or deserving of our care. Our ability to make evaluations, that is, to 
determine the value of a thing, is dependent on our emotions. To engage in 
practical reasoning, in contrast to theoretical reasoning, requires emotion. It is 
often the case that a moral evaluation is formulated into a normative standard 
and passed on to others who embrace it even though they do not share that 
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evaluation in their own emotional experience. In such cases a person may 
“consent without conviction to what others believe”, that is, he may hold to beliefs 
that he does not see for himself are true and right.72 One can accept as 
authoritative that which one has not judged for oneself is rightly so. Such 
consent, sometimes given due to external compulsion, Halliday describes as “a 
form of slavery.”73 It constitutes a failure to engage the world in a manner that is 
personal because it fails to win from us our own consent. A helpful example of 
this is found in Mark Twain’s Adventures of Huckleberry Finn.74  
 As Huck travels down the Mississippi with the escaped slave Jim a 
friendship begins to develop between them and Huck grows into the awareness 
that Jim is a man, that is, a person just like himself. This leads to what Huck 
considers a conflict of conscience. His cultural and religious upbringing leads him 
to affirm the judgment that Jim is someone’s property and that he doesn't have 
any worth of his own. Moreover, he believes that if he doesn’t turn Jim in that he, 
Huck himself, is worthy of punishment in hell. His judgment about a black man’s 
worth and the punishable character of his own action are ones that he is not quite 
yet capable of recognizing as not fully his own. They come into painful conflict 
with the perspective that is beginning to form on the basis of his own experience 
with Jim. Its resolution comes when he decides to embrace his own evaluation, 
                                                 
72
 Halliday, Reconciliation and Reality, p. 30. See pp. 27-40 for a thorough account of the 
centrality of subjective insight for that kind of life that can be considered moral or personal. 
  
73
 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
 
74
 See Chapter 31 of The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. As we will see this story provides a 
plausible example of where an emotional evaluation corrects a value judgment. Though I wrote 
this section several years ago I recently discovered that Bennett Helm also briefly alludes to the 
same scene in his paper “Emotional Reason: How to Deliberate About Value”. See p. 13. 
128 
 
rooted in his emotional apprehension of Jim through their developing friendship, 
instead of the one he has been taught. He tears up a letter he is composing that 
exposes Jim’s whereabouts to his owner and says to himself, “All right, then, I’ll 
go to hell.” He rejects his previous beliefs about Jim's personhood even under 
the threat of external compulsion. 
 Twain, through Huck’s example, hints at the importance of embracing 
one’s own evaluations as an integral part of responsibly engaging the world.75 
We must own our convictions as our own. We must believe, not merely because 
we are told by others what to believe, but because we cannot help it – we see for 
ourselves that it is true and right.76 This “ownership” is part of the subjective 
insight, or personal conviction, necessary for our engagement with others and 
the world to be personal. It is important to note that one can affirm this and not 
affirm subjectivism. Something is not morally right merely because one believes it 
to be morally right. Emphasizing the necessity of personal insight is not the same 
as endorsing the view that a subject's beliefs are determinative of what is morally 
right. In other words, the individual is not the source of that which is morally 
authoritative. Something is authoritative because it wins from us our consent and 
because we take it to be objectively worthy of that consent. We would not use the 
word authoritative to describe something that we take is merely a matter of our 
own opinion. We need to look at whether the authoritative character of reality, 
moral or otherwise, is compatible with the autonomy requisite for the realization 
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of our identity.    
Fidelity, Autonomy, and Identity 
 If apprehending the world involves learning how to act in terms of the 
world, that is, if it requires exercising fidelity to reality, then what shape does that 
responsiveness take when the reality we are seeking to know is another person 
or persons?77 Answering this is important given my effort to identify the character 
of that form of caring or love necessary for knowing others in a manner that is 
personal or intimate. It is commonly thought that the autonomy necessary for 
mature moral agency or for the realization of one's unique personal identity is 
diminished by the influence of other persons. In contrast, I argue that our identity 
is ultimately personal, that is, we are not fully who we are apart from being in 
relationships with others that are personal. At stake in the conflict between these 
two positions are issues about autonomy and authority that bear on the nature of 
the self and the character of our identity as moral persons. There are two other 
important questions that are important to ask. First, what are the characteristics 
of, and conditions for, that kind of autonomy necessary to live a life that is 
personal and to engage in relationships that are personal? Second, is there room 
for the requisite kind of autonomy if knowledge of another person requires some 
form of fidelity to that other as a reality that exists independently of us? I will 
begin to sketch an answer to these questions here that will get more fully 
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developed in the fifth and final chapter of this paper.  
 As we have seen the subject of fidelity, or responsive receptivity, raises 
deep and important concerns. It is possible that nowhere are these concerns 
more emotionally charged than in the arena of our relationships with other 
persons, including God. The notion that apprehending reality might involve some 
form of surrender, conformity, or receptivity to a reality independent of ourselves 
seems incompatible with the autonomy necessary for our well-being. Earlier I 
relied on Ernest Becker to identify this concern. He thinks that the central 
problem in life is our need to “win a degree of self-realization without surrender to 
complete spiritlessness or slavery.”78 Concerning its cosmic, or personal, 
dimension he asks “How does one lean on God and still stand on his own feet as 
a passionate human being?”79 Thomas Nagel shares a similar concern. He 
makes clear that one need not believe that God exists for the mere possibility of 
God's existence to evoke fear. He candidly describes his own fear in terms of 
having a “cosmic authority problem” and intimates that God's existence would 
impinge on his life in ways he does not welcome.80 Recognizing the evaluative 
character of emotion enables us to explore these emotional responses in an 
effort to discover what they might reveal about our conceptions of autonomy, 
authority, and identity as they bear on our notion of the good life.  
 We seem to be faced with an unsatisfactory choice: either we express 
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ourselves and disregard any reality that would seek to constrain that expression 
or we respect reality and disregard ourselves.81 I take it that each of these 
alternatives, presented here rather starkly, are problematic. Possibly, not many of 
us would be comfortable adopting either. However, they seem to be undergirded 
by, or the outcome of, the common assumption that our identity is realized 
through an autonomy that we exercise most fully on our own. God and other 
persons seem to constitute influences that undermine or threaten that autonomy. 
If so, the choice before us is apparently between an unfettered individualism in 
which the autonomy of a person can be fully developed and expressed 
independently of others or a dependence on others that inevitably involves some 
diminishment of that autonomy. This concern to safeguard autonomy from 
diminishment by influences external to the self is also expressed in the work of 
Henry David Thoreau. Seeking to capture the spirit that animates Thoreau, Philip 
Hallie writes:  
He would not let himself be enslaved by other people’s demands, 
or by his own fear and ambition… He believed that the land of 
redemptive, joyous living was wherever and whenever you 
sauntered, if only you wholeheartedly turned your back on the 
suicidal, quietly desperate, mutually enslaved slaves of human 
society… As for him, he felt himself coming alive only when he was 
free of social bondage. A tame dog lives to please its human 
masters; a wild animal does not. In fact a wild animal is somewhat 
surly when you try to use it for your purposes… Their energies are 
vivaciously self-indulgent.82  
 
Thoreau thinks that most people live “hidden inside little nutshells of timid 
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obedience.”83 He recognizes that there are ways in which we order our lives to 
secure the acceptance of others that is a form of enslavement to them. This 
conformity constitutes a form of obedience that is self-diminishing and as such is 
ill-fitting to our character as persons. Paul Gooch sums up this awareness as: 
“Obedience is a virtue – in dogs.”84 We are suspicious about obedience, Gooch 
writes, because we recognize that “…every obedient dog has, necessarily, it’s 
master.”85 Being under a master connotes a relationship marked by domination 
and servility. Thoreau suggests that the alternative to gentle, dog-like compliance 
is a kind of wild self-indulgence patterned after the untamed natural order. 
Perhaps he is merely engaging in hyperbole as Emerson does when Emerson 
says he wants to cultivate speaking the “rude truth” in all relationships that he 
might be more capable of being himself.86 Whether hyperbole or not Thoreau 
draws attention to the crucial point that being personal requires an independence 
or uprightness that involves stepping out of a manner of relating to others that 
constitutes a form of enslavement. 
 Thoreau, Becker, Nagel, and Gooch draw our attention to what can be 
called the Problem of Authority. Gooch describes the issue in this way: 
“...obedience, in that it always looks toward some master or authority, diminishes 
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the freedom and autonomy we think the inalienable possession of mature moral 
agents.”87 However, I will argue that we cannot resolve this problem merely by 
ridding ourselves of those things that we might consider masters or authorities. In 
practical terms something becomes authoritative for us, whether it should be so 
or not, when we stake ourselves on it, that is, when we exercise a consistent 
pattern of attending to it and acting on its behalf. We will conform ourselves to 
something that we take as authoritative. It may be that even conformity to our 
own impulses, in contrast to conformity to external influences, is not itself 
sufficient to avoid diminishment or enslavement. One important question is: Who 
or what should we conform to, that is, who or what should be authoritative in our 
lives? This is Borgmann's point when he writes that we are “always and already 
engaged in drawing the outlines of... a way of life, and we have to take 
responsibility for this fact and ask whether it is a good life.”88 The shape of these 
lines is determined in important ways by what we have already chosen to take, 
and continue to choose to take, as authoritative in our own lives. A second and 
related question, which was raised earlier, is: Is there any authority whose 
influence will result in the flourishing of one's autonomy? I will argue that whether 
conformity will enhance or diminish our autonomy is dependent not only on the 
character of the conformity but also on the character of that to which we conform.  
I will explore a biographical story by Tim O'Brien to help illustrate how these 
issues of authority and autonomy are intimately connected to the character of our 
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identity as persons. 
 Tim O’Brien provides a compelling account of the diminishing effects of 
social conformity in his short story “On the Rainy River”.89 O’Brien recounts a 
week he spent on this river, one of the watery boundaries between Minnesota 
and Canada, wrestling with whether to serve in the Vietnam War or flee to 
Canada. He worries that if he flees he will be labeled a “treasonous pussy” by his 
father and the other men from the small Midwestern town he calls home. From 
their perspective it is “a war to stop the Communists, plain and simple” and they 
believe it is justified to feel disgust toward those who have “second thoughts 
about killing and dying” for “plain and simple reasons.” O’Brien’s reasons for not 
wanting to fight are mixed. Yes, he fears death; he states, “at the very center, 
was the raw fact of terror, I did not want to die. Not ever. But certainly not then, 
not there, not in a wrong war.” But beyond this fear, and more importantly, he 
emphasizes that he does not want to give allegiance to a cause that he sees as 
suspect. He admits to being young and politically naïve yet to him the war seems 
wrong as “Certain blood was being shed for uncertain reasons.”  
 O’Brien anguishes over his decision for a week at the Tip Top Lodge 
under the “mute watchfulness” of eighty-one year old Elroy Berdahl. Elroy seems 
to sense, but is willfully silent about, the reason why O’Brien is there. His face, 
unlike those from his own community, affirms O’Brien’s struggle; he does not 
seek to manipulate him with threats, taunts, or even kindly advice. Late in the 
week Elroy takes him fishing within swimming distance of the Canadian shore. 
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O’Brien recalls,  
It struck me then that he must have planned it. I’ll never be certain, 
of course, but I think he meant to bring me up against the realities, 
to guide me across the river and to take me to the edge and to 
stand a kind of vigil as I chose a life for myself.  
 
Under Elroy’s compassionate, watchful presence, he begins to cry. Quietly at first 
and then with loud, hard convulsions. He tries to will himself out of the boat and 
over to Canada. In that moment he is confronted with a swirl of faces from his 
hometown, the whole universe – parents, old teachers, Huck Finn, Abe Lincoln, a 
New York cabbie, veterans of the Civil War, cheerleaders, and more – all yelling 
at him “Traitor!”, “Turncoat!”, “Pussy!”  O’Brien writes,  
I couldn’t endure the mockery… the shore just twenty yards away, I 
couldn’t make myself be brave. It had nothing to do with morality. 
Embarrassment, that’s all it was. And right then I submitted. I would 
go to the war – I would kill and maybe die – because I was 
embarrassed not to. That was the sad thing. And so I sat in the bow 
of the boat and cried. 
 
Sensing O'Brien's decision Elroy says, “ain’t biting”, reels in their lines, and 
quietly turns the boat back to the Minnesota shore. O’Brien returns home to 
submit to the demands of his government and, more so, the expectations of his 
community. I take it that it is this kind of diminishing social conformity – one that 
constitutes a failure to rise to the demands of living a life that is personal – that 
Thoreau finds so repugnant. His story offers support of Emerson's observation 
that we easily capitulate to others in a manner that constitutes a failure to walk 
upright.90  
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 O'Brien's story, along with Twain's Huck Finn, helps us to identify two 
aspects of the capacity for uprightness indicative of moral autonomy that 
distinguish it from that kind of conformity to others that undermines it. Conformity 
to others fails to rise to the level of personal action when it involves acting in 
accord with another’s demands or expectations when those fail to appear to the 
agent's own insight to be right and fitting. Such actions involve a kind of 
dependence on others that is irresponsible; they constitute an abdication of one's 
need to exercise one's own insight. Voicing this concern W.F. Halliday writes,  
... that men should stand upon their own feet, that their belief 
should be the outcome of their own convictions and held in the light 
of the whole of their experience... to consent without conviction to 
what others believe... is a form of slavery.91  
 
The need for personal insight is echoed in H.H. Farmer's comments about the 
conditions required to relate to God in a manner that is personal. He writes,  
For if the demands of God are to enter a man’s soul in a truly 
personal way, they must present themselves to his own insight as 
reasonable and right and relevant to the situation in which he is, 
otherwise they would have no intelligible meaning, or, having 
meaning, could only be obeyed as a horse obeys the whip.92  
 
Being able to perceive something as reasonable, right, and fitting and being able 
to maintain, or affirm, that insight, even in the face of pressure to do otherwise is 
                                                 
91
 Halliday, Reconciliation and Reality, pp. 9-10; 29-30. Halliday thinks that this capacity for 
uprightness is one that can be fostered by a loving, personal agent. He criticizes the influence of 
organized religion throughout history, including Christianity, as a hypnotic force that has 
undermined this capacity. Yet he argues that the God of Jesus is one that seeks to promote it. 
 
92
 H.H. Farmer, The World and God, p. 190. John Oman, in Grace and Personality, describes the 
importance of this facet of autonomy in this way: “Action, though otherwise not wrong, is less than 
right, unless we, of our own insight, judge it right; and when it conflicts with that insight, its 
innocuousness does not hinder it from being, for us, wrong.” See Part One, Chapter 7.  
137 
 
an integral part of engaging others or the world in a manner that is personal. This 
is the case whether that pressure comes from others or from impulses within 
oneself that are contrary to one's moral insight. To “obey the whip” constitutes a 
failure to stand upright. However, moral autonomy is more than the absence of 
external compulsion; it is more than freedom from an external master. It has to 
do with the capacity to act in accord with one's insight. On this account being 
personal is an attainment.93 We are responsible for our actions whether or not 
they conform to, and are an expression of, our moral insight. However, we fail to 
be personal – to realize or express our moral personality – when we act against 
our own insight. 
  It should be apparent that not only is moral autonomy more than the 
absence of external compulsion but that also it cannot consist in an unqualified 
conformity to ourselves, that is, it cannot consist of the unrestrained expression 
of our own impulses. Even Thoreau recognizes that there are impulses within us 
to which if we yield will result in a diminishment of the self. We cannot wildly 
indulge all our impulses and yet be free. To secure our own well-being there are 
impulses within ourselves that we should affirm and those that we should not. 
Like Emerson he recognizes we should resist conforming to our desire to gain 
acceptance from others if doing so involves violating our personal moral insight.  
Thus, implicit even within Thoreau is a normative notion of identity. To submit 
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oneself to an authority that one does not apprehend as rightful and true, that is, 
as one that should be obeyed, is to be enslaved.94 It is to diminish one's identity. 
 A second facet of autonomy, and one that is interrelated with the first, is 
that which can be called self-determination.95 An act is self-determined when that 
act originates or is initiated by the self. Being personal requires that we exercise 
our wills in accordance with our moral insight, not in violation of it. An action is 
personal when that act is an expression of what the agent sees for himself as 
right and true. John Oman states, “…a moral person is self-determined according 
to his own self-direction [personal insight].”96 Accidentally doing the right thing 
does not constitute personal action. And choosing to do what others deem is 
right but that you do not, as in O'Brien's social conformity, also fails to constitute 
action that is personal. He fails to be appropriately responsive to his character as 
a moral person and surrenders that in favor of embracing a decision which he 
thinks will prevent rejection. He presents a façade, or shell, that resembles 
himself to his community while his real face is hidden from their sight. In so doing 
he fails to recognize that acceptance or affirmation from others – if it is to be 
personal - is itself morally conditioned. If others accept him only on the basis that 
he does what they think he should do, regardless of whether he sees it as right, 
their behavior constitutes a failure to treat him as a person. His story helps us to 
see that we can seek to satisfy our hunger for communion in ways that makes 
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communion – an activity of the highest personal order – impossible. His actions, 
along with the character of acceptance he is inviting others to extend, constitute 
a failure to engage with others personally. He fails to respond to his identity as 
that which is personal and instead treats himself as a thing. He presents himself 
as an object, or commodity, whose value lies in being found appealing to others 
on grounds external to those which constitute his self as personal.97   
 O'Brien's failure to stand upright, to live up to those values he recognizes 
are worthy of his fidelity, results in a persistent shame. He begins his story by 
saying, “This is one story I've never told before... For more than twenty years I've 
had to live with it, feeling the shame, trying to push it away.”98 Shame is the 
emotion we experience when we fail to uphold the values that we recognize are 
worthy of staking our lives on. It is indicative of an awareness that one has failed 
to realize the values central to one's identity. Helm's work is helpful here. He 
writes, 
To be a person is, roughly, to be a creature with a capacity to 
care... about yourself and the motives for action that are truly your 
own. To care about yourself in this way is to put yourself at stake in 
your engagement with particular things... things that you thereby 
value... [it] is, in effect, to define the kind of life it is worth your living 
and so your identity as this particular person.99 
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Our well-being as persons is not merely a matter of our psychological or physical 
health. Helm argues that our well-being crucially depends on whether we uphold 
the values constitutive of our identity, that is, whether we succeed or fail to live 
the kind of life we think is worth our living.100  
Howard Thurman, a “grandfather” of the Civil Rights movement in 
America, provides further testimony that our well-being crucially depends on 
whether we uphold the values constitutive of our identity. In his book Jesus and 
the Disinherited, which was first published in 1949, Thurman as a black American 
writes from his familiarity with the violence, or threat of violence, used by whites 
to control blacks in the pre-Civil Rights south. He reports that the inability to find 
effective ways to uphold one's own values and constructively respond or resist 
one's oppressor “at the moment of descending violence is to be a coward, and to 
be deeply and profoundly humiliated in one’s own estimation and in that of one’s 
friend and family.”101 Such failures to stand upright are experienced as deep, 
personal failures. The emotions evoked by these failures reveal the important 
connection we judge to exist between autonomy and identity. The shame evoked 
by these failures and the moral weakness to which they attest may partially 
explain the strong criticism that Thoreau and Emerson level at them. I sometimes 
wonder if the biting character of that criticism is fueled by the hope that it could 
help lift them out of that weakness. Regardless, recognizing the evaluative 
character of emotion enables us to explore these emotional responses in an 
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effort to discover what they might reveal about our conceptions of autonomy, 
authority, and identity.   
 Shame is not merely an awareness that we have failed to uphold the 
values constitutive of our own identity but, as Thurman points out, also includes a 
sense that others evaluate us as falling short of a recognized standard or value 
that we share. To experience an emotion is to be committed to the import or 
value of something that is that emotion's focus.102 With shame the agent has 
failed to attain some end that is valued as part of what constitutes their well-
being. What might be that focus or end? What is it that we want that when we fail 
to attain it we experience humiliation not only in our own eyes but also fear the 
same from others? To answer this question it is important to return to my earlier 
account of emotion. Consider my example of the emotion of fear. The focus of an 
emotion (e.g. fear) is a background object having import to the agent (e.g. safety) 
that is related to an emotion's target (e.g. a snarling dog) in such a way as to 
make intelligible that evaluation of the target, or formal object, relevant to the 
emotion (e.g. dangerousness). It is apparent that shame not only includes a self-
referential evaluation that Helm identifies but a social one as well, that is, it also 
has to do with an evaluation of where we stand in relation to others.103 Shame is 
the feeling that we are deserving of the disapproval of others and thereby 
possibly being unworthy to be known and loved. This is to say that the focus of 
shame, that is, that which has import to the subject experiencing it is being 
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valued or wanted by others. The target of shame, that is, that at which this 
emotion is directed is social rejection. The implicit evaluation of shame's target, 
its formal object, is that such rejection is diminishing of one's value. Shame is 
often indicated or accompanied by the emotion of fear – we fear having our 
shortcomings made known, even when they have not been so made, because 
we fear disapproval and rejection. The power and character of shame seems 
best explained in light of our need for some form of emotional connection to 
others. Shame provides evidence that we consider some sort of belonging to 
others to be a central part of our well-being. In other words, we are aware in 
some fashion that we have needs that are central to our identity that cannot be 
satisfied in isolation from others. This can be so even if the one experiencing 
shame has yet to identify this need. As evaluative feelings our emotions can 
reveal to us convictions that we hold about what constitutes the good life that we 
might not otherwise recognize or acknowledge as such. We can apply Helm's 
analysis of the evaluative character of emotions in an effort to surface the 
evaluations implicit in the emotions evoked by the issue of authority.    
 The issue of authority, as we have seen, is one that can evoke fear. It may 
also evoke anger, resentment, or revulsion. Given that our emotions are 
evaluative they can reveal that which is of import that we take to be jeopardized 
by such authority. Surely, Thoreau's emphatic response to authority identifies 
one issue of import to him – there is a way of relating to authority that is 
diminishing. We recognize, along with Thoreau, that our well-being requires 
protecting some sort of self-determination or autonomy. A slavish conformity is 
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repulsive. Being personal requires exercising personal insight. In addition, the 
character of that which we conform to is also critical. It is right to feel resistance 
toward a person that would ride over us and obliterate our identity. We should not 
take as an authority that which would treat us as things and not persons. 
However, as Nagel intimates, one's emotional response to authority may involve 
an evaluative perspective about autonomy and authority that differs from these. 
Nagel describes his “fear of religion” in terms of having a “cosmic authority 
problem.”104 He thinks this fear, and the authority problem associated with it, is 
widespread. If this is so, what evaluations about autonomy, authority, and identity 
might be a part of this emotional aversion to religion or a divine personal 
authority?105    
 It is not clear that Nagel's emotional aversion to a cosmic authority is best 
described as fear though he does associate the two. He never explicitly identifies 
the emotion that the contemplation of a cosmic authority evokes. He merely 
states, “I don't want the universe to be like that.”106 One could fear religion itself 
and fear that it is true because it is inconsistent with one's evaluation about what 
constitutes the good life. In other words, one's fear may be secondary to a more 
fundamental emotional aversion to authority. Nagel's fear of religion may be an 
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outgrowth of his commitment to a particular conception of personal identity, 
autonomy, and authority that is necessary for living the kind of life he thinks worth 
living. Religion is feared because, if true, it constitutes a reality with an authority 
structure that is incompatible with what he takes is necessary for his well-being. I 
take it that his problem is not merely conceptual, that is, it is not solely a matter of 
intellectually puzzling out who is worthy of our allegiance or of reconciling moral 
autonomy with authority, but is something more difficult to neatly identify. To put 
it in Becker's terms being subject to the authority of another may not fit Nagel’s 
conception of what it is to be a man. If so, he is not unusual in experiencing an 
aversion to an authority that challenges his own. It is an emotional response that 
is commonly experienced, and widely attested to, by the practitioners of the 
world's monotheistic religions. For many it forms the central struggle of their 
religious lives.   
 Many of us find it hard to imagine an authority besides one's own self that 
has import, that is, that is worthy of our attention and action.107 Freedom, or 
autonomy, is freedom from interference. We just want to be left alone to do our 
own thing. One may be deeply committed to this manner of “being in charge” and 
judge that any authority that interferes with that is a threat to that value. If this is 
the case, one's fear of religion (or certain kinds of religion) and one's emotional 
aversion to a cosmic authority are interconnected. What makes the connections 
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between these emotions intelligible is their shared focus.108 To experience an 
emotion, as Helm writes, is to be committed to the import of its focus. The focus 
that these two emotions share is that of being in charge or, what Borgmann calls, 
unconditional self-determination.109 These emotions are connected in a way that 
one's fear of religion and one's anger at a kid who accidentally scratches your car 
door is not. The emotional response to the child is not evoked because you 
perceive him as a threat to your authority but because he damaged an object of 
value to you. Thus, it makes sense that Nagel associates his fear of religion with 
his emotional aversion to a cosmic authority. In each of these his commitment to 
an unconditional self-determination is threatened.    
 Nagel is concerned about these emotions and writes that “one should try 
to resist the intellectual effects of such a fear (if not the fear itself), for it is just as 
irrational to be influenced in one's beliefs by the hope that God does not exist as 
by the hope that God does exist.”110 We can agree with the insight implicit here 
that what is true is true regardless of one's feelings about it. With that said 
however, we should be careful to avoid characterizing the struggle to apprehend 
reality as one in which the emotions are solely cast in the negative role of 
irrational influences that will corrupt one's beliefs or interfere with the pursuit of 
truth. The analysis of emotions as evaluative and of reason as emotional 
suggests that we cannot simply resist the intellectual effects of our emotions as 
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in some instances they may already constitute an evaluation concerning what is 
good. In other words, if we are fearful it may not be the case that we can merely 
resist the emotion of fear. Given what holds import for our fear may be part of a 
larger rational pattern of emotions that should be expected.  If my aversion to 
authority is an indicator of my commitment to a vision of the good life that 
includes an unconditional self-determination, then the worry that fear as an 
irrational force is going to hinder the intellectual process may obscure a more 
significant concern. The issue of critical concern may not have to do with what we 
fear but with what we love. Practically speaking we have already answered, and 
are presently answering, what we take as worthy of staking our lives on.111 Our 
only option is to ask ourselves whether or not those things are worthy of our love. 
Revering our own sovereignty might itself be irrational not because of the 
influence of the emotion but because of the object that is loved – it is possible 
that our own sovereignty is not worthy of that devotion. We need to ask whether 
this kind of life is the good life. 
 To ask ourselves if that which we love - that which we practically identify 
as having import through consistently attending to it and acting on its behalf – is 
worthy of that love is to acknowledge that it is plausible that we can reverence 
the wrong things.112 If we can reverence the wrong things, then our identity, 
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which is dependent in some manner on what we care about, can be prevented 
from its proper development and expression. It would entail that we can be less 
than what we should be as we fail to love those things that can promote the 
realization of the self. It is this identification with what we love, this commitment 
to what we have judged to be worthy of staking our lives on, that seems to entail 
that we are dependent on something external to ourselves for our identity. And, 
as we have seen, many people fear that being dependent on something external 
to the self is diminishing. Helm seeks to provide an account of caring that is 
personal or intimate, one distinguished by a strong sense of identification with the 
one loved, yet is not diminishing. Interestingly, his approach underscores the 
concern Becker raised that fidelity to a reality external to oneself, that is, being 
subject to an authority not of one's own making, is intrinsically diminishing. His 
account of love is dependent on a particular conception of autonomy that he 
considers to be central to one's personal identity. 
Autonomy and Intimacy – Are They Related? 
 Helm presents an agent-relative account of identity that is rooted in his 
account of agent-relative normativity.113 In what appears to be an effort to 
safeguard the requisite autonomy for personal life he concludes that our identity 
is up to us. Your well-being is dependent on whether you have upheld the values 
that constitute your identity and consequently on whether you have succeeded or 
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failed to live the kind of life you have determined is worth living.114 Autonomy 
consists in exercising the capacity to be responsible for your evaluations of who 
you should be and for your efforts to acquire this identity. Because you not only 
have the capacity to control what you value but also to “autonomously create” 
those values you control your identity.115 Identity is agent-relative. Being personal 
involves being the author of your own identity – via the path of one's being the 
autonomous creator of one's values - and this identity serves as a normative 
standard by which you can judge how your life is going.116 With this conception of 
identity we can assess how it might fit the concerns that we have seen both 
Tolstoy and Becker raise.   
 On Helm's account we can find someone to stake our life on, to be 
intimately identified with, and not have to worry about being diminished unless 
we surrender our capacity to be the author of our own values. Loving another 
may alter what we find worthy of devoting ourselves to and hence may alter our 
identity but that is not a diminishment as long as within that process we remain 
the autonomous creator of those values.117 We choose to adopt these new 
values as we affirm our desire to embrace a new sense of identity. If we take 
Helm to be advocating a strong account of authorship, either of moral value or 
personal identity, this fails to address the demand for significance Tolstoy finds 
within himself. He wants to know if there is anything worthy of devoting himself 
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to. The strong account would say that the reality to which you are to be 
responsive to is your own self. What is worthy to stake your life on is whatever 
you decide for yourself is worthy to stake your life on. There is nothing that you 
should find worthy. Love is merely an evaluative response that you make, it is not 
a response that is evoked by (and fits) reality as it is in itself. You are the author 
of your own values.  
 Helm's approach, on this interpretation, affirms that the good life consists 
in unconditional self-determination. Tolstoy would say that this view presents a 
diminished view of moral reality, the other, and the self. He desires a significance 
of which he cannot be the author. He wants to give himself to something that he 
can see is worthy of his devotion. A life of creating one's own values is not 
adequate for the demand he experiences within himself. Moreover, it fails to 
make sense of his moral experience. Tolstoy senses that he fails to treat others 
in a manner which their reality as persons demands; it is much more than merely 
a failure to uphold his own values. It also lacks the resources to help him address 
his moral failures and his aspirations to be morally good. To Becker it says that 
there is no way to obey God and not be diminished. Autonomy is not a 
responsive receptivity to a reality that exists independently of you. It is not a 
responsiveness to the demands of membership in an order whose goodness we 
can participate in but of which we are not the creator. Instead, it is a capacity to 
assert ourselves in particular ways.  
 Helm could affirm a softer version of authorship regarding moral values 
and personal identity. On this account we discover values and consent to them 
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as normative not because we are their source, but because we see for ourselves 
that they are good and we take that they are objective. We do take responsibility 
for our evaluations of what is worthy of staking our lives on. However, we own 
these values as our own not because we are their author or creator but because 
they capture from us our hearty consent. Huck Finn did something like this in his 
affirmation of Jim's personhood. Possibly we could say of such consent that it is 
marked by the conviction that if we were capable of creating values these are the 
ones that we would create. We affirm these values by seeking to manifest them 
in our lives but that does not make us their author. There is room for a 
responsive receptivity, or fidelity to reality, that is not diminishing because that 
reality possesses such a character that it wins from us our own consent.  
 It is not clear which of these views Helm advances. Being personal, on the 
strong account, is not a matter of being capable of engaging in relationships that 
are personal; it is a matter of being able to autonomously create one's values. 
We need not ever choose to love others and we could still adequately realize our 
identity, that is, being in relationships that are personal is not central to our 
identity. This autonomy seems too shallow to do justice to our character as 
persons. The implications of the strong account appear to be in tension with 
another account of which he gives but promising suggestions. On this account it 
would not be accurate to say that what is normative is agent-relative. What is 
normative involves being in relationships that are personal, that is, one's marked 
by what he calls intimate identification. Autonomy is the capacity for intimate 
identification, that is, it is the capacity for engaging in relationships that are 
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marked by personal caring. Being in a relationship characterized by intimate 
identification requires that you care not only for the realization of your own 
identity but also for the realization of the other's. If so, is there anything that can 
enhance our autonomy?   
 In the final paragraph of his paper Helm points to a loving parent with a 
young child as a picture of how to take another's identity to heart in a manner that 
will help her to discover and uphold her identity.118 He wonders if being loved in 
this personal manner may help “enhance our autonomy,” that is, whether it might 
increase our capacity to “determine our identities as persons.”119 And, I would 
add, will it increase our capacity for helping others determine their identities? He 
states that our interpersonal, or social, nature is central to our autonomy and that 
“we should not conceive of our autonomy as a capacity we exercise on our own 
and apart from others.”120 At this point his conception of love begins to look more 
like a loving relationship and less like an evaluative attitude.121 If growing in our 
capacity for autonomy requires being loved, this means it is dependent on 
something that one has to receive. We cannot exercise fidelity to just anyone or 
anything and expect our autonomy to mature and grow. Moreover, receiving love 
is something we do. It is possible that somebody could love us, take our identity 
to heart, and for that love to have no effect. We could be indifferent to that love.  
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What is involved in receiving love? It appears to require taking that person's care 
for you to heart, that is, their care for you becomes an important part of your own 
identity. If their love, as the particular person that they are, does not matter to 
you, it is difficult to see how it would help you to grow.122 When we discover that 
we are loved by one whom we would want to be loved by the effect of this can be 
transformative. Being loved can evoke a response of love. As Edmond La B. 
Cherbonnier writes, “In ordinary human experience one loves as a result of 
having first been loved.”123  
Conclusion 
  Helm's comments hint at a direction that might help address Becker's 
Concern. Being the recipient of a particular kind of love and participating in a 
loving relationship of a particular sort may enhance and not diminish our identity 
as a person. If so, our identity is not established in isolation from others. Fidelity 
to reality is not intrinsically diminishing. Fidelity's effect on identity is dependent 
not only on the character of that fidelity but also by the character of that reality 
toward which it is directed. That reality that it is worth being receptive to is one 
that can help us realize our identity as moral persons, that is, one that can 
increase our capacity for engaging in relationships that are personal. Being 
personal, on this account, is a moral adventure that requires both receiving and 
giving love.    
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 It is possible that our identity is ultimately personal, that is, we are not fully 
who we are apart from being in relationships with others that are personal. If we 
start with the idea that our identity is ultimately that of an isolated individual who 
when fully autonomous has no need for other persons, God or human, then we 
will never be able to conceive of dependence on, or need for, others in terms 
other than enslavement or diminishment.124 Helm's dependence on the image of 
a parent-child relationship to portray love intimates a need for metaphor, 
exemplar, or narrative in moral discourse. Nussbaum writes that the knowledge 
of love is the knowledge of a love story.125 Love is not a general phenomenon 
and its character cannot be depicted merely as a set of “necessary and sufficient 
conditions.”126 It is an activity of persons. Adequately describing the character of 
a particular love will require the telling of a story that involves characters with 
aims and purposes. In the following chapter I will argue that narrative accounts 
are needed to image the normative content of love. The normative character of a 
love is narrative dependent, that is, it requires a story or an exemplar to be fully 
portrayed.  
 As we seek to answer the question how should I live we search for images 
of what we might do and be and look for a fit between an image and what is 
deepest in our lives. We need narratives because they can portray the character 
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of the moral life in ways that a theoretical account, by itself, cannot. In doing so 
we can consider whether the image they convey fits with our aspirations. This is 
to suggest that Becker's concern cannot be addressed merely theoretically.  If 
the character of the good life cannot be fully depicted in theoretical form, then a 
theoretical account may fail to speak to us as fully as we need in order to assess 
whether it fits or illuminates our experience. For example, he finds the “problem” 
of “how to be a man” a pressing concern.127 If it were possible to present a 
theoretical account of how fidelity to God is not intrinsically diminishing, that 
would not by itself present an image of what it is to be a man that fits his 
aspirations and what is deepest in his experience.128 His concern has theoretical 
dimensions but it goes beyond that.  
I will argue that the New Testament portrayal of the person of Jesus and 
his relationship with the God whom he calls Father can address Becker's concern 
in a manner that a theoretical response cannot fully do. This relationship images 
a way in which there can be mutual fidelity between persons that enhances and 
not diminishes the personal character of the agents involved. In so doing it 
presents a vibrant image, or exemplar, of what it is to be a person. Our need for 
exemplars to help us determine whether fidelity diminishes autonomy gives us 
grounds for engaging the New Testament. The following chapter will provide 
further justification for directly engaging this narrative. I claim that this 
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engagement is justified by arguing that narrative imagery can convey content 
about the normative character of love that exceeds that which can be presented 
discursively as a list of normative principles. The volitional, desiderative, and 
emotional aspects of the love that the New Testament maintains constitutes 
Reality, as well as the love that constitutes an appropriate response to that 
Reality, can only be portrayed in sufficient depth through a narrative. It provides a 
relational image of love that is capable of addressing Becker's Concern.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
NARRATIVE AND NORMATIVITY: 
 
IMAGINATION AND EMOTION IN MORAL THINKING 
Introduction 
 The overarching goal of this chapter is to provide further justification for 
directly engaging the New Testament narrative. This is important because in the 
chapter subsequent to this one I turn to the New Testament to develop an 
account of personal knowing in terms of the relational image of agape that is 
central to it. I claim that this engagement is justified by arguing here that narrative 
imagery can convey normative content that exceeds that which can be presented 
discursively as a list of normative principles. The normative character of this love 
is narrative dependent, that is, it requires a story or an exemplar to be fully 
portrayed. Oftentimes exemplars are presented to us in story form and 
sometimes, though possibly less so today, they are presented through the well-
lived life of an actual person that we are fortunate to know and observe. When 
conceptual analysis is employed to distill normative guidelines from a narrative it 
inadvertently diminishes the normative content of the love portrayed therein. It 
assumes that the content that matters ethically is separable from affective 
content without loss. Analysis diminishes the character of volitional, emotional 
and desiderative elements central to love that may be describable discursively 
but that require narratives to portray their full character or “depth.” I argue that
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the moral quality of an action is dependent on the full character of these 
elements. I will engage Soren Kierkegaard in his Works of Love to illustrate how 
his effort to account for the normative character of agape results in a diminished 
account of its normative character. 
 Narratives play an indispensable role in our reflection on the good life. I 
support this claim by arguing that narrative imagery can convey normative 
content that exceeds that which can be presented discursively as a list of 
normative principles. Conversation, or discourse, about what constitutes the 
good life will be inadequate to meet the demands of our lives if it fails to take into 
account our need for narrative. In Chapter Two I concluded that explanationism 
plays an important yet modest role in ethical reflection. Important because the 
view that we hold must provide us with the best explanation. Our concern to be 
honest with ourselves and with others demands that. However, it is modest 
because it cannot identify for us what phenomena are in need of explanation nor 
can it serve to adjudicate between competing explanations held by individuals 
who begin with different basic phenomena they consider veridical. Though a 
vision of the good life must have explanatory power, that is, though it should 
appeal to us because of its ability to explain phenomena that we judge are crucial 
to explain – it must also make appeal to our aspirations of what me might do and 
be. In this chapter I argue that we need narrative imagery because of its capacity 
to provide us with exemplars of what constitutes the good life. 
 This will allow us to return to and address Becker's Concern. He asks: Is 
there a way to be in a relationship with God that enhances rather than diminishes 
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what it means to be the human being that I am?1 I think the New Testament 
portrayal of love as imaged in the Father-Son relationship between God and 
Jesus provides an example of how one person may depend on another in a way 
that enhances, not diminishes, the individual character of the person in the 
relation.2 This relational exemplar, that is, who Jesus was in himself as he 
addresses the circumstances of his life, provides an “answer” to Becker's 
question. It will be the purpose of Chapter Five to explore this image and show 
how it is capable of addressing his concern as well as ones that Tolstoy invites 
us to consider about life's meaning. In particular, I will show how the New 
Testament illuminates for me the character of an important array of phenomena 
that I take are central to both personal knowing and meaning. Part of its ability to 
do that will hinge on the thesis that is the focus of this chapter.  
Explanationism and Exemplarism 
 It is important to note that when I use the word “image” it can refer to 
something as complex and dynamic as the relationship between Jesus and his 
Father. It is not merely picturing something that is simple or static. Here 'image' is 
synonymous with 'exemplar' – the narrative portrays, images, or shows a 
relationship of a particular character. Imaging of this sort is sometimes more like 
a movie than a single picture or snapshot. However, speaking of exemplars or 
narratives as imaging normative content can be misleading. Exemplars present 
                                                 
1
 As stated in the previous chapter there is a way in which the intent of the question is broader 
than what it may appear here. Becker wants to know if any of the persons or things that we 
depend on to give our lives meaning can do so in a way that does not diminish our identity. 
 
2
 I take it that even though this image is of divine persons in relationship with one another it is 
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us with more than a batch of moral prescriptions. They speak not only to our 
sense of moral obligation but also to our aspirations – they show us not only what 
we must “do” but what we might “be.” They portray a life, or a way of being, that 
can address concerns like Becker's of “how to be a man” - that is, of how to live a 
vibrant life. Theoretical ethical discourse, by itself, cannot do this. Its inability to 
adequately portray the character of the good life in its fullness means that we 
cannot turn to it as a view of life that might “fit” with, or speak to, that which is 
deepest in our lives.3 This is another reason why narratives are essential for 
reflection on what constitutes the good life. 
 The fact that I must rely extensively upon the New Testament narrative 
raises two interrelated issues that I have been addressing progressively 
throughout this dissertation. The first has to do with the place of direct 
engagement with religious works as a part of the practice of philosophy. The 
second has to do with what value such a portrayal of agape might hold. 
Concerning the first I follow Nussbaum, Murdoch, Hallie, and others in arguing 
that a variety of narrative forms should be incorporated into philosophical 
reflection as part of our effort to deepen our moral understanding. Questions 
about the good life or life's meaning do not fit neatly into one academic discipline 
to the exclusion of the rest. Engaging a variety of narrative forms can serve as an 
indispensable vehicle for critical reflection about the nature of love and personal 
                                                                                                                                                 
presented as the pattern for which humans are to enter into relationship with these persons. 
 
3
 Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge, p. 26. Both Halliday, in Reconciliation and Reality, and 
Borgmann, in TCCL, speak of narratives as a form of discourse that invites the listener to search 
his or her experiences and aspirations. See pp. 165-167 and 176-180 respectively. See also 
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relationships. One of the reasons for this, that I have mentioned and will argue 
for in this chapter, is that narratives convey normative content that otherwise 
could not be portrayed in non-narrative form. Thus, engaging the New Testament 
narrative of agape is essential for an adequate portrayal of the normative 
character of that love. The second issue needing further attention involves 
clarifying the value of engaging this particular narrative. There are many 
narratives. What is the value of the New Testament's narrative image of love? 
Why commend it to the reader? These questions return us to the account of 
modest explanationism that I provided in Chapter Two. 
 When we seek to commend our views on ultimate issues, like the 
character of the good life or life's meaning, or when we seek to show the value of 
a particular view, our efforts will be inescapably personal.4 For example, there 
are several reasons why I value the New Testament image of love and its 
account of what constitutes a vibrant life. I find that it helps me to understand 
features of my experience as a person that for me are crucial to understand. Like 
Tolstoy I too have hungered for significance, I have experienced moral failure 
and a desire for forgiveness, and I have longed for a love that will overcome my 
aloneness. As I previously argued in Chapter Two I cannot demonstrate either 
that these phenomena, or those associated with them, are veridical or that they 
are the most significant to explain. Yet these experiences demand my attention in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Linda Zagzebski’s “The Admirable Life and the Desirable Life” concerning the need for narrative 
detail to portray moral exemplars.    
 
4
 Borgmann, in TCCL, provides an excellent account of the necessity of testimony in addressing 
issues of ultimate concern. See especially his chapter “Deictic Discourse” pp. 169-182. 
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ways that I find inescapable and evoke in me a desire for understanding. This fits 
with Nozick's observation that the original impulse for engaging in philosophical 
reflection is not about “trying to get someone to believe something whether he 
wants to believe it or not” but “puzzlement, curiosity, a desire to understand.”5 
Our aim in philosophy is “explanation rather than proof.”6 However, even if we 
agree with Nozick we might be tempted to prove to others that one view is better 
than another by arguing that one view has superior explanatory power relative to 
another. Possibly to lend our efforts a more objective air this approach obscures 
the reality that our explanations rest on our personal judgments about the 
phenomena. When it comes to issues of ultimate concern we should only hold a 
view that we think best explains, or accounts for, the phenomena, but proving to 
others that this view possesses superior explanatory power is something we 
cannot do. However, we can give witness to the explanatory value it holds for us, 
including the phenomena we deem worthy of our attention, and invite others to 
give these their consideration.  
 Given that discourse about issues of ultimate concern rests on personal 
judgments it must include personal witness or testimony. We cannot excise the 
need for this from ethical discourse by an appeal to explanatory power. In a 
comment that fits nicely with Nozick's above Leif Enger states,  
The lovely part of being a witness is that you can’t compel belief. All 
you can do is say: here is what happened. In saying this the 
witness is only doing his job; how people respond is their own 
                                                 
5
 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, p. 13. 
 
6
 Ibid. 
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burden, their own responsibility. Whom would you say has more 
credibility: the man who pounds on the table insisting his story is 
true, or the one, who having the reputation of honesty, frees his 
listeners to decide for themselves?7 
  
Why give witness? What's the point of philosophical discourse if it ultimately boils 
down to this? Speaking directly to this question Borgmann writes, “if there is 
something that I have experienced as greater than myself and of ultimate 
significance” and if I “have profound regard for... [my] fellows [and their] welfare”, 
then I will want to join these concerns and act upon them.8 And this leads us 
beyond explanationism to exemplarism. Because narratives can convey 
normative content that theoretical discourse cannot they are able to portray a 
compelling vision of a life, or a way of being, that appeals to aspirations of what 
we might do and be. We address others by inviting them to search their 
experiences and aspirations and see for themselves if this view addresses these. 
I turn now to my argument that narrative imagery can convey normative content, 
including a vision of the good life, which exceeds that which can be presented 
discursively as a list of normative principles. 
Image and Analysis: Narrative Imagery for a Normative Agape  
  There are several possible ways to engage the New Testament narrative 
to develop an account of agape. The first is a distillative approach that relies 
upon conceptual analysis. The second is a metaphorical approach. The third 
involves some combination of the two. On the first approach one surveys the 
                                                 
7
 Leif Enger, Web Interview (www.wab.org), Writers & Books, Rochester NY, Feb. 19, 2004. 
  
8
 Borgmann, TCCL, p. 178. 
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central images of agape in the narrative and seeks to distill the normative content 
of agape from each of those images and present that content in discursive form 
as a set of moral principles. For example, in Gilbert Meilaender’s book on 
friendship he begins with the story of the Good Samaritan and relies on it as the 
central image to provide the determinative account of agape’s normative 
content.9 The content distilled from this image constrains the way agape is 
conceptualized. Agape is a form of neighbor love - it is a disinterested and 
universal form of benevolence.10  It is universal and disinterested in that it is a 
kind of caring that we direct toward all people without regard for, or consideration 
of, what distinguishes one person from another. It is an impersonal mode of 
concern akin to compassion. In contrast, a caring that is personal requires that I 
enjoy you as the particular you that you are an am committed to helping you 
become that you both for your sake and mine.11 Later in this chapter, and in the 
one that follows, I will argue that personal caring involves intimate identification. If 
a broader approach is taken that surveys a greater number of images, once the 
content has been distilled from each image one may develop a general account 
of love that best accounts for the various particulars that have been identified.   
 One could also aim to determine the normative content of agape by relying 
                                                 
9
 See Meilaender’s Friendship: A Study in Theological Ethics. The parable of the Good Samaritan 
is found in Luke 10:30-37. 
  
10
 Ibid., pp. 34, 15, 7, and 64. 
  
11
 On this account it is a good that I know you as the you that you are. There is nothing egocentric 
or selfishly self-serving in my wanting to enjoy you, or become capable of enjoying you, because 
the joy of knowing another in an intimate manner is a mutual or shared good. To know another in 
this fashion is an end that requires each person to become their truest self and to share that self 
with the other.  
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upon the distillations of others. Gene Outka, in Agape: An Ethical Analysis, 
exercises this kind of approach. He surveys a period of literature on the subject 
of agape in order to assess its basic normative content in its utmost generality, 
that is, the kind of content it possesses irrespective of circumstances.12 For 
practical purposes he restricts his survey to claims about neighbor-love, that is, 
to “those features most commonly said to characterize agape as an other-
regarding principle.”13 He states that in so doing he will pay a “large price” as 
some of the “profoundest themes,” for example, how love for God may shape the 
normative character of neighbor-love, will be explored only briefly or not at all.14 
Given this restricted scope Outka relies on the distilling work of others to present 
what John Cottingham calls “the main fact-stating propositional core” of agape’s 
normative content.15 For Outka this content is formulated in his principle of “equal 
regard.” Outka recognizes that the distillative approach of conceptual analysis 
leads to a general, and hence reduced, account of love and love’s demands.  
  The second method of developing a robust account of agape can be 
called the metaphorical approach. It maintains that apprehending the normative 
content of the narrative depiction of agape requires more than mere conceptual 
analysis of its imagery. The content of agape is not presentable apart from 
analogies or examples of agape-like love presented in narrative fashion. The 
depth of its emotional, volitional, and desiderative elements cannot be captured 
                                                 
12
 Outka, Agape: An Ethical Analysis, p. 7. 
 
13
 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
 
14
 Ibid., p. 8. 
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fully in a discursive account but must be “shown.” Rather than providing us with 
precisely worded conceptions of agape’s normative demands, the narrative 
provide snapshots of agape that taken together form a family photo album of 
sorts.16 Each image contributes to a fuller depiction of the love that is agape. 
Stories about common experiences like scouring the house for a lost coin, 
searching the surrounding countryside for a lost animal, and waiting for the return 
of a beloved son who has lost his way are used as metaphors to image the 
character of agape. I take it that the New Testament portrayal of the relationship 
between God and Jesus is the preeminent narrative image of agape. As I present 
support for the claim that narrative imagery can convey normative content in 
excess of that which can be captured in a set of normative principles I will also 
begin to untangle the relationship between this metaphorical approach and 
conceptual analysis.     
Conceptual Analysis and Normative Content 
 The central thesis of this chapter is that non-narrative normative accounts 
of love’s demands fail to convey normative content that is otherwise capable of 
depiction in narrative form. One way of making this evident is through examining 
a part-whole problem that faces conceptual analysis. Analysis is a process of 
idea formation where a generalization is derived from individual instances. 
Heschel observes that one of the dangers of this process is that it involves 
                                                                                                                                                 
15
 John Cottingham, The Spiritual Dimension: Religion, Philosophy, and Human Value, p. 83. 
 
16
 If my line of argument is correct, the use of narrative is important not merely as an aid to foster 
understanding for those who lack the interest or capacity for sophisticated, abstract thought but 
because it has the potential to convey content that cannot be presented in non-narrative form.  
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“separating a partial aspect or quality from a total situation” which implies that 
there can be “a split between situation and idea.” The problem with such a 
process is that it encourages us to “disregard… the fullness of what transpires” in 
a given situation, that is, the whole, and mistake that partial aspect, the part, for 
that whole.17 Cottingham uses the metaphor of a juice extractor to illustrate this 
part-whole problem that faces conceptual analysis. He writes,  
A juice extractor does not… give us the true essence of a fruit; what 
it often delivers is not a very palatable drink plus a pulpy mess. 
Someone who has only tasted strawberries via the output of a 
juicer… may have a radically impoverished grasp of what it is about 
the fruit that makes the strawberry lover so enthusiastic.18  
 
To someone who is familiar with strawberries the juice distilled from them could 
not be mistaken as their essence. That essence can be captured only by the 
whole. If we were to introduce someone to strawberries who was unfamiliar with 
them and we only had the juice and the pulp to give them, there is no way they 
could develop an adequate conception of the whole strawberry from such a 
partial representation.  
 Conceptual analysis gives primacy to intellectual or cognitive content that 
can be stated in abstract, propositional form. Because metaphorical language is 
considered to be imprecise and ambiguous, painstaking efforts are made to 
express these facts in literal fashion. When it approaches metaphorical or 
figurative discourse, Cottingham argues, it seeks “to extract the juice… the 
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 Abraham Heschel, The Prophets, p. 221. 
 
18
 Cottingham, The Spiritual Dimension, p. 80. 
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relevant set of theses – from what is taken to be a largely irrelevant background 
‘pulp’ or ‘mush’ of emotive, poetic, narrative, and symbolic elements.”19 It 
assumes that “we may distill out from the story a core of metaphysical claims”, 
that is, it assumes that there exists a “pure cognitive juice” to be extracted.20 The 
critical assumption here is that the content that matters ethically can be 
separated, or split, from the narrative and be expressed in non-narrative form 
without incurring loss. Cottingham states,  
On this view, there are ‘the facts’, which are expressible in quite 
unambiguous and literal terms; and any emotional component is 
seen as a kind of extraneous ‘add-on’ – of no real interest in terms 
of the structure and the properties of the facts….21  
 
A narrative, on this account, may supply or indicate an emotional content for the 
moral principle it illustrates but this emotional aspect is not a part of its normative 
content. This assumption concerning content may lead us to overlook the 
possibility that there is normative content that is at least partly emotional and 
desiderative in structure that cannot be conveyed to the necessary depth without 
narrative imagery. One way the inadequacy of conceptual analysis can be made 
evident is to take the distillations of agape by someone like Kierkegaard and try 
to “build back up” to the New Testament imagery of agape. In examining 
Kierkegaard in this manner it will become apparent that the moral principles he 
generates lose critical normative content that is contained in the narrative 
                                                 
19
 Ibid., pp. 79-80. 
 
20
 Ibid., pp. 80, 82. 
 
21
 Ibid., p. 83. The view of emotions implicit here is one that is critiqued in the previous chapter. I 
argue there that emotions are evaluative judgments or evaluative feelings whose structure 
contains cognitive content. They are not passive sensations like taste or touch. 
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account. These principles fail to fully portray the character of that love that is 
presented in the narrative. 
 There are many images used to portray the character of agape in the New 
Testament. Two important ones are the Parable of the Prodigal Son and the 
Father-Son relationship between God and Jesus. These images represent 
“wholes.” When conceptual analysis is applied to these wholes it breaks down 
these images into “parts”. There are several steps we can take to show that 
these analyses represent only partial aspects of the original whole. First, identify 
the elements that have been distilled, that is, the content or parts. Second, take 
the parts and based solely on them find an image to convey that content. In this 
step we attempt to reverse the process of the juice extractor. Ultimately we want 
to know if we can build back up to strawberry from only the juice and pulp. Third, 
compare that image to the original image. What we will discover is that what 
serves as a suitable image for an account of love that is based on the distillations 
given in a discursive account will be something less than was found in the 
original image. The images based on the abstract normative account will fail to 
convey the fullness of the love depicted in the original image. We cannot take the 
parts and build back up to the whole. Imagery, that is, a complex narrative, is 
necessary to show the normative content in its fullness or depth. An illustration of 
how the results of conceptual analysis, when taken by themselves, yields a 
diminished account of this content can be found in Kierkegaard’s Works of Love. 
Soren Kierkegaard's Analysis of Love 
 When we take Kierkegaard’s distillation of the essence of love and love’s 
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demands, found in the early chapters of Works of Love, and seek to find an 
image to convey it that fits appropriately with that content, that image will present 
a diminished picture of love compared to the image(s) of agape found in the New 
Testament. The images rooted in his analysis fail to convey the fullness of the 
love that is imaged in the Father-Son relationship or of that portrayed in Jesus’ 
story of The Prodigal Son. In the first few chapters Kierkegaard is occupied with 
distancing the Christian conception of love, agape, from the pagan ideal of 
friendship that is based on preference and natural inclination. He writes, 
One must rather take care to make the issue very clear in order 
calmly to admit in the defense that Christianity has thrust erotic love 
and friendship from the throne, the love based on drives and 
inclinations, preferential love, in order to place the spirit’s love in its 
stead, love for the neighbor....22 
 
Though distinguishing agape from these other loves is a worthy and important 
goal, it appears that in his desire for clarity he presses his point too far and ends 
up with a diminished account of agape.  
 According to Kierkegaard love is only “eternally secured against every 
change” and thus of “enduring continuance” when it has “undergone the change 
of eternity”, that is, when the sole motivation for love becomes duty.23 He writes, 
“Only when it is a duty to love, is love eternally secured.”24 Such love is 
independent.25 This is important, he argues, because loving another cannot be 
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 Soren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, p. 44. 
 
23
 Ibid., pp. 29, 31, and 32. 
 
24
 Ibid., p. 32; italics his. 
 
25
 Ibid., See pp. 37-40 for his account of love’s independence. 
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based upon, or depend on, one’s need for love, though it is not incompatible with 
that need. Nor can love depend on the object of love. When love is a response 
that is evoked by love’s object it is dependent on something outside itself. These 
are both forms of dependence because the law of love’s existence in each, that 
is, the principle that animates love, is something external to love itself. Such 
externally motivated actions are not love. Instead, love loves because it shall 
love, that is, by becoming duty; love “depends only on love itself through 
eternity’s shall.”26 The animating force in love is duty. It is a dutiful response to 
God’s commandment to love, such a command being eternity’s shall, that alone 
strips the imperfections from our otherwise merely human loves.27 The charge 
brought against erotic love and friendship is that they are preferential loves, that 
is, they are based on the lover’s preference for the character of the one loved, 
and as such they are merely forms of self-love.28 In these cases the lover loves 
that which he naturally enjoys or finds pleasurable; he’s merely satisfying his own 
inclinations. Such love is selfishly self-serving.  
 Christian love, in contrast to friendship and erotic love, is love for neighbor 
and according to Kierkegaard that is self-denial’s love. Eternity’s shall guarantees 
the self-denial that enables love to be directed to all. We must deny the 
inclinations that would lead us to prefer one person over another. To love from 
duty alone secures that the self will not be loving others merely because there is 
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 Ibid., pp. 38 and 39. 
  
27
 Ibid., p. 43. 
 
28
 Ibid., p. 52-53. 
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“something in it” for the self. Kierkegaard writes, “Insofar as you love the beloved, 
you are not like God, because for God there is no preference... But when you 
love the neighbor, then you are like God.”29 Neighbor love is the essence of 
God’s love. The neighbor for Kierkegaard is the “utterly unrecognizable 
dissimilarity between persons” or the “eternal equality before God” that is 
common to all persons, even our enemies.30 The neighbor is seen “only with 
closed eyes”, that is, only when we are blind to the features that make one 
individual different from another.31 It is these differences that form the basis for 
friendship and erotic love – we prefer one person over another on the basis of 
such differences. God loves blindly in that he loves all without distinction. The 
one who loves God must love others in the same fashion as God. With this 
characterization of love we are now ready to consider what image would most 
fittingly portray it. 
 As I seek to image Kierkegaard’s distillation of the essence of agape it is 
important to acknowledge his positive effort to elevate something important about 
the character of Christian love. By making love an expression of duty he seeks to 
secure love’s eternality or unchanging character. By making love blind he seeks 
to secure its universality or unconditionality. He aims to emphasize that God 
loves everyone and that that love, which we also are to extend toward others, is 
not based upon worldly characteristics or behavior that might distinguish one 
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 Ibid., p. 63. 
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 Ibid., p. 68. 
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 Ibid. 
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person from another. Rich people are not intrinsically more worthy of love than 
the poor, the virtuous more than the immoral, or the beautiful more than the ugly. 
Many of us find it difficult to love people without giving preference to some of 
them based on such characteristics as these. Kierkegaard wants to make it clear 
that such actions do not constitute Christian love. 
 Keeping these positive aims of Kierkegaard in mind, we must still ask: 
What image might best fit, or portray, the content of Christian love that he has 
provided in these chapters? This is the second step in the three-step process 
outlined above. Interestingly, Kierkegaard himself supplies the following 
metaphor to represent, at least partially, the normative content of his extraction. 
Love for another, to meet the exacting demands of Christian love, must be blind. 
A blind person images the spirit of God’s love because such a person can’t see 
who they are loving and must love all without reference to any distinctions. 
Moreover, love issues forth from duty and has no aim, nor purpose other than the 
giving of love itself. There is nothing about the other as that particular other that 
evokes love or makes love a fitting response, nor can there be any desire or 
inclination in the lover that makes love what love essentially is, that is enduring 
and eternally secure, except love issuing forth out of duty. Love is not externally 
motivated but only internally so.32  
 Anders Nygren, following Kierkegaard, characterizes God’s love as 
                                                 
32
 Kierkegaard's conception of love seems to be that kind of “overmoralized ideal of benevolence” 
that Robert Adams aims “to combat” because it “would not allow God to desire, for its own sake, 
a relationship with creatures.” He appears quite possibly to be one of the “many [who] have 
concluded that divine love should be identified with benevolence with no place in it for self-
interest.” See Adam's Finite and Infinite Goods, pp. 132 and 136. 
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“spontaneous and ‘unmotivated’”, that is, as a love that has “no motive outside 
itself.”33 Similarly, Max Scheler writes,  
There is no longer any ‘highest good’ independent of and beyond 
the act and movement of love! Love itself is the highest of all 
goods! The summum bonum is no longer the value of a thing, but of 
an act, the value of love itself as love – not for its results and 
achievements.34 
 
The account of God’s love provided by Kierkegaard, and echoed by Nygren and 
Scheler, may possibly be best imaged as an impersonal, unidirectional force like 
a river.35 A river moves forward, it flows, without desired end or aim; it is blind.  
God’s love spills out of him because it is the character of such love to be spilled 
out. It’s pouring forth has no desired relational end or aim; it cares not about a 
response from the one loved. Instead of Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover we have 
God as Unmoved Lover. God loves not as an expression of an interest to 
accomplish some goal, for example, to establish personal communion or 
fellowship with the one loved but merely because it is the character of God to 
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 Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, p. 76. In particular, for Nygren, God’s love is not motivated by 
the personal worth of men or women, that is, it is not dependent on our moral goodness. God’s 
love is “indifferent to value” and “any thought of valuation whatsoever is out of place in connection 
with fellowship with God.” As cited in Paul J. Wadell’s Friendship and the Moral Life, p. 88. 
 
34
 Max Scheler, Ressentiment, p. 66-67. Like Nygren he emphasizes that agape is not motivated. 
He writes, “in the Christian view, love is… [an] act of the spirit (not a mere state of feelings, as for 
the moderns), but it is nevertheless not a striving and desiring, and even less a need. These acts 
consume themselves in the realization of the desired goal. Love, however, grows in its action. 
And there are no longer any rational principles, and rules or justice, higher than love, independent 
of it and preceding it, which should guide its distribution among men according to their value.” 
 
35
 Moreover, both the character of human agents and the character of the love with which God 
haves them love also appears impersonal. Nygren, in Agape and Eros, writes that a person “is 
merely the tube, the channel, through which God’s love flows.” See p. 735 and also p. 740. 
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love.36 Moreover, in its Kantian character God doesn't will the good of others 
because it brings him joy to love others but because it is God's duty. His love 
lacks an emotional concern for us as the particular persons we are (or are being 
fashioned by God to be). On this account a personal communion that is both 
nurtured and sustained, indeed constituted, by ongoing acts of love aimed at 
enjoying the other and being enjoyed by that other (or creating the conditions 
necessary for such enjoyment) are extraneous to the character of love.37 It 
should be evident that the moral character of loving actions will take their shape 
according to how the volitional, emotional, and desiderative features that 
constitute love are characterized.  
 As we examine the images that seem to portray best the content of love 
according to Kierkegaard we need to ask two questions that are closely related. 
These two questions are a part of the final step in the three-step process, 
outlined above, of assessing whether we can build back up to the whole from the 
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 What is the character of this “spilled out” love? Scheler describes it as a love that stoops, or 
bends down, to serve. See Ressentiment, pp. 65-70. This leads me to ask: In what ways do we 
most need to be served? Our deepest needs may indicate the profoundest ways in which 
someone who loved us could serve us. What if our deepest need is to be in a relationship with 
God characterized by intimate personal knowing? Regarding this Adam's writes, “the moral value 
of actions often depends at least as much on what they express about personal relationships as 
on what they cause, or are meant to cause by way of benefit... to individuals... [and] there is a 
range of behavior in which benevolent motivation and an interest in a personal relationship for its 
own sake are intertwined... [for example] expressions of affection normally indicate an interest in 
our relationship with the other person, and are not sincere if we do not value the relationship for 
its own sake.” From Finite and Infinite Goods, p. 143. As with Kierkegaard it's not clear that 
Scheler's account of God's love has room within it to include this kind of self-interest as part of its 
motivation. 
 
37
 Liz Carmichael describes this as a “disinterested altruism” in which a person does good things 
for another, not only because it is good to do so (that is, it is not done merely to gain some 
advantage), but also without any interest or desire to enjoy a mutual relationship – of giving and 
receiving - with the one on whom the goods were bestowed. See Friendship: Interpreting 
Christian Love, pp. 102-104, 186-187, and 200. For a helpful discussion of both the values and 
limitations of this altruistic conception of benevolence for capturing important characteristics of a 
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parts. First, is this the way the New Testament images the love between God and 
Jesus or that love portrayed in the Parable of the Prodigal Son? The loving 
relationship between Jesus as Son and God as Father provides essential 
narrative imagery because the character of love that Jesus commands others to 
love with is that which is exemplified in this unique relationship. Second, could 
we build back up to these New Testament images on the basis of Kierkegaard’s 
analysis?  
 In response to the first question, on Kierkegaard’s account Jesus loves the 
Father not because of who the Father is as the particular person that he is but 
because it is Jesus’ duty. The same holds for the Father’s love toward Jesus. 
Their love to one another, in order to be love, must be an expression of duty 
alone or the eternality of their love is jeopardized. Neither the Son’s love for the 
Father, nor the Father’s for the Son, can be motivated because it is the fitting 
response to the one who is loved; their love for the other cannot be born from 
wanting to do justice to that other by responding appropriately to him.38 If their 
love for the other is evoked by a vision of the particular character or unique 
personhood of that other, such love is no longer blind. Moreover, their love for 
one another could not be an expression of a mutual longing for personal 
relationship where each desires to give of their self to the other and receive the 
self of the other. They must love each other with passionate devotion because it 
                                                                                                                                                 
full conception of love see Adam's Finite and Infinite Goods, pp. 136-146.   
 
38
 For more on love as “fitting response” see Daniel Hardy and David F. Ford, Praising and 
Knowing God, pp. 1-11. 
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is their duty not because it is their desire. The essence of God’s love is neighbor 
love. This love is distinct from other lesser loves because by its very nature it is a 
“moral task.”39 The pagan view of erotic love and friendship are deficient because 
they lack a moral task; they are merely good fortune. Agape is distinct from 
pagan loves in its emphasis on duty and its corresponding stringent moral 
character. 
 Kierkegaard’s image of the essence of God’s love is very different than the 
manner in which the New Testament images this relationship and the love that 
characterizes it. Jesus’ love for the Father and the Father’s for Jesus are each 
focused on the particularity and distinctiveness of the other. As Hardy and Ford 
put it - the focus of fascination, wonder, amazement, and commitment is the 
other person in all their individuality.40 In the relationship between Jesus and the 
Father each is the focus of the other. But if Christian love is blind, there can be 
no such external focus. Love is blind to the particularity of the other. Neighbor 
love, as the essence of God’s love, dictates that what is loved is the “eternal 
equality before God” that is common to all persons.41 The particularity of the 
individual cannot serve, even partially, as the motivation for love. The gravity of 
the error here may be illustrated with a question. Would it sound right if God said 
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 Kierkegaard, Works of Love, pp. 50-51. He seems to think that love in order to be love must be 
hard and cut against the grain of our character. Though it is the case that loving others is hard for 
us, especially those who have injured us, would love cease to be love if it became both easier for 
us to love others and something we desired to do? If love ceases to be love when loving others 
becomes easy, then the Father’s love for Jesus must not be love either. 
 
40
 Hardy and Ford, Praising and Knowing God, pp. 6-7. 
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 Kierkegaard, Works of Love, p. 68. 
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to Jesus, “I love you, but only because it is my duty”? How would that sound if we 
were to say that to God? While it may be my children’s duty to love me, if they 
only love me because it is their duty something is amiss. Put somewhat 
differently, love involves more than merely doing good for another out of a sense, 
or a fulfillment, of one's duty.42 Robert Adams argues that such an account would 
fail to depict the fullness of love. He writes, “What persons need in their 
relationships with others goes far beyond anything that can or should be spelled 
out in a system of rules of duty... If I am committed only to do my duty to you, my 
commitment seems more to duty than you.”43 In contrast, love involves being 
committed to a particular person as such and “not just to appropriate behavior.”44 
This brings us to the following related point.  
 Love’s dynamic, or movement, is completely internal according to 
Kierkegaard. It is neither a response to, nor does it seek a response from, the 
one loved. Agape is not aimed at “seeking to preserve and create community,” 
that is, its aim is not to establish and sustain personal fellowship, nor is it “a 
                                                 
42
 Commenting on this Josef Pieper writes “…to repeat the words of Karl Jaspers, it is perfectly 
possible for there to be ‘charity without love,’ a doing good that lacks something decisive to make 
it love….” See Faith, Hope, and Love, pp. 196-197. I provide an example of this from Lawrence 
Blum in the section “Emotions as Evaluative Feelings” in Chapter Three that is worth restating 
here. He writes, “An integral part of the good to Sue in Bob’s act of visiting her in the hospital is 
that he is thereby showing concern for her. We cannot envisage the act of visiting prompted by 
some other motive, while still preserving the good to Sue of that act. Suppose that Bob’s 
motivation in visiting Sue is not concern for her but a sense of duty towards her. His attitude is not 
one of concern for how she is doing, or of making her feel better by his visit. There is no direct 
desire to see her.” Without the emotional aspects of love Bob's action is not as great a good to 
Sue as it could be. From Friendship, Altruism and Morality, p. 142 as cited in Caroline Simon's 
The Disciplined Heart, p. 31. 
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 Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, p. 172. 
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willingness to go to any length to restore community.”45 Instead as Scheler and 
Nygren claim, and in which they appear to express acutely Kierkegaard’s notion 
of love’s independence, the aim of love is the act of love itself, not anything that 
results from the act. Agape, to be agape, must not be seeking to effect, or 
achieve, anything external to its own expression. Love has no aim or vision other 
than the expression of itself. Works of love are important for their own sake. They 
are not warranted or find their motivation in the blessing they may bring to the 
ones loved. If love was motivated by such inclinations it would become 
something less than a moral task.  
 This conception of love seems to be rooted in a legal view of morality in 
which respect for law is elevated over a passionate concern for persons and 
personal relationships. Fulfilling the demands of love seems akin to our 
relationship to a justice that is imaged legally as when depicted as a blindfolded 
virgin.46 Justice so imaged has no aim other than its own impartial administration; 
it is important for its own sake and neither its validity nor its motivation lies “in the 
blessings it brings to man.”47 Howard Robinson describes this legal conception of 
justice as one that lacks vision. This justice doesn’t recognize fellowship – that 
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 Martin Luther King, Jr. as cited in A Theory of Agape by Stephen G. Post, p. 25. Heschel 
critiques such notions of independence. He writes, “What the Lord requires of man is more than 
fulfilling one’s duty. To love implies an insatiable thirst, a passionate craving. To love means to 
transfer the center of one’s inner life from the ego to the object of one’s love.” See The Prophets, 
p. 207 ff..  
 
46
 See Norman Robinson, Christian Justice, pp. 55-59 and 69-71; Abraham Heschel, The 
Prophets, pp. 215-220; and George MacDonald's, “Justice,” in Unspoken Sermons. Our legal 
conception of justice, though possibly necessary to ensure impartiality, is an incomplete account 
of justice precisely because it fails to see the interpersonal character of personhood.  
  
47
 Heschel, The Prophets, p. 216. 
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we owe ourselves to one another - as its aim.48 An unloving act is condemned 
because a law has been broken, a duty shirked, rather than because a person 
has been hurt. It fails to recognize that breaking fellowship, or failing to seek to 
establish it, may constitute our greatest moral failure. The ethical character of 
God’s love is not passionate concern for the lives of individual persons but the 
ethical in and for itself.49 Such a love is impersonal.50 Thus, in answer to the first 
question it appears that the New Testament images the character of God’s love 
differently than does Kierkegaard.51  
 It should be apparent that we could not take Kierkegaard’s analysis and 
imagery and build up to the imagery of the Father-Son relationship or that of the 
Parable of the Prodigal Son. This is the answer to the second question raised 
above. A father, like the one in the parable, loves his children with his eyes wide 
open. Love is creative of distinction, not blind to it. Each child is passionately 
loved in their particularity with a vision toward nurturing and establishing that 
child in their unique individuality. One child is not interchangeable with another.52 
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 Robinson, Christian Justice, pp 69-72. 
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 Heschel, The Prophets, p. 215-219. 
 
50
 Gilbert Meilaender writes, in Friendship: A Study in Theological Ethics, that being loved with 
agape “does not offer all that we need or want. To be loved with agape alone is, however 
important, not sufficient: for it is too impersonal.” See p. 64. It is impersonal because it is not 
aimed at wanting to know the other, that is, it is not aimed at establishing a relationship with the 
other as that other. On Kierkegaard's account God can fulfill the demands of love completely 
without wanting to know us. See also Paul J. Wadell's Friendship and the Moral Life, pp. 89-90. 
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 I am not alone in recognizing the austerity of Kierkegaard's conception of love as depicted in 
the Works of Love. Henry Bugbee admits that though he may be misreading this work it seems to 
have “much to say about love, the neighbor, and loving the neighbor, but little in it to quicken the 
understanding with respect to these.” See The Inward Morning, p. 95. 
 
52
 One charge brought against that love that is characterized as unidirectional and independent is 
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In the prodigal son story the father’s response on the return of his estranged son 
- he runs out to embrace his son while his son is still far off - indicates a fierce 
longing for union or re-union with his son. He wants to be with, that is, to share in 
the life of, his son. The depth of the father’s joy upon his return is an indicator of 
the depth of the father’s longing. If the father did not desire to be with his son as 
that son, his son’s return would mean nothing to that father. The story relies on 
the unique character of a father’s heart toward his son to get its force; his love 
has an aim – a loving relationship with his son – and that aim is intrinsic to the 
character of his love. The shape of that love is made evident through the 
characters and events of the story. If the essence of God’s love is its 
independence - that in its abundance it blindly flows like an impersonal river with 
no other purpose than the expression of itself - there would be no cause for the 
father’s joy upon the son’s return. This would be so because that father has no 
personal stake in that relationship. The son, like any number of stones in a river,  
is loved because he is in love's path.     
 The cost of conceptualizing love’s motivation as strictly internal is that love 
is shut up within itself; it is reduced to an impersonal force. Love does not find its 
consummation in the creating and sustaining of personal relationships. It is 
indifferent to response. It does not long for reunion. Its satisfaction is found in its 
expression and is not enhanced by the response of the one it touches. Its joy is 
                                                                                                                                                 
that the recipient of such love is interchangeable with any other. Wadell raises this charge in 
Friendship and The Moral Life, pp. 89-90; and Daniel Day Williams in The Spirit and The Forms 
of Love, p. 114. Williams writes, “If I am loved merely as one who illustrates a general type, then I 
know that I am really not loved at all. I dissolve into a universal who is ‘loved’ by another 
universal.” It is an impersonal conception of love. Outka, in Agape, responds to this charge as it is 
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solitary. Its independence leaves no room within itself to house the motivation 
provided by what Kierkegaard conceives of as an external aim. Its fundamental 
aim is internal, that is, to follow law. We may need, and seek, relationship but this 
is not love’s need or demand. We must now return to Cottingham’s juice 
extractor. The tender affection and longing for joyful re-union with an estranged 
child, as conveyed by this narrative, is not picture-able in terms of a blind person 
who, as a stranger, loves everyone that he happens to encounter. If all we have 
to begin with is this picture of blind love, we could not build from it to the longing 
imaged in the parable any more than we could know the flavor, texture, and 
character of tasting a fresh strawberry if all we had to go on was a glassful of 
pulpy extract. On Kierkegaard’s analysis love and love’s demands has been 
presented in such a way that diminishes or distorts the original whole.  
 If love is to be conceived personally, that is, as more than just a power or 
force, it must contain within it a joyful hope of reciprocity – a longing that the 
person loved would gladly enter into relationship by responding with self-giving 
to, and a joyful reception of, the other. Mutual affection, characterized in part by 
this wanting to be received by the one you have given yourself to as well as a 
wanting to receive the self of the other, is an essential part of this personal giving 
and receiving.53 The emotional and desiderative character of joy is a facet of this 
                                                                                                                                                 
brought against his view of agape as “equal regard.” See pp. 260-274.   
 
53
 Edmond La B. Cherbonnier, in “Macmurray’s Transformation of Ethics,” writes, “Mutual 
affection, then is what human beings are made for… Morality is the expression of personal 
freedom. That freedom is grounded in our capacity to be real and to love reality. The supreme 
reality of human life is the reality of persons and of persons in personal relation with one another. 
Friendship, therefore, is the essence of morality.” The intention of God in creation is to form a 
universal community of persons characterized by friendship. Cherbonnier's exploration of 
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affection; it forms part of the evaluative perspective that it is good to know the 
other as that particular other; thus, it also involves a commitment to the identity of 
the other.54 When love is characterized as having a higher purpose than the 
securing and sustaining of personal communion, love might be service but such 
service by itself does not constitute a love that is personal. Stooping low to serve 
is not the essence of God and God’s love as Scheler claims it to be.55 It may be a 
facet of love but it’s not the whole. Service can be a form of giving that is hollow, 
that is, it can easily be empty of the self. Such a love may seek “to remedy 
misfortune without creating intimacy,” in fact, it need not even aspire to intimacy, 
and yet be approved as adequately fulfilling the demands of love.56 This 
represents a failure to realize that man’s greatest misfortune, because it is his 
greatest need, is intimate personal relationships. God’s stooping reveals not the 
essence of God’s love but is a reflection of the depth to which God is willing to 
descend in order to establish and sustain personal communion.57 It reveals the 
extent of God’s longing for union with human beings.58 God gives his self 
                                                                                                                                                 
Heschel’s view yields a similar point. Heschel argues that our ethical motivation is to be rooted in 
the hope of sharing in God’s emotions and of “thereby cooperating with God in creating a 
community of mutual friendship,” that is, of “mutual affection.” See “Divine Pathos and Prophetic 
Sympathy.” 
    
54
 In Chapter Five I will provide an extended account of the kind of identification central to 
personal love. 
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 Scheler, Ressentiment, p. 67. 
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 Post, A Theory of Agape, p. 27. 
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 Ibid., pp. 25-27, 33, and 49-50. Abraham Heschel writes that the essence of God's moral 
character as revealed in the Hebrew scriptures is God's “willingness to be intimately involved in 
the history of man.” See The Prophets, p. 225. 
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 Concerning the character of God's longing as portrayed in the biblical narrative H.R. 
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because he desires that self to be received. He wants to enter into relationships 
with others, that is why he gives himself. Love is the giving of one’s self and it 
hopes to be received and hopes to receive the other’s self-giving. A love that has 
no room for this is a love that appears to go beyond Kierkegaard's idealization of 
self-denial to some form of self-annihilation – there is no room for the self in this 
account of love; the self does not have any legitimate desires that can 
legitimately be satisfied by another. 
Affective Normative Content Requires Narrative Imagery to Portray It Fully 
 We cannot distill a set of normative principles from the New Testament 
narrative that can adequately portray the normative character of that love. Any 
set of principles will inevitably provide a diminished account of that love. Further 
support for this thesis is that affective normative content is dependent on 
narrative imagery or exemplars to be conveyed. This becomes evident when we 
seek to capture the character of intimate, personal knowing in a set of normative 
principles. It is not the case that any account of friendship or communion will 
count as personal knowing. A set of normative constraints will likely help us 
identify conceptions that are faulty. Any account that says that doing wrong for a 
friend is morally acceptable, as Cicero argues, would be an inadequate 
account.59 However, a set of normative constraints is no substitute for an account 
of love in narrative form as a set of constraints, by themselves, cannot 
                                                                                                                                                 
Mackintosh writes, “that while in one sense God might seem to have no need of us, since we can 
add nothing to His glory and His power, yet in a far deeper sense He does need us, and in his 
longing is prepared to go all lengths to reach and win the guilty. We are dealing with a love that 
does not wait to calculate the return upon its capital before flinging its riches wide upon the 
needy.” See his Sermons, p. 144. 
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adequately image the fullness of that love's content. 
 One could respond to these claims by saying that a normative account of 
agape reached through conceptual analysis may not be as robust as that which 
is capable of being portrayed in a narrative account yet still serve as an 
indispensable guide to right living and right thinking about love’s demands. It 
might also be argued that my evaluation of Kierkegaard’s analysis was 
inadequate because it left out affective normative content. Surely Kierkegaard as 
well as Scheler and Nygren would concur that God’s love is a fatherly, tender, 
and yet fierce, love that it is characterized by a longing to be reunited in loving 
relationship with his children. If these emotional and desiderative qualities of 
agape are considered normative and put into propositional form, then 
Kierkegaard’s analysis could be saved. It would provide the robust conception of 
agape that we need.  
 I maintain that the qualities of tenderness, fierceness, fatherliness, and 
longing for reunion cannot be portrayed without narrative imagery supplied by 
literary sources or actual exemplars. Thus, to the extent affective qualities like 
these are part of the normative content of agape, right thinking about love’s 
demands will require intimate engagement with narrative imagery. For example, 
not only the character of love's tenderness but also its depth are qualities that 
can only be shown. I concur with Hallie when he remarks that he can understand 
moral guidelines only insofar as he can “understand a story that embodies them” 
Without stories to illuminate moral principles, he writes, “I would not understand 
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 Cicero, De Amicitia, xi-xiii. 
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the principles at all. They would be words about words about words.”60 Like 
Murdoch he realizes that robust moral content cannot be adequately conveyed 
as a list of principles but must be shown. Of course such stories can include 
those that are embodied in the actual lived lives of others. We could consider 
such exemplars as living images or stories. It is time now to examine why 
affective normative content is dependent on narrative imagery.  
 Consider the following candidate for one aspect of an affective normative 
constraint distilled from the Prodigal Son story: You should love others with a 
tender-hearted, fatherly compassion. Setting aside questions about how and why 
someone would come to hold this as a constraint, I suggest that these affective 
qualities of compassion – “tender-heartedness” and “fatherliness” cannot be 
adequately portrayed for our understanding without relying on narrative imagery. 
This includes those that are portrayed in the actual interaction between persons 
that Caroline Simon calls the “storied” character of our experience.61 Whether 
these images are supplied from a story like the Prodigal Son or the account of 
the relationship between Jesus and his Father or from persons that we actually 
know, the need for narratives to fill out the volitional, desiderative, and emotional 
character of such an affective normative constraint becomes evident when we try 
to portray these affective qualities without a story or an exemplar.  
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 Philip Hallie, Tales of Good and Evil, Help and Harm, p. 6. 
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 Simon, The Disciplined Heart, p. 33. She writes, “Lived experience has the elements of 
narrative: it involves purpose as well as mystery, plans and intentions as well as accidents, 
particularity as well as “the moral of the story.” In trying to understand ourselves, we develop a 
narrative grasp of our lives.” When I refer to narrative I intend this term to be understood in this 
broad sense that includes actual examples that can be found in the storied character of our lives. 
It is only through the particularity of narratives that the full character, or depth, of those elements 
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 We know that there are good fathers and bad fathers. What principle could 
we identify that would help us distinguish between these fathers? For starters 
consider this principle: A good father does no harm to his children. This do no 
harm principle, however, is so general that it applies to the actions of all people 
and thus gives us no insight into what is distinctively fatherly. Maybe it could be 
stated: A good father takes joy in his child; he delights in his child and desires a 
heartfelt union with his child. This constraint gets us closer to fatherliness than 
the first. Notice however, that in order for it to be helpful the need for specificity, 
that is, for additional narrative detail, increases. To unpack the constraint would 
involve trying to convey what delight, joy, and longing for heartfelt union mean. 
This unpacking would require additional metaphorical description or actual 
exemplars of these qualities, that is, it would require that we move back into the 
domain of narrative description or imagery to aid our comprehension. To portray 
the character of the constraint would require telling a story in which it is 
embedded or pictured. After all, what does taking joy, delighting, or longing for 
heartfelt union look like? This constraint by itself would not be enough; the depth 
of its particular normative character must be shown. For example, the depth of 
longing for heartfelt union will depend upon the character of its narrative 
portrayal. There are a variety of depths at which this longing, or the other 
affective qualities, can be portrayed. What depth of longing makes one a good 
father? Two further examples, one from Aristotle and one from Bennett Helm, 
offer additional help to show the importance of sufficient narrative detail for 
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portraying affective normative content.   
 In the Nichomachean Ethics when Aristotle wants to capture the affective 
qualities of that kind of love characteristic of the highest form of friendship he 
turns to the image of a loving mother delighting in her infant or young child.62 It is 
this familiar yet potent image that provides one of the targets that Aristotle 
aspires to hit in his analysis of the character of that love. If we ask Aristotle: What 
is the character of that love that exists between friends? He gives us that picture. 
The reality that gives this image its currency can be analyzed to assess some of 
its normative content. For example, Aristotle points to circumstances in which a 
mother cannot hope to both love her child and have that love returned. Loving 
mothers love their child anyway. Though he argues that the highest form of 
friendship exists when a certain kind of love between individuals is mutual or 
reciprocated, he also argues that friendship depends on this capacity and 
willingness to love like a loving mother, that is, to gladly love even when that love 
may not be returned. However, to understand the character of that delight or 
gladness that a friend should love another with requires a narrative depiction or 
exemplar. It requires pointing to an image and saying, “Delight looks like that.” 
It’s a quasi-Kripkean approach to the meaning of this moral term. The character 
of delight is narrative dependent – it needs an exemplar. Another way to put this 
is that some moral content can only be shown. A moral principle that tells us to 
delight in another yet does not provide us with a narrative example that provides 
content regarding that delight would be to give us a vague or empty command. 
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 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1159a30.  
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There is normative content that is at least partly emotional and desiderative in 
character and cannot be conveyed without narrative imagery. 
 Some argue, based on Aristotle's passage from 1155b30-1156a5, that his 
conception of friendship can be adequately captured in the definition that two 
people are friends provided: 1) they have goodwill for each other, and 2) each is 
aware of the other's goodwill.63 While these two conditions are necessary for 
friendship they are insufficient to capture the intimate character of love that 
Aristotle thinks characteristic of friendship. He writes, “But such men may bear 
goodwill to each other; for they wish one another well and aid one another in 
need; but they are hardly friends because they do not spend their days together 
nor delight in each other and these are thought the greatest marks of friendship.” 
(1158a5-9) And, as we have seen, to portray that delight he provides an image of 
a mother and her child. Moreover, in 1166b30-1167a20, he argues that goodwill 
by itself, even when mutual, is not identical with friendship because it does not 
amount to the intimacy that is characteristic of friends. This underscores my point 
that describing a love that is intimate or personal requires more than a set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions. When Aristotle seeks to describe the 
intimacy that constitutes the highest form of friendship he appeals to narratives or 
exemplars to portray both the character of delight and the character of that 
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 That passage reads: “...but to a friend we say we ought to wish what is good for his sake. But 
to those who thus wish good we ascribe only goodwill, if the wish is not reciprocated; goodwill 
when it is reciprocal being friendship. Or must we add 'when it is recognized'? For many people 
have goodwill to those whom they have not seen but judge to be good or useful; and one of these 
might return this feeling. These people seem to bear goodwill to each other; but how could one 
call them friends when they do not know their mutual feelings? To be friends, then, they must be 
mutually recognized as bearing goodwill and wishing well to each other for one of the aforesaid 
reasons.” 
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activity involved in spending their days together.64  
 Another example of the importance of narratives or exemplars for 
depicting the character of love is provided by Bennett Helm. He argues that the 
kind of concern that distinguishes personal love from impersonal forms involves 
“taking to heart” the identity of the one loved.65 A person's well-being is crucially 
dependent on her identity, that is, “on whether she has upheld the values 
constitutive of her identity” and whether she succeeds or fails to live the kind of 
life she has determined is worth living.66 Personal concern for that person 
involves a commitment to respond emotionally to that which significantly impacts 
her well-being in either positive or negative ways.67 For example, if one cares for 
her personally her successes will evoke pride. This concern is not for one's own 
well-being but her's. It is a commitment to her identity for her sake and involves 
sharing her values, not in the sense that they become one's own, but out of one's 
respect for her role in shaping her own identity.68 He calls this commitment 
“intimate identification.”69 It is a deep concern for her identity that is analogous to 
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 For more on the character of this condition of spending their days together see Nichomachean 
Ethics 1170a5-1171b15 and 1166b30-1167a20. Aristotle appears to link the desire friends have 
to spend their days together with the other hallmark of friendship, that is, delight. He observes 
that when we genuinely delight in someone, where that delight is an expression of love and not 
merely the anticipation of how another can increase our own pleasure, that we will “long for” him 
when absent and “crave for his presence.” See 1167a1-10. 
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concern for one's own. He seeks to convey something of the depth of its 
interpersonal character by describing it as taking her identity to heart. He places 
these terms, identified here in italics, in quotations whenever he uses them. This 
seems to indicate an awareness on his part of their metaphorical character and 
that he needs their help to fully describe the affective character of love. I find his 
analysis extremely helpful, however, unlike Aristotle he fails to provide exemplars 
or images to give content to his notion of taking to heart another's identity. Depth 
of identification can vary – to what depth must love go? Showing that depth 
requires a narrative.70 Interestingly, in the final paragraph of his paper, he briefly 
points to a loving parent with a young child as a picture of how to take another's 
identity to heart in a manner that will help her to discover and uphold her 
identity.71 Again, here is normative content that is at least partly emotional and 
desiderative in character and as such needs to be conveyed with the help of 
exemplars or narrative imagery.  
 Returning to our discussion about fathers one could object to this 
conclusion that links normative content and narrative imagery by arguing that 
additional constraints about fatherliness would fill out its character. Perhaps for 
fatherliness we could say: A good father contends with tender fierceness for – 
passionately seeks to nurture – the reign of goodness both in his own heart and 
in his child’s. The natural response to such proposed affective normative 
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 In Chapter Five I will show how the New Testament narrative relies on its images of Jesus' 
loving relationship with God and his loving relationships with others to give content to the 
character of agape. These images are used to convey the depth of this kind of love. 
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 Helm, “Love, Identification, and the Emotions”, p. 27. 
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constraints would be: Show me what you mean. One might ask: How deeply 
does a good father contend? And, again, to do that requires a story. The qualities 
of “tender fierceness” or “passionate seeking” must be imaged and not merely 
stated discursively. Philip Hallie expresses our need for stories in order to think 
morally in the following way:   
At their best Kant and Mill’s philosophies are ingenious 
generalizations about particular people doing and feeling particular 
things. I can understand their principles only insofar as I can 
understand a story that embodies them. If there were no stories to 
illuminate their principles, I would not understand the principles at 
all. They would be words about words about words.72  
 
Even when stated with affective terminology a normative principle or constraint 
cannot image, or portray, the character of that affective normative content.73 We 
need examples or stories to supply that content. Regarding the importance of 
images for moral discourse, Murdoch writes that it seems impossible 
…to discuss certain kinds of concepts without resort to metaphor, 
since the concepts themselves are deeply metaphorical and cannot 
be analysed into non-metaphorical components without a loss of 
substance.74 
 
It is for reasons such as these that I concur with Nussbaum, Murdoch, and Hallie 
when they argue that emotive or literary styles are capable of capturing moral 
insights in ways that abstract theoretical writing is not. This is critical to keep 
before us as we seek to characterize the normative demands of agape. 
 
                                                 
72
 Hallie, Tales of Good and Evil, Help and Harm, p. 6. 
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Emotional Stories and Moral Thinking 
 Having established that discursive accounts of love’s demands fail to 
convey normative content that is otherwise capable of depiction in narrative form 
we need to explore some of its implications for our own moral thinking and for our 
discourse with others. One implication already mentioned is that we cannot fully 
discuss the normative character of love, in particular, agape, without engaging 
the narratives about agape. If “knowledge of love is a love story,” as Nussbaum 
writes, then getting to know the character of a particular love, in this case agape, 
will require attending to the narrative that tells that story.75 Moreover, this 
narrative approach assumes that there are other faculties important for knowing 
in addition to those relied upon in abstract styles of discourse.76 Conceptual 
analysis presents distillations for our comprehension with no barriers to our 
understanding these facts beyond the proper application of our intellectual 
faculties.77 One way the narrative approach differs from this is that it recognizes 
that apprehension of content involves engaging emotional and moral facets of 
our being through our imagination and not merely our intellects. 
 At this point it becomes important to consider Nussbaum’s comment that 
trying to grasp some truths merely intellectually, especially truths about love, may 
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 Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge, p. 275.  
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 Ibid., pp. 21 and 7. See also Chapters 1 and 11. See also my Chapter Three where I presented 
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 H.R. Mackintosh, in The Christian Apprehension of God, remarks that there are intellectual 
methodologies, like scientific analysis, that “have no purchase on the entire personality” because 
they aim at knowledge that is “severely intellectual, impersonal, and unemotional” and, in so 
doing, leave the “conscience untouched.” See pp. 50 and 62. 
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be a way of “not suffering, not loving… [but] a stratagem of flight.”78 Our aversion 
to narrative forms of moral discourse may be based in our awareness, as 
Murdoch writes, that “Metaphors often carry a moral charge, which analysis in 
simpler and plainer terms is designed to remove.”79 Narratives, unlike discursive 
accounts, invite the reader to invest themselves in the story in an imaginative and 
emotional way and thus have the potential to reveal the reader's moral 
commitments. They require that you “put yourself” in the story. In doing so they 
hold the potential to evoke emotional responses that can reveal what constitute 
one's core evaluative judgments about the good life that are often hidden from 
one's own view. Our emotions are eudaimonistic – they are concerned with the 
value of some person or object as it pertains to our flourishing or well-being. Our 
emotional responses hold the potential to illuminate our orienting convictions - 
one's central evaluative judgments about the good life that guide our actions - 
that otherwise might remain hidden. Thus, we may need to approach narratives 
with a willingness to be searched ourselves rather than merely, or primarily, 
being the searchers. Narratives that provide “sufficient attention to particularity 
and emotion” require a kind of participation from the reader, Nussbaum argues, 
in which the text can serve as an “optical instrument” through which “the reader 
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becomes a reader of his own heart.”80 Narratives in their ability to robustly depict 
visions of the good life and that demand our emotional engagement for their 
apprehension can reveal our moral commitments and challenge us with an 
alternative moral vision.81  
 Imaginative participation with a narrative regularly requires an emotional 
participation with the narrator - we must be open and available to experience the 
emotions she is seeking to evoke - in order to understand the idea she is seeking 
to convey. To see things the way she sees them may require helping us to feel 
things the way she feels. In this case emotions are integral to the character of the 
normative content that is being presented and not merely a subjective response 
related to that same content. Cottingham argues that the emotional coloring that 
a narrative provides not only adds a subjective reaction to an objective state of 
affairs, but that the emotional coloring is a way of reconstituting the state of 
affairs itself.82 He writes, “Emotion is partly constitutive of the facts that are 
experienced”, that is, the emotion is part of the factual content that is to be 
experienced and yet itself is not of the character that it can be captured 
propositionally.83 We don’t know the quality of an emotion through a linguistic 
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 Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge, pp. 46-47. Halliday, in Reconciliation and Reality, also gives 
witness to this ability of narratives. He speaks of his experience with the New Testament 
narrative, in particular its account of the person of Jesus, as having the power to “unveil” his 
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description any more than we know the taste of coffee through such descriptions 
– we know such things through phenomenological acquaintance with them, that 
is, through experience.  
 In this way narratives can provide us with an opportunity to participate in 
what Cottingham calls “transformative ways of perceiving reality.”84 Peter Goldie 
describes it this way:  
 Coming to think of [the world] in [a] new way is not to be understood  
 as consisting of thinking of it in the old way, plus some added-on  
 phenomenal ingredient – feeling perhaps; rather, the whole way of  
 experiencing, or being conscious of, the world is new… The difference  
 between thinking of X as Y without feeling and thinking of X as Y with  
 feeling will not comprise just a different attitude towards the same content 
 – a thinking which was earlier without feeling and now is with feeling.  
 The difference also lies in the content, although it might be that this  
 difference cannot be captured in words.85 
 
If having certain emotions are integral to the character of normative content and 
not merely a subjective response related to that same content, then imaginatively 
entering into an emotional experience as fostered by a narrative may help us 
apprehend normative content. The emotional experience is one of the facts that 
constitutes a part of this new way of seeing. It is not that we come to a narrative 
with an emotion that we will use to aid this new way of seeing. It is a willingness 
to engage with a narrative in an emotional manner, that is, to allow it to evoke in 
us an emotional response that itself may partly constitute the normative attitude 
                                                                                                                                                 
to portray affective normative content that cannot be portrayed fully in discursive form. 
  
84
 Ibid., p. 85. 
 
85
 Peter Goldie, The Emotions, pp. 59f., original emphasis. Cited in Cottingham, The Spiritual 
Dimension, p. 85. 
196 
 
we are to have toward others.  
 If Cottingham and Goldie are correct, one can come to a narrative without 
this willingness to engage it emotionally it and fail to apprehend normative 
content that cannot be apprehended through an emotionally detached or 
disinterested approach. We may resist the manner in which narratives may unveil 
us to ourselves. Our understanding of the moral dimensions of our engagements 
with others may be occluded by self-protective emotional commitments. This fits 
Nussbaum's earlier comment that trying to grasp some truths merely 
intellectually, especially truths about love, may be “a stratagem of flight.”86 An 
example of how a narrative and narrator can engage us emotionally in order to 
help us apprehend normative content that is emotional in character is found in 
the New Testament story The Parable of the Prodigal Son.87 
 In the emotionally colored story of the Prodigal Son Jesus invites his 
audience to participate in a new way of seeing. The parable is directed toward 
religious leaders who are criticizing Jesus for spending time with people that they 
perceive to be morally and spiritually unfit. Their judgment is that if Jesus is good, 
he would not spend time with people of such undesirable character. In response 
Jesus offers a narrative. It addresses their unspoken assumptions about God, in 
particular the character of God’s love, the value of others, and their proper 
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 See Luke chapter 15. The fact that this story is self-referential, that is, that the narrator is 
speaking about himself in some fashion to people who know him or of him to varying degrees, 
means that the force of this narrative – at least to its original audience – would depend on one's 
assessment of the character of the person telling this story. Members of the audience cannot 
reject the opportunity for moral self-evaluation that the narrator is providing without rejecting, to 
some extent, the authority of the one telling the story. 
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relationship to both God and these others. He addresses them as if they asked, 
How are we to love? His answer: Like the father in this story. Agape is like this 
father's love and still yet more. To understand his picture of love he invites his 
listeners to “step inside” this story and imagine what it would feel like to be loved 
like this son or to love like this father. It is as if he asks, “What would it be like to 
have a dad that races out of the house to hug you and tell you he loves you after 
you did something you were sure would disappoint him and possibly lead him to 
reject or abandon you?” Or, possibly, “If you had a wayward child that returned 
home to you like this, wouldn’t you feel like celebrating too?” 
 By picturing a familiar set of relationships that evoke a familiar range of 
emotions Jesus seeks to engage the imagination of his listeners to convey the 
affective normative character of this love. I take it that the emotions it evokes 
toward the returning son are aimed at revealing the nature of their attitude toward 
the outcasts. One might discover that they're like the older brother who feels 
resentful that his father shows this love to his brother. Like the older brother they 
may not be able to see the goodness of the father’s love. They might find 
themselves judging that it is morally repugnant for the father to love the son in 
this manner. Thus, by evoking the emotions of the listeners, which are 
themselves morally evaluative, this parable is able to challenge their vision of 
God's love. He invites his critics to shift from seeing these others as worthy of 
rejection because of their moral and spiritual offenses to seeing them, as this 
father sees his son, as estranged family members for whom they should sorrow 
for and long for reunion. Love requires seeing them completely differently, that is, 
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having a different valuation of them, and that transformed way of seeing will be 
partly constituted by certain emotions.  
 Part of the moral robustness of the narrative depiction of agape is its 
affective normative content. Joy is an emotion, that is, it is an affective evaluative 
attitude that is a component of agape. In his famous passage on love the apostle 
Paul strives to articulate that agape is more than an indifferent benevolence even 
when that benevolence is exceptionally generous and sacrificial.88 Love, and the 
justice that issues from it, involves joy - and joy involves wanting the other and 
myself to be made the kind of persons capable of personal communion, that is, 
capable of enjoying the presence of the other as well as being enjoyed by that 
other.89 It is an affirmation of the evaluation that the other who has injured me is 
one that remains worth knowing in a manner that is personal. It recognizes that 
their present actions make them less the person they truly are and need to be 
while resisting the temptation to believe otherwise. The narrative imagery of this 
parable aims to give content to the affective character of this love; if a love does 
not possess this affective content then it is an altogether different kind of love. 
This is Goldie's point above. This love involves seeing others in a way that we 
previously did not see them. The necessity of this emotion as part of agape's 
structure makes the normative content of that love different.90  
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Conclusion 
   Narratives can serve as an indispensable vehicle for critical reflection 
about the character of love, personal relationships, and the good life. I have 
supported this thesis by arguing that narrative imagery can convey normative 
content that exceeds that which can be presented discursively as a list of 
normative principles. In light of this it is the case that conversation, or discourse, 
about what constitutes the good life will lack the requisite depth to meet the 
demands of our lives if it fails to take into account our need for narrative. 
However, speaking of exemplars or narratives as imaging normative content can 
be misleading. Exemplars present us with more than a batch of moral 
prescriptions. They speak not only to our sense of moral obligation but also to 
our aspirations – they show us not only what we must “do” but what we might 
“be.” They portray a life, or a way of being, that can address concerns like 
Becker's of “how to be a man” - that is, of how to live a vibrant life. A narrative 
may also unexpectedly awaken and illuminate aspirations that until then we did 
not know that we had. Theoretical ethical discourse cannot do this. Its inability to 
adequately portray the character of the good life in its fullness means that we 
cannot turn to it as a view of life that might “fit” with, or speak to, that which is 
deepest in our lives. This fact that narratives can convey normative content that 
otherwise could not be adequately portrayed provides us with grounds for 
engaging the New Testament directly to explore how it portrays the good life 
including the character of love and personal relationships. 
 In the following chapter I argue that the New Testament presents a portrait 
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of intimate, personal knowing in terms of the relational image of agape that is 
central to it. To understand agape we need to look at it in the context of the love 
story of which it is a part.91 This narrative presents two primary images of that 
love. The first is the pattern of engagement between God and Jesus that 
constitutes their love for one another. I use the term intimate identification for this 
pattern. The second is the manner in which God and Jesus seek to draw human 
persons into a relationship with God and others that shares the same character.  
I argue that the distinctive quality of this love requires narrative imagery or 
exemplars to be fully portrayed through.  
 The New Testament presents intimacy as a form of personal knowing that 
is a shared activity between persons that involves an ongoing encounter of their 
genuine selves. I argue that joy is an emotional and desiderative element of 
agape that shapes its moral character and is necessary for intimacy. Love for 
another as that other involves taking joy in that other, that is, it involves wanting 
to be with that other and to enjoy that other as the particular other that they are. 
Joy is both the result of, and a condition for, intimacy.92  
 I argue that this account of agape has the resources to address Becker's 
Concern that fidelity to another, in particular God, diminishes a person's 
autonomy. This narrative presents a portrait of the self, or person, as one in 
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which the capacities essential for personhood such as autonomy are not 
diminished through intimate identification with God but instead are most fully 
realized. Participating in an intimate, personal relationship with God requires an 
identification with God that, given God's character, requires and nurtures the 
development of our autonomy. Our capacity for intimate, personal engagement 
with God and others increases as our capacity for autonomy increases. Jesus, in 
his unparalleled capacity to engage God and others in a personal manner, is 
presented as the portrait of “how to be a man”, that is, of how to live a vibrant life. 
His identity is not diminished or obscured, but instead finds its unique expression 
in identification with the God he calls Father. 
 I will also show that this kind of personal knowing is capable of addressing 
the existential problem of meaning. On this account the human hunger for 
meaning, or significance, is one that finds its satisfaction not in theoretical or 
explanatory knowledge but in intimate, personal engagement with God and, 
through God, with others. Significance is found in being significant for Another, 
that is, in being loved by One who is worthy of our fullest love. Leo Tolstoy's  
testimony from his religious writings will be engaged to help support this view. 
This will contribute further to the view that our identity is not found in isolation 
from God and other persons but is most fully realized through participation in 
intimate, personal relationships with God and others.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
THE INTIMACY OF AGAPE 
Introduction 
 We can only discuss the normative character of agape to the depth we 
need by engaging the New Testament narratives about agape. The narrative 
imagery of the New Testament conveys normative content that exceeds that 
which can be presented discursively. This narrative is nothing if not a “love story” 
and the character of the love it portrays cannot be adequately depicted any other 
way.1 Two illustrations of the narrative dependency of normative content will 
orient this chapter's exploration of agape. The first is found in Jesus' admonition 
to his disciples where he states: “You are to love others as I have loved you.”2 To 
grasp the content alluded to here requires that we look at how Jesus loved those 
who he spoke this to. To do this requires looking at the narrative. In so doing we 
discover a second illustration of the narrative dependence of normative content, 
one that bears on the content of the first, in Jesus' statement that, “As the Father
                                                 
1
 Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge, p. 275. Charles Baxter writes that narratives provide “depth” by 
the way in which they address certain questions. Several essential ones are: “What do these 
characters want? ...what are they afraid of? ...what's at stake in the story? [and] …what are the 
consequences of these scenes or actions? ...if you don't know what's at stake in the story, it 
means that nothing stands to be gained or lost in it. Something has to be risked. The characters 
have to want something or wish for something.” Glimmer Train, Summer 2001, pp. 75-76. 
 
2
 John 13:34 and 15:12. 
 
203 
 
has loved me, so have I loved you.”3 Thus, the character of the love with which 
his followers are to love others is further elucidated by that love which is 
portrayed in the particular relationship between Jesus and his Father.4 To learn 
about the character of their love for one another we must turn to the narrative for 
the needed content.   
 Jesus' loving relationship with God and his loving relationships with others 
constitute the two central images of agape in the New Testament. These images 
have two sources - Jesus’ words, often in the story form in which he taught, and 
his life or person, that is, who he is in himself, that is portrayed through the 
manner he engages God and others. I focus primarily on that picture of agape as 
manifested in the relationship between Jesus and his Father. I use the term 
intimate identification for the pattern of engagement between God and Jesus that 
constitutes their love for one another.5 I consider their relationship to be one of 
the central images in the New Testament account of this love. Daniel Day 
Williams writes, “The failure to see that the understanding of love in Christian 
faith is given in the Father-Son relationship in God himself has vitiated many 
Christian theologies of love.”6 Similarly, George MacDonald writes, “The secret of 
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 John 15:9, 17:23, and 17:26. 
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 H.H. Farmer, in his Gifford Lectures, writes: “The term ‘Father’ as applied to God is obviously 
metaphorical, the metaphor being drawn from human relationships… But there is one basic 
element in the meaning of the term ‘father’ as used of the human relationship that Christian 
worship refuses to take metaphorically when it transfers it to God, and that is the personal 
element. When the Christian faith says, ‘God, Father’ it says ‘God, radically other as God, yet 
veritably personal and entering into personal relations with men’.” Revelation and Religion, pp. 
57-58. 
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 See also Chapter Three for more on the character of this pattern. 
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 Daniel Day Williams, The Spirit and the Forms of Love, p. 35. 
204 
 
the whole story of humanity is the love between the Father and the Son. That is 
at the root of it all. Upon the love between the Son and the Father hangs the 
whole universe.”7 However, it is not possible – nor desirable - to focus on this 
one image to the complete exclusion of the other because the character of agape 
is also made evident by the character of the effort the Father and Son undertake 
to draw others into the loving relationship that they share.  
 God's efforts to draw others into this loving relationship are portrayed in 
many ways but two images in particular are crucial to the character of those 
efforts. These are Jesus' incarnation and his crucifixion. Incarnation is the word 
used for the act of Jesus entering the created order as a human person. Prior to 
becoming a man Jesus, according to the narrative, eternally co-exists with God 
the Father and God the Holy Spirit in a loving relationship. Jesus, as God's Son, 
willingly becomes man and willingly accepts death at the hands of humans in an 
effort to draw them into the loving relationship that he shares with his Father. 
Crucifixion is the manner in which Jesus was put to death by the Roman 
government. These images of incarnation and crucifixion are central to the 
narrative's depiction of God's efforts to reconcile humans, who are portrayed as 
at enmity with God, to himself.8 They reveal the lengths God is willing to go to 
draw human persons into the personal fellowship that exists between the Father, 
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 MacDonald, From the Pulpit, p. 278. Also, W.F. Halliday writes, “This filial relationship, with God 
as Father, was to Jesus the solution of everything.” See Reconciliation and Reality, pp. 158-159. 
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 This enmity is portrayed as a desire to live independently from God. It is congruent with those 
who otherwise live exemplary lives as when a good person says, “Why do I need God, I am 
good?” Sometimes the attitude behind this question is that God should leave me alone to enjoy 
myself because I have done nothing to warrant his unwanted intrusion or interference in my life. It 
is that attitude, or something quite like it, that constitutes the enmity that God seeks to address. 
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Son, and Holy Spirit. My focus will not primarily be on these two images but on 
the kind of relationship with God that God seeks to restore humans to which is 
imaged in the relationship between Jesus and his Father. 
 In its image of the Father-Son relationship the New Testament provides a 
vibrant image of what constitutes personal knowing.9 That knowing is a form of 
intimacy that is a shared, or mutual, activity between Father and Son. It is 
something that is not capable of being established or secured by the efforts of a 
solitary person. Moreover, this intimate identification, or loving communion, is 
constituted by volitional, emotional, and desiderative elements particular to the 
agents themselves. Halliday reminds us that these are “qualities or activities of a 
personality” and cannot be radically separated from the person, or from one 
another, even though we regularly do so in thought.10 For example, volition is 
often portrayed as a pure activity that operates independently and uncolored by 
emotion and desire. By elevating volition as separate from and more central to 
love than emotional and desiderative elements agape is sometimes 
misportrayed, as we saw in Kierkegaard's account of agape in Chapter Four, as 
a disinterested benevolence or the legal fulfillment of a moral duty. The character 
of these commitments, emotions, and desires is reflective of the character of the 
agents. And it is these operating as elements of a whole that determine the moral 
quality of an action. Thus, we must explore how the narrative depicts these to 
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 The person of the Holy Spirit is also portrayed in the narrative but there is much greater detail 
about the relationship between Jesus and his Father. Thus, my focus will be on that relationship. 
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 Halliday, Reconciliation and Reality, p. 116; see also pp. 31, 59-60, and 113-117. For example, 
if we are to treasure God as Jesus indicates in Matthew 6:19-24, this kind of action involves more 
than merely following God's commands. It involves emotional and desiderative elements that are 
evaluative and that shape the character of that action.   
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understand the character of the Father and Son's love for one another. 
  In what follows I argue that this account of agape as intimate identification 
addresses Becker's Concern that fidelity to another, in particular God, diminishes 
a person's autonomy. This narrative presents a portrait of the self, or person, as 
one in which the capacities essential for personhood such as autonomy are not 
diminished through intimate identification with God but instead are most fully 
realized. Participating in an intimate, personal relationship with God requires an 
identification with God that, given God's character, requires and nurtures the 
development of our autonomy. Moreover, Jesus' unparalleled capacity to engage 
God and others in a personal manner, is presented as the portrait of “how to be a 
man”, that is, of how to live a vibrant life. His identity is not diminished or 
obscured, but instead finds its unique expression, in identification with the God 
he calls Father. 
 I also argue that this intimate identification constitutes a kind of personal 
knowing that is capable of addressing the existential problem of meaning or 
significance that Leo Tolstoy identified in Chapter Two. On this account the 
human hunger for meaning, or significance, is one that finds its satisfaction not in 
theoretical or explanatory knowledge but in intimate, personal engagement with 
God and, through God, with others.11 Tolstoy's religious testimony will be 
engaged to help support this view of the personal nature of meaning. His life 
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 Concerning this Cherbonnier writes, “Part of the uniqueness of Christianity, however, is its 
contention that true fulfillment is to be found, not in the splendid isolation of the beatific vision, not 
in the self-contained certitude of contemplation, but – of all places – in a certain quality of relation 
between free agents (agape).” See Hardness of Heart, p. 105. 
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gives witness to a hunger for something more than explanatory knowledge as 
such knowledge cannot meet the existential demands he finds within himself. 
These demands include the need for forgiveness coupled with a demand for 
moral perfection, the need for significance, and the need for a love that will 
overcome his aloneness. In addition, I argue that Tolstoy embraces Christianity, 
at least in part, because to him it makes the best sense of the powerful existential 
demands he experiences. In doing so he employs a modest form of 
explanationism.12 The manner in which he gives witness to his deepest 
aspirations and to that which he has found to satisfy them models the character 
of discourse, or conversation, that best fits these issues of ultimate concern. He 
does not claim that he can demonstrate that his view is more reasonable than 
others but in sharing his experiences he invites others to investigate their own. At 
this point it is time to examine how the New Testament narrative portrays the 
character of that love for one another that exists between God and Jesus.   
God's Glad Fidelity to His Son 
 The New Testament provides us with an image of God as a Father who 
finds his supreme joy in being intimately identified with one who is uniquely his 
Son. This identification is not one in which their identities are “blurred or erased”, 
however, it is one in which the character of their relationship is integral to each of 
their identities.13 Jesus is portrayed as the Son of God and God as the Father of 
                                                 
12
 See my second chapter for an account of modest explanationism. 
 
13
 Helm, “Love, Identification, and the Emotions”, pp. 2-3. He critiques robust union accounts of 
intimacy for construing intimacy in a way that undermines the separateness of the two persons. 
His concern is that there is no way of caring for another as that particular other if intimacy 
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Jesus. Their identities, though defined in relation to one another, are yet distinct. 
For example, the passion narrative highlights their distinctiveness. In the Garden 
of Gethsemane Jesus does not give up his will in place of his Father's but 
exercises his will to freely affirm his Father's.14 Throughout the New Testament 
the character of God's identification with Jesus is evidenced in how God gladly 
makes his self unreservedly available to his Son. I will explore how the narrative 
portrays the volitional, emotional, and desiderative elements of this identification. 
God entrusts himself to Jesus in that he gladly yields his purposes and the power 
to fulfill his purposes to Jesus. The character of the Father's responsiveness to 
Jesus is a reflection of the supreme import Jesus holds for his Father. 
 The depth of God's commitment to attend to and act on Jesus' behalf 
reveals the depth of his identification with Jesus.15 The narrative portrays the 
Father as one who fully reveals and entrusts his purposes to his Son. Jesus' 
cousin John the Baptist tells his followers concerning Jesus that, “The Father 
loves the Son and has placed all things into his hands.” (John 3:35) The Father 
exercises his authority to defer to and affirm the authority of his Son. On a 
separate occasion Jesus says something similar. When some highly religious 
people are infuriated at him for healing someone on the Sabbath, a day believed 
to be a God-ordained day of rest, Jesus answers them by saying he can do 
                                                                                                                                                 
dissolves or blurs the identities of each of the selves in the relationship. 
 
14
 The Gethsemane narratives highlight a volitional encounter of independent wills. See Matthew 
26:36-46, Mark 14:32-42, and Luke 22:40-46. 
 
15
 Helm identifies these two things – a consistent pattern of “attending to” and of “acting on behalf 
of” - as indicators of something or someone having import to you. The depth of that import is 
revealed by the depth and character of these two activities. See “Love, Identification, and the 
Emotions,” p. 9. 
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“nothing on his own, but only what he sees the Father doing” and that the “Father 
loves the Son and shows him all that he himself is doing.”16 (John 5:20) Note the 
link between loving and revealing. The narrative repeatedly makes this link. The 
Father reveals himself fully to Jesus because the Father loves him. In another 
place Jesus himself links this kind of disclosure to a special relationship, to 
friendship, when he tells his disciples – “but I call you friends because I have 
made known to you everything that I have heard from my Father.” (John 15:15)  
Jesus discloses himself to his friends, like the Father discloses himself to his 
Son. In healing someone on the Sabbath Jesus justifies re-interpreting and re-
orienting their religious traditions by attributing the authority behind his actions as 
coming from God. His remarks indicate that he perceives that the Father entrusts 
himself fully to him. And implicit in his understanding is that the Father's 
unreserved disclosures reveal an intimate closeness - God considers him to be 
his friend.17 
  Herbert Henry Farmer, in The World and God, offers a helpful description 
of the phenomenological conditions necessary for one individual to exercise trust 
in another.18 This can help us understand more clearly the character of God's 
                                                 
16
 Consider also Luke 10:22 where Jesus states “All things have been handed over to me by my 
Father; and no one knows who the Son is except the Father, or who the Father is except the Son 
and anyone whom the Son chooses to reveal him.”  
 
17
 Congruent with this view that God's love toward Jesus is akin to friendship is Cicero's 
observation that love toward friends leads us not to seek our own advantage, but to gladly 
obligate ourselves toward our friends at our own expense for their good. A genuine friend may 
even willingly die in the place of another friend. This is a view that Jesus shares. See Cicero's De 
Amicitia xvi. 57 and vii. 24 and John 15:12-15.  
 
18
 Farmer, The World and God; see especially pp. 18-25, 70, and 85-88. 
 
210 
 
trust in Jesus as evidenced in God's disclosures to Jesus. Farmer writes that an 
individual’s will always stands in a particular kind of “irreducible tension” with the 
wills of other persons that he encounters.19 This tension is rooted not in 
antagonism but in the awareness that the will of the other is independent of ours 
and serves as a natural barrier to our own. The other’s will presents itself to us as 
an “inaccessible source of activity” that continuously creates an “invisible frontier 
between his being and ours”.20 We are aware that the will of the other stands as 
an inaccessible limit to our own - the other belongs to an order that morally binds 
or limits the expression of my will - and that there is no entering this frontier 
except that that person “invites us to do so”.21  
 The extent of the Father's disclosures to Jesus represent that the frontier 
of God's self is fully open to Jesus. It is this invitation that makes it possible for 
one self to be personally present to another self; God is as fully attentive to Jesus 
as he possibly can be. Trust involves a “volitional encounter” where “the will of 
each party must impinge on the will of the other.”22 Here the Father's will is 
exercised in the form of an invitation to the Son and of which the Son chooses to 
accept. The necessity of this volitional encounter for knowing someone 
                                                 
19
 Ibid., p. 21. 
 
20
 Ibid., p. 19. 
  
21
 Ibid. 
 
22
 Edmund La B. Cherbonnier, “A.J. Heschel and The Philosophy of the Bible”, p. 27. Knowledge 
of another person, he writes, “does not consist entirely of descriptive data about observable facts; 
it is an understanding of another's will... the prerequisite of such knowledge is a volitional 
encounter. The will of each party must impinge on the will of the other. If the encounter is hostile, 
then their knowledge of each other remains minimal.” 
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personally becomes clear when we contrast it with situations where it is absent. 
Consider someone who comes to learn true things about me but who learns 
these things incidentally by overhearing a conversation or through gossip. In 
neither of these instances is the disclosure personal because I did not freely 
choose to entrust my self to that other person. I did not invite them to enter that 
frontier that constitutes my self. That act, as it is directed and sustained toward 
another, is an integral part of encountering me. Without that a person lacks a 
“direct acquaintance” with me. Thus, they fail to have knowledge of me, even 
though they may know facts about me.23 
 Returning to the narrative we find a consistent pattern of the Father 
exercising his authority to defer to and affirm the authority and purposes of his 
Son. In Helm's terms the Father is not only fully prepared to act on the Son's 
behalf but consistently does so. One example is found in chapter 10 of Luke 
where Jesus says,  
All things have been handed over to me by my Father; and no one 
knows who the Son is except the Father, or who the Father is 
except the Son and anyone to whom the Son chooses to reveal 
him. (Luke 10:22) 
 
Another is found in John 10:17-18. Here Jesus, speaking of his impending death, 
says,  
For this reason the Father loves Me, because I lay down my life 
that I may take it again. No one has taken it away from Me, but I lay 
it down on my own initiative. I have authority to lay it down, and I 
have authority to take it up again. This commandment I received 
from my Father. 
 
                                                 
23
 Ibid. 
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These examples indicate the depth to which the Father identifies with Jesus. 
Helm argues that what makes identification a form of intimate personal concern, 
in contrast to an impersonal one, is that when you love that person you must take 
an interest not just in her well-being but also in her identity itself.24 A personal 
love cares for the other as that particular other. Personal care involves taking that 
person's identity to heart, that is, it involves a commitment to respond emotionally 
to that which significantly impacts her well-being in either positive or negative 
ways.25 This concern is not for one's own well-being but for her's; it is a 
commitment to her identity for her sake.26 The narrative presents the Father's 
concern for Jesus – the depth of the import Jesus holds for his Father - not only 
as a commitment to respond emotionally but also as a commitment to help him 
realize his full identity. In this way the narrative portrays God's love for Jesus as 
fatherly. God is not portrayed as an absolute monarch who begrudgingly 
condescends to yield his power to a lesser subject, but instead demonstrates a 
filial concern that we are familiar with in some sense from the best we've 
encountered in parent-child relationships.27 God is a gracious father.  
                                                 
24
 Helm, “Love, Identification, and the Emotions”, p. 5. Though I think Helm makes his case that 
such a love is personal, I think he fails to adequately capture what constitutes intimacy. This will 
be addressed in greater detail later. 
   
25
 Ibid., pp. 5,  21, 23 and 25. The narrative regularly depicts Jesus' care for God in these ways. 
For example, Jesus experiences anger at people who are desecrating his Father's house, the 
temple, by using it not as a house of prayer but as a place to seek monetary advantage over 
others. In so doing they use it for concerns that are incongruent with his Father's - they fail to 
attend to and act on God's behalf, that is, they fail to intimately identify with God. See Matthew 
21:12-13, Mark 11:15-19, and Luke 19:45-48. 
 
26
 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
 
27
 The narrative considers it to be more than this yet the narrative consistently turns to the arena 
of human relationships to give insight into the character of the divine. Even though these 
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 A good parent embraces, as a part of his or her identity as a parent, the 
commitment to helping their child develop into one who can see the good and 
choose to embrace it though it might exact a personal cost. In Chapter Three we 
saw how Huck Finn stood upright in this way. In affirming the personhood of an 
escaped slave named Jim he both found and exerted a costly moral 
independence as he stood against the conventional religion of his day. We also 
saw how Tim O'Brien failed to find the moral independence he needed to refuse 
to go to Vietnam. O'Brien's actions were less personal than Huck's – in failing to 
act according to his own insight he fails to inhabit his action with his self. Good 
parents focus their attention and efforts to provide the care to their child that is 
needed in order to help her develop in this way. Moreover, as their child matures 
they create the space for their child to exercise her identity in a way that 
increasingly makes her acts her own. Love is creative of distinction – it wants the 
other to be the other. This commitment is not diminishing but creates the 
possibility of intimacy.28 Loving relationships enhance our autonomy which 
enhances our capacity for intimate identification.29 The New Testament, in some 
fashion akin to this, intimates that God is committed to exercising his agency in a 
manner that enhances Jesus' capacity to express his character, or identity, as 
the particular person that he is. 
                                                                                                                                                 
analogies are imperfect, they are regularly relied upon. The Parable of the Prodigal Son in Luke 
chapter 15 is a classic example of this as are the other two parables in this chapter. 
 
28
 Spouses also seek to cultivate this capacity for moral independence in one another as do 
friends. Consider St. Francis de Sales remarks that “We challenge our friends to be who and 
what they really are without ever implying in the challenge a withdrawal of our affection for them.” 
See his Introduction to the Devout Life.  
 
29
 Helm, “Love, Identification, and the Emotions,” p. 27. 
214 
 
 At one point the narrative explicitly links God's act of entrusting himself to 
Jesus with God's concern for Jesus' identity. God's commitment to Jesus' 
identity, that is, the depth to which he takes his identity to heart, is indicated by 
God's desire that Jesus may be known and honored. Moreover, it is revealed not 
only by God's desire but also by God's willingness to give himself fully to Jesus to 
realize that end. Consider John 5:19-27 where Jesus says,  
For just as the Father raises the dead and gives them life, even so 
the Son also gives life to whom He wishes. For not even the Father 
judges anyone but has given all judgment to the Son, in order that 
all may honor the Son, even as they honor the Father…. 
 
God is presented as caring for Jesus' identity for Jesus' sake. One of God's 
central purposes is to attend to Jesus, and act on his behalf, in order that others 
would know him and honor him. God's actions here intimate that he delights in 
Jesus and wants others to delight in him. When we take joy in someone we want 
others to take joy in him as well. Macmurray speaks of this as glad awareness. 
He writes,  
When you love anyone you want above all things to be aware of 
him, more and more completely... You want to see him and hear 
him, not because you want to make use of him but simply because  
this is the natural and only way of taking delight in his existence for 
his sake... You want other people to look at it and enjoy it too... You 
want to know it, to know it better and better, and you want other 
people to do the same.30  
 
This seems to fit God's intentions as imaged in the narrative. God wants others to 
delight in his Son in the manner that he does. We will explore this subject of joy 
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 John Macmurray, Reason and Emotion, pp. 42-43; italics mine. 
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further below.  
 God’s willingness to let Jesus “call the shots”, that is, the sharing of his 
authority with Jesus, indicates God's willingness to be influenced by the life of his 
Son. It portrays the kind of engagement that God wants to have with his Son. In 
Helm's terms the emotional import of Jesus to God is revealed in God's 
consistent pattern of attending to Jesus and of acting on his behalf.31 God puts 
himself at the disposal of his Son. God identifies with his Son - he purposes to 
support the purposes of Jesus. This reveals further the filial character of God's 
personal concern for Jesus. It also fits one of the hallmarks of intimacy. 
Catherine Wallace states that intimacy occurs when “the inmost depth is opened 
to what another may bring in.”32 God knows and loves his Son and trusts him 
enough to gladly receive the consequences of Jesus’ choices. He doesn’t 
override Jesus in some benevolent fashion. Jesus is not a mere “puppet” 
installed to govern by a larger power yet not invested with any real power of his 
own. When God invites Jesus into the frontier that constitutes his self he invites 
Jesus to bring who Jesus is to bear on God and influence God in some regard. 
God seeks a volitional encounter with Jesus and this requires nurturing Jesus' 
moral independence or autonomy. Jesus must freely choose his course of action 
in order for it to be his. God's receptiveness to Jesus in this manner and Jesus' 
responsiveness to his Father constitutes one facet of the intimacy they share. 
 Another way the New Testament images the way in which God identifies 
                                                 
31
 Helm, “Love, Identification, and the Emotions”, p. 9. 
 
32
 Catherine Wallace, For Fidelity: How Intimacy and Commitment Enrich Our Lives, p. 95. 
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personally with Jesus is through God's entrusting his power to Jesus. Implicit 
within the examples we have just looked at is that God not only reveals himself 
fully to Jesus but he shares his power with Jesus. God is portrayed not only as 
one who initiates and effects his own purposes but also as one who aligns his 
loving agency behind, or in support of, the purposes of Jesus. In so doing God 
puts his very self at the disposal of his Son. 
 The New Testament also images the identification between God and 
Jesus through the delight, or joy, that God takes in Jesus. On two important 
occasions in Jesus' life God declares Jesus to be his “Beloved”. The first 
occasion is when Jesus leaves his trade as a carpenter to teach publicly about 
God and God’s kingdom. At this time Jesus goes to his cousin John to be 
baptized. It is recorded that at his baptism, people hear an audible voice that 
says, “You are my Son, the Beloved, with you I am well pleased.”33 The other 
occurs shortly before Jesus is crucified. Apparently in preparation for that event 
God affirms Jesus for the second time in a manner that is audible to those 
around him. Anticipating his crucifixion Jesus goes to pray on a mountainside 
with Peter, James, and John. During that time they hear a voice that says, “This 
is my beloved Son, with whom I am well pleased; listen to Him.”34 (Matt. 17:5) 
The book of Isaiah, written several hundred years before Jesus’ life, and from 
which the author of Matthew's narrative regularly draws, states “Here is my 
                                                 
33
 This account is found in Luke 3:22, Matthew 3:17, and Mark 1:11. Interestingly, this instance 
and the following one are the only two occasions in which the gospel narratives depict God as 
making himself present in an audible manner. 
 
34
 See also Luke 9:28-36 and Mark 9:2-8 for these stories. 
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servant, whom I uphold, my chosen, in whom my soul delights; I have put my 
spirit upon him; he will bring forth justice to the nations.” (Isaiah 42:1) Matthew, in 
quoting this section of Isaiah, presents Jesus as this one in whom God delights. 
(Matthew 12:15-21) Moreover, the narrative portrays Jesus as carrying this 
awareness of being God's Beloved throughout his life. He perceives himself as 
one who existed in a loving relationship with his Father prior to the existence of 
the universe.35  
 God’s command that Peter, James, and John listen to Jesus is another 
indicator of how God gives himself unreservedly to his Son. God desires others 
to be attentive to Jesus in a manner that involves receiving what he says and 
allowing it to decisively impact or influence the course of one’s life. God is 
affected emotionally by how others respond to his Son and desires that others 
love him. Here this act of entrusting is linked to the joy, or pleasure, God takes in 
Jesus as his Son. By affirming Jesus as his Beloved God intimately identifies 
himself with Jesus. The character of this identification as intimate is made 
apparent not merely by God's willingness to attend to and act on Jesus' behalf 
but through the emotional and desiderative character of God's activities.36 These 
activities are what they are because of the joy with which they are done and the 
joy toward which they aim. The orientation of God's heart in these activities, and 
not merely his will, give them a character they would otherwise not have. 
                                                 
35
 See John 17:5, 3:13-17, 6:37-51, 8:38-42, and 16:27-28. 
 
36
 Actually intimacy is a quality of a relationship, that is, of a particular kind of engagement 
between persons. It is not something that can be established unilaterally. However, wanting to 
enjoy the presence of that other as that particular other can be exercised unilaterally and is 
necessary to make intimacy possible. 
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 Joy is the affective element of God's response to Jesus that makes their 
identification intimate. It is possible for one to identify with another in the manner 
Helm describes and yet that identification lack something necessary to make it 
intimate. One can attend to and act on another's behalf and take their identity to 
heart, that is, one can be emotionally impacted by whether or not they are 
successful in upholding their identity, and yet such concern not rise above a kind 
of benevolence. Such care for another is personal in the limited sense that it is a 
care for that other as that particular other, yet that by itself does not make it 
intimate. Dostoevsky, in The Brothers Karamazov, speaks of this through the 
reflections of his character Zosima. In writing about his relationship with a man 
he had known earlier in his life Zosima states, “And we should have become very 
close friends if he had spoken to me about himself as well. But he hardly said a 
word about himself, but only kept asking me about myself.”37 This man intimately 
identified with Zosima - in the manner Helm describes - yet their relationship 
lacked intimacy. This is so even though Zosima deeply loved this man. Intimacy 
involves a desire to know and be known. This desire to be known is not reflected 
in Helm's account of intimate identification. In his concern for Zosima this man 
maintains an isolation that is incompatible with intimacy. He refuses to present 
himself to Zosima in a manner to be known. Thus, his concern for Zosima is 
personal, in the limited sense mentioned above, rather than intimate. Intimacy 
requires that each person in the relationship open the frontier of their life to the 
other and that each accepts the other's invitation and enters their frontier. It is 
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 Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, p. 302.  
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constituted by an encounter between persons. Helm puts forth a more limited 
notion of what is personal than I have been using throughout this dissertation. I 
have been using personal to denote a kind of intimate engagement or encounter 
between persons. I think his account describes how one can care for another 
person, very deeply in fact, yet that account does not adequately describe what 
constitutes intimacy. A unilateral concern for another person's identity, even one 
that affects you emotionally, is not sufficient by itself for intimacy. 
 Intimacy is a quality of a relationship. It is dependent on a mutual 
identification between persons that is shaped by the affective element of joy. As 
Macmurray pointed out above we know from our own experience, even if only in 
a small way, that a part of the structure of delighting in, or taking joy in, another is 
the desire to enjoy the presence of that other as the particular other that they are 
– it is the other we find enjoyable. In this way love is creative of distinction; it 
wants the other to be other. Aquinas maintains that it is the wish to be with the 
other, what he calls the “unio affectus,” that makes the doing of good an 
expression of love, that is, it is what is needed to make love personal.38  
Moreover, as Meilaender points out, this desire to be with the other is a “desire to 
enjoy the other person in a reciprocal union of affections.”39 The reciprocal 
character of this desire is necessary for that broader sense of personal that 
                                                 
38
 Josef Pieper, Faith, Hope, and Love, pp. 196-197. Pieper writes, “…it is perfectly possible for 
there to be ‘charity without love,’ a doing good that lacks something decisive to make it love.” 
Aquinas’ comments are found in Summa Theologica II, II, 27, 2. Helm thinks this account of 
intimacy makes love egocentric. However, it does not seem incompatible to desire to enjoy the 
presence of the other as that particular other and to be committed to that other's identity for their 
sake. Thus, we may be committed to their identity both for their sake and our own. 
   
39
 Gilbert Meilaender, Friendship, pp. 48-49. 
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includes intimacy. It is not merely the desire to enjoy the presence of the other 
that makes love personal but it is also the desire to be so enjoyed by that other. 
We wish to be loved much by one whom we love much.40 It must matter to me 
that I matter to you. If it does not matter to me whether or not the person I care 
for receives my care, that is, whether or not they would be gladdened by it, this 
kind of concern lacks that which is needed for a relationship to be intimate.41 The 
depth of my wanting to be received by you, of wanting to matter to you, can be 
an important indicator of how much you mean to me.42  
 One might object that intimacy has no necessary connection to joy on the 
grounds that some intimate relationships are extremely painful and unpleasant 
and involve no joy at all. In response it is important to reiterate that the concept of 
intimacy as I use it refers to a quality of a relationship and not a class of 
relationships. Our family relationships are sometimes referred to as “intimate” 
because of the close association that is shared among those who live together.   
However, it is not uncommon for family members to be estranged from one 
another and for those relationships to lack intimacy. The kind of familiarity that 
family members have of one another does not by itself amount to intimacy or 
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 Carmichael, Friendship: Interpreting Christian Love, p. 86. In the 12th century Richard of St. 
Victor observed that love requires two persons and described its mutual character in this way. 
  
41
 This is not advocating that we love others in order to be loved. Love is not love if it is merely 
mercenary. However, if we love someone for their sake, which involves desiring to enjoy their 
presence, that will be accompanied with the hope that they would enjoy our presence as well. 
 
42
 There is room for self-interest in love without love being egocentric. A person is not using 
another person if they want to enjoy that other for that other's sake. However, if I want to spend 
time with someone solely for the way they make me feel, the pleasure I get when I am with them, 
then one might rightfully claim that I am using them. If I desire to be with them only to get 
something from them other than the joy of knowing them, then I am not loving them personally.  
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emotional closeness. In other words, the intimacy that constitutes personal 
knowing is not equivalent to extensive biographical knowledge or the shared 
history of family life. Such relationships often fail to reach intimacy or are anti-
intimate. On the other hand there is evidence to support the position that the 
emotional closeness characteristic of intimacy involves joy.43   
 To take joy in another for their sake is a desiderative and emotional 
response indicating that that person holds the highest import. It involves desiring 
to be with him when he is not present and the enjoyment of him - itself marked by 
the ongoing desire to be with him - when he is present. In responding to Jesus as 
his Beloved or Delight the narrative presents God as one who considers Jesus 
his greatest treasure. The character of God's attending to and acting on Jesus' 
behalf gains its shape from these emotional and desiderative aspects of joy. In 
other words, God's fidelity to Jesus wouldn't be what it is without this joy. We 
must now look at Jesus’ response to God to see if this glad fidelity is mutual. 
Jesus' Glad Fidelity to His Father 
 The New Testament presents an image of Jesus as one who finds his 
supreme joy in the God he calls Father. One way the narrative portrays Jesus’ 
intimate identification with his Father is in his unswerving fidelity, or loving 
responsiveness, to his Father. The character of that fidelity is elaborated by an 
exploration of the biblical conception of obedience. Another manner in which that 
identification is portrayed is through Jesus' reflections on what it means for 
human persons to be his friend. Jesus describes a pattern of engagement with 
                                                 
43
 See my section on “Aristotle and the Neuroscientists” in Chapter One.  
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him that constitutes friendship and indicates that it is similar to his relationship 
with God. Indirectly this account of friendship provides us with insight into the 
intimacy that the narrative considers him to share with God.  
 The narrative portrays Jesus' intimate identification with God in terms of 
Jesus living a life of unswerving fidelity, or passionate responsivity, to his Father. 
On one occasion while facing hostile religious leaders Jesus replies,  
…I do nothing on my own, but I speak these things as the Father 
has instructed me. And the one who sent me is with me; he has not 
left me alone, for I always do what is pleasing to him. (John 8:28-
29)  
 
He is regularly portrayed, especially in John’s gospel, as choosing a life of eager 
loyalty to the Father. Jesus repeatedly states that he acts on God’s initiative, in 
contrast to his own or to others, and that he does so in order to please God and 
bring Him glory or honor.44 We know that a devotion to pleasing others can be a 
way of engaging others in a manner that is less than personal. In Chapter Three 
we saw how it can be a kind of slavishness, that is, it can be a failure to act 
autonomously.45 However, it is also the case depending on the character of the 
one doing the pleasing, the one being pleased, and the character of that which is 
taken to be pleasing that such a devotion can be a vital part of what constitutes 
                                                 
44
 In John's narrative Jesus teaches that we act on the initiative of, conform ourselves to, or serve 
those from whom we seek honor or glory. We shape ourselves to the wills of those whom we 
seek to please and from whom we want to be found pleasing. See: John 4:34; 5:19-20, 30-44; 
6:38; 7:17-18, 28; 8:16, 26-55; 9:4; 10:17-18, 22-38; 11:42, 12:42-43, 49; 14:10, 24; and 17:6-8. 
This fits with Matthew 6:19-24 where he teaches that our hearts will be found where our treasure 
lies. Our actions are shaped to secure what we treasure most. 
 
45
 See Tim O'Brien's story “On the Rainy River” in The Things They Carried. O'Brien conforms 
himself to the expectations of his community – going against his own personal convictions - out of 
fear of being ostracized by that community. 
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an encounter between persons that is personal. Jesus is portrayed as one who 
delights in his Father and desires to please him, that is, there is something he 
wants for his Father. He wants his Father to experience pleasure. His Father 
finds pleasure in being loved freely, that is, in a manner that is personal. Implicit 
in Jesus’ efforts to please his Father is his desire to be found pleasing to his 
Father, that is, there is something he wants from his Father – he wants to be a 
source of pleasure to his Father.46 He does find it. He doesn’t falter in his 
confidence that God finds him pleasing.  
 The truism that we desire to be loved much by one whom we love much 
seems to hold for the narrative portrayal of Jesus' relationship with God. Jesus, 
above, makes the connection between God’s presence with him and his pleasing 
God – “He has not left me alone for I always do what is pleasing to Him.” He links 
his dwelling with God in God’s love to being receptive, or attentive, to God in a 
certain way. He identifies listening to and doing God’s commands as critical 
features of that complex way of being with God that constitutes the activity of 
personally knowing God. Jesus, in Helm's terms, considers his Father as that 
which holds the greatest import. Jesus has judged, and repeatedly judges, that 
there is no other person or thing to which he should give his full devotion. That he 
uniquely judges his Father to be worthy of his attention and action is made 
evident in the character of his identification with God.47 He gives God his full 
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attention and makes it his primary goal to act on his behalf. Pleasing God by 
fulfilling God’s purposes is that which provides him sustenance. He says, “My 
food is to do the will of him who sent me and to complete his work.” (John 4:34)  
 The biblical conception of obedience is not a legal one, that is, it is not 
portrayed merely as the following of a command. This is strikingly presented in 
the book of Job. There we find Job's friends seeking to follow God's commands 
merely to secure goods from God yet not caring to be in a relationship with God 
himself. At points they recommend to Job, who they perceive as unfaithful to 
God, to do what God says so God will get off his back. Their motivation to do 
what God says appears to be to appease God. The narrative does not consider 
their actions to constitute a fitting response to God. Appeasing God is not the 
same as obeying God. Actions can outwardly conform to God's commands yet 
lack something that makes them obedient. This kind of posture toward God 
constitutes a failure to enter into a relationship that is personal. Their moralistic 
approach is mechanical. Their actions seem to be guided by an axiom that can 
be stated as either “Do x, and get y” or, “Do x, so y won't happen.” The biblical 
conception of obedience cannot be separated from love. For the following of a 
command to constitute obedience that action has to be rooted in love. It must be 
a loving response to be obedience. Without the emotional and desiderative 
qualities of love the action of following a command is qualitatively different, that 
is, the act itself is constituted by a different content, than one in which love is 
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present.48 The moralistic approach requires no volitional and emotional 
encounter between persons. God is not responded to as an end, a person, to be 
lovingly engaged but primarily as a means – a thing like a tool - for securing other 
goods.  
 Job's friends follow the commands of God like a slave follows the 
commands of its master. The master is not looking for trust and the slave, 
appropriately, does not give it. The slave recognizes that the master is not worthy 
of his allegiance yet ultimately surrenders his autonomy because his actions are 
not determined in accordance with his own insight but with that of his master's. 
The master evokes consent by coercion, not love.49 Their relationship does not 
involve an engagement between the full personalities of each individual in that 
relationship. The slave is forced to do that which he would otherwise not do. In 
his compliance the slave holds back a portion of himself from the one to whom 
he conforms. He does not entrust himself, or make himself available, to the other. 
Moreover, the one demanding compliance is not interested in receiving the self of 
the one who complies. The other is an object or thing that is manipulated or 
managed to serve one’s own ends. Given the character of his demand, he too is 
withholding his very self; he is not available to be influenced by the genuine self 
of the other. In the case of Job’s friends they recommend conformity to God 
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because He can make life miserable for those who do not, or blessed for those 
who do, but not because they see that God desires and deserves their trust. We 
recognize this kind of engagement to be less than personal because using others 
primarily to satisfy our own ends constitutes a failure to treat them as a person. 
 Obedience in the biblical sense is a form of engagement that is personal. 
It is not merely a trait, characteristic, or activity of an individual – it is a response 
of trust that is fitting given the character of the one to whom it is given. Such a 
response is portrayed as a shared responsibility. Good human relationships 
illustrate this as well. H.H. Farmer remarks, “A child’s trust in his parents is their 
greatest gift to him, for it is evoked and sustained in him only by their continually 
presenting themselves, revealing themselves, as trustworthy.”50 Obedience in the 
biblical sense is a response that fits not only due to the character of the one 
obeying but also due to the character of the one who is being trusted. Personal 
insight is necessary for autonomy. Here that insight is into the character of the 
one being obeyed. Following another's command can be an expression of 
autonomy if it is based on the follower's own insight that that person is worthy of 
such trust. Farmer writes of a child’s obedience or trust as being a gift that is 
given from the parents to the child – their character provides the opportunity for 
the child to exercise its autonomy. Being of the right character is the parent’s job. 
It is that which makes the child’s conformity fitting. 
 Jesus’ obedience, in contrast to that of Job's friends, constitutes a 
profound receptiveness to God that is personal. Given the character of his Father 
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he gladly identifies with God and God's concerns. This receptivity involves not 
only being attentive to a Father who has purposes that he discloses, or makes 
evident, to Jesus; it also involves making himself utterly available to cooperate 
with God for God’s work. He sees this work as his own; he calls it his food. His 
identification reveals that he finds God as worthy of his ultimate commitment – it 
is not the dissolution of Jesus' identity or autonomy but the expression of it. God 
is the reality that is worthy of his devotion. He doesn’t give his allegiance 
grudgingly or out of fear but freely. When speaking to his disciples of his 
impending death Jesus says, “You heard that I said to you, ‘I go away, and I will 
come to you.’ If you loved me, you would have rejoiced, because I go to the 
Father, for the Father is greater than I.” (John 14:28) Engaging with God in a 
personal manner, that is, being intimately identified with God, brings Jesus great 
joy. This connection between joy and being available to God is made even in 
relationship to Jesus' death. He is described as one, “…who for the sake of the 
joy that was set before him endured the cross, disregarding its shame.” (Hebrews 
12:2) He wants his followers to understand that connection and share in that with 
him. He states that his availability to God should be an indicator to them of his 
love for God: “…but I do as the Father commanded me, so that the world may 
know that I love the Father.” (John 15:31) As the Father gives himself fully to 
Jesus that “all may honor the Son” so does Jesus give himself fully to his Father 
so that the world will know who Jesus honors. (John 5:19-27) Jesus’ glad 
entrustment of his self to God is one of the central themes of the narrative. 
 Jesus' obedience is not incongruent with the uprightness, or rectitude, 
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necessary for engaging with his Father in a manner that is personal. It is a 
characteristic of a particular kind of relationship in which such a response is 
fitting given the character of the one obeyed. His obedience as a form of trust is a 
way of presencing his self, that is, of being intentionally present, to his Father. 
The presence of the individual is called forth or evoked because that presence is 
welcomed and sought for by the one who is obeyed. God, like the example of the 
parent, desires the glad trust of Jesus. The narrative portrays God as one whose 
loving character establishes him as an authority that evokes Jesus' glad consent. 
The mutual yielding and reception between Father and Son is a sign of their 
mutual trust and respect.51 Jesus gladly gives himself fully to his Father in such a 
way that he stands upright and is not diminished in his dependency. He sees it 
as his supreme good to make himself unreservedly available to his Father and he 
freely does so. 
 The New Testament account of the relationship between Jesus and God, 
presented here in terms of intimate identification, enables us to address a 
concern that was first identified in Chapter One through Ernest Becker. He states 
that the “only real problem of life” is our need to “win a degree of self-realization 
without surrender to complete spiritlessness or slavery.”52 Framing the problem in 
its cosmic dimension he asks, “How does one lean on God and give over 
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everything to Him and still stand on his own feet as a passionate human being?” 
He thinks this is no mere “rhetorical question” but a “real one” that goes right to 
the heart of the problem of “how to be a man.”53 In Chapter Three I sought to 
identify the conditions in which fidelity is compatible with moral autonomy. The 
New Testament addresses this issue in its image of the relationship between the 
Father and the Son. Jesus belongs to the Father in a way that does not diminish 
but affirms his identity as a person. For one who is portrayed as utterly 
dependent on his Father, he has been widely considered to be one of the most 
vibrant and fully alive individuals in the history of the West. The mutual fidelity 
that constitutes their love does not appear to obscure either of their identities. 
The New Testament provides a vision of “how to be a man” in its image of the 
person of Jesus and the character of his relationship with his Father. Of course, 
this claim that their mutual fidelity does not diminish the autonomy necessary for 
Jesus' moral personhood or the full realization of his identity is not the kind of 
claim that can be demonstrated. Befitting of an exemplar his life gives witness to 
something that cannot be logically demonstrated but only shown.54 Ultimately, to 
evaluate it one must look at his life in light of one's experiences and aspirations 
and judge for one's self whether or not his fidelity is diminishing.   
  Another way the narrative portrays Jesus' intimate personal concern for 
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his Father, albeit indirectly, is through Jesus' account of friendship. Jesus 
describes a pattern of engagement with him that constitutes friendship and 
indicates that it is similar to his relationship with God. Thus, it can serve as a 
window into that relationship. In John's gospel Jesus tells his followers, “You are 
my friends if you do what I command you.”55 (15:14) He links personal knowledge 
of himself to such fidelity. This is quite striking. Partly, as we have seen, because 
we tend to think that it is slavish to follow commands. But also because of what it 
says about Jesus’ self-conception and his conception of others. Jesus is aware 
that people must exercise caution and wisdom regarding whom they obey, or 
align themselves with, yet presents himself as qualified for such a response from 
others. A significant pillar of his Judaic heritage, which he does not repudiate but 
affirms, maintains that giving one’s ultimate allegiance to a person, thing, or 
purpose other than God is idolatry.56 We can shape our lives to reach a variety of 
ends. These ends guide, or determine, the ways we must act in order to reach 
them. Jesus is emphatic about the dangers of allowing ends like money, the 
good opinion of others, a secure future, and many other things – things that are 
often actual goods when appropriately appreciated - to become our ultimate 
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guides. He perceives such allegiances as improper forms of worship. They 
involve treasuring, or devoting ourselves to, ends that are not intrinsically worthy 
of such devotion. Such things are “idols.”57 Giving primacy to these things is 
inherently self-diminishing in that it inhibits our ability to be in relationships that 
are personal with God and others.58 This is tied to Becker's Concern about 
dependency and autonomy. The narrative makes clear that it is not a matter of 
whether we will choose to worship or treasure something but a matter of what we 
will choose to worship or treasure.59 At stake is whether the character of what we 
depend on, or give primacy to, will enable us to become more or less of our real 
selves, that is, whether it helps us to become more or less capable of personal 
relationships. 
 In one instance Jesus directly links the effort to secure the good opinion of 
others with an inability to know him. To one such group of people he asks, “How 
can you believe when you accept glory from one another and do not seek the 
glory that comes from the one who alone is God?”60 Ultimately, God alone is the 
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one to whom we are to be responsive and entrust ourselves. Given his sensitivity 
to the danger of idolatry, Jesus' expectation that those who want to be his friends 
will give their ultimate allegiance to him underscores his perception of his unique 
relationship with God. Without this self-conception he would knowingly be 
presenting himself as another idol for others to wrongly worship. Jesus assumes 
he embodies those qualities that qualify him for the loving devotion of others. He 
believes that it is through obedience to him that one can become his friend. He 
assumes our obedience should be constrained by, or be an expression of, what 
constitutes our good or end. For Jesus that end is to be found in friendship with 
himself and his Father.   
 Jesus’ conception of friendship both fits and illuminates the pattern of his 
relationship with God. He considers these patterns of interpersonal engagement 
to be similar. He makes this comparison explicit when he says,  
As the Father has loved me so I have loved you; abide in my love. 
If you keep my commandments, you will abide in my love, just as I 
have kept my Father’s commandments and abide in his love.61  
 
 Jesus describes here the living character of personal knowledge. One dwells in 
love, he in God’s, his disciples in his own, through a particular kind of 
responsiveness or engagement. The kind of knowledge of his love that he deems 
valuable is not the intellectual apprehension of a fact but is that which is found in 
ongoing friendship with himself. His friends are to engage Jesus in the way Jesus 
engages his Father. Moreover, Jesus explicitly connects this identification with 
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him to joy. He says, “I have said these things to you so that my joy may be in 
you, and that your joy may be complete.”62 Given the comparison Jesus is 
making we can reflect back upon his fidelity to the Father and recognize its 
friendship-like quality and how it is animated by joy.63  
 This account of friendship underscores the comments made earlier about 
the distinctive character of obedience in the biblical narrative. Consider the 
following remarks from Jesus:  
This is my commandment, that you love one another as I have 
loved you. No one has greater love than this, to lay down one’s life 
for one’s friends. You are my friends if you do what I command you. 
I do not call you servants any longer, because the servant does not 
know what the master is doing; but I have called you friends, 
because I have made known to you everything that I have heard 
from my Father. (John 15:12-15) 
  
Jesus does not treat them like a master treats a slave but like his Father treats 
him. He emphasizes the character of his relationship to them as the basis for the 
influence he seeks to wield in their lives. As the parents in Farmer's example 
seek to evoke trust from their child by being trustworthy, Jesus seeks to evoke a 
response of love, both toward others and himself, by the love he has for them. 
According to the narrative we are made for loving relationships both with God 
and others. His commands are portrayed as ones that are responsive to our 
identity as persons and will lead to its fulfillment. The response he seeks is not 
merely some form of behavioral conformity to his commands as commands can 
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be followed without love. A slave or servant can do that. He wants more than 
that. He wants friendship. He wants them to gladly give themselves fully to him as 
he gladly gives himself fully to them. 
 As the Father makes everything known to the Son, the Son makes known 
to his friends everything he considers central to his existence. Self-disclosure has 
long been recognized to be one of the central features of friendship. In his essay 
“On Friendship” written in 44 B.C. Cicero speaks of friendship as requiring that 
“you behold and show an open heart.”64 The heart is the “invisible frontier” of 
which Farmer speaks and which cannot be entered except that that person 
“invites us to do so.”65 Jesus extends friendship to his disciples in presenting an 
open heart to them.66 John Macmurray puts it this way, “To be a friend is to be 
yourself for another person” and characterizes that as “committing yourself 
completely and revealing yourself completely without reserve… it means stark 
reality between persons without pretence or sentimentality.”67 It’s more than 
merely being friendly; we can be friendly yet retain our isolation. When I engage 
in self-disclosure I choose to move from a posture where I am not accessible to 
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another person to one where I unveil myself and welcome that other into the 
recesses of my life.68 This invitation involves entrusting one's self to another - it 
invites the other to receive the self that you are making present to them. Jesus 
makes himself known to his disciples in this way.  
 Intimacy is a characteristic of a relationship and requires not only that your 
heart is open to the other but also that you behold the other's heart in similar 
fashion. Intimacy requires mutuality; it is a shared activity. The author and farmer 
Wendell Berry describes the fidelity between a farmer and his farm in terms of 
mutual responsiveness. He observes that they “are responsive partners in an 
intimate and mutual relationship.”69 Berry does not think that a farm exerts a 
personal agency, however it does have a character, or identity, that asserts itself 
that a farmer must be actively attentive to, or responsive to, in order to promote 
its well-being. He describes this relationship between the farmer and the land as 
a “sort of dance” in which “the partners are always at opposite sexual poles, and 
the lead keeps changing.”70 In describing fidelity as a dance Berry is searching 
for a metaphor that illuminates the dynamic, or mutual, character of fidelity. It is 
an activity that involves initiating and responding – it is not mere passivity.  
 When it comes to the activity of loving and knowing another person Berry's 
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image of a dance is even more fitting. The New Testament image of the 
relationship between Jesus and the Father is one of intimate and responsive 
partners in a mutual relationship. Each is deeply concerned about the concerns 
of the other. Moreover, in the effort of each to bring honor to the other they 
appear to try to outdo one another.71 As a friend who loves greatly will die for a 
friend if necessary, they each take their own life and put it at the disposal of the 
other. Friends don't die for one another out of duty, but out of love and loyalty, 
that is, from a desire to honor. The emotional and desiderative character of the 
act makes all the difference to the moral quality of that act. Their fidelity to one 
another is portrayed not as a matter of fulfilling a duty, or obligation, but of love. 
Each is faithful to the other in order to help bring about a purpose central to the 
identity of the other, that is, in order to draw others into the loving relationship 
that they share as Father and Son.  
Mutual Identification Evident in Shared Goal of Reconciliation 
 The New Testament narrative is a “love story” and the character of the 
love it portrays is depicted primarily through the loving relationship between God 
and Jesus and through the love they have for others. The normative character of 
the love with which Jesus' followers are to love others is elucidated by these two 
categories of images. To see the fullness of the love that the Father and the Son 
have for one another also requires looking at this love as it is directed toward 
human persons. In the New Testament the character of the mutual fidelity 
between God and Jesus is made visible by its portrayal of their shared goal. 
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Jesus and his Father work together to draw others into the loving relationship 
that they share and to build a celebratory community of mutual affection and 
joy.72 It is a goal they each possess and support one another to attain. The 
narrative arc of this story is simple and well known. For my purposes here I will 
present it in broad outline. 
 The character of the efforts the Father and Son undertake to draw others 
into the personal fellowship they share helps reveal the character of agape. And 
the character of those efforts can be more fully understood by knowing the 
character of those to whom this love is directed. Rembrandt in his painting of 
Jesus' crucifixion attempts to capture the biblical picture of the individual human 
person as one who is at odds with God. He seeks to accomplish this by painting 
himself into the picture as one who helps hoist up the cross upon which Jesus is 
nailed. It is a graphic acknowledgment that he finds within himself a desire to 
keep God from intruding into his life. It is his way of affirming his experience of 
the narrative's account of the depths to which humans will descend to remain in 
control of their own lives. The narrative calls this attitude “sin.” It constitutes a 
failure to act in terms of what is real, that is, it is a commitment to other ends than 
engaging a personal God in a manner that is personal.73 Milton sought to portray 
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it in his fiction with the words - “Better to reign in Hell than to serve in Heaven.”74 
And George MacDonald with the statement that “Hell's motto is - 'I am my own.'”  
 The narrative portrays our sinfulness in terms of idolatry. We tend to love 
or reverence things that are not worthy of our ultimate allegiance instead of the 
God who is. Even though the things that we devote ourselves to may seem 
harmless the character of our devotion is indicative of a disorientation of the 
heart that is gravely serious. That seriousness is constituted by a willingness to 
refrain from engaging with God in a personal manner in order to pursue lesser 
ends. This disorientation also interferes with our capacity to engage with others 
in a personal manner – idolatry is a kind of dependency that diminishes rather 
than enhances this capacity. People have difficulty in entering into and sustaining 
loving relationships with others. Moreover, even if they yield to others their rights 
they tend to do so not as a matter of love but merely as a matter of duty.75 Our 
deepest and most prevalent moral failures are failures of personal fellowship. As 
Halliday points out this is evidenced in that - 
The deepest sorrows of life are personal, and are relative to the 
attitude of persons to persons. They come from the sense of 
personal injury or through personal loneliness; thus their source is 
lack of fellowship.76  
 
However, even in the face of human failure it is important to note that the 
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narrative does not encourage us to “tell disparaging lies about ourselves to the 
effect that we are nothing but sin.”77 Its portrait of the human condition is complex 
and sober enough without claiming that. However, the story makes it clear that 
though we are created for loving, personal fellowship with God we are regularly 
in flight from the demands of personal engagement with God. 
 The character of agape is made evident by the work the Father and Son 
undertake to draw those who are alienated from them back into the loving 
relationship that constitutes their identity as Father and Son. They do not let the 
indifference or hostility that human persons show them and one another to inhibit 
their efforts to draw those persons back into loving relationship with them and 
with other human persons. This is quite unlike how we respond to those who are 
indifferent toward us, slight us, or cause us some measure of harm.78 Abraham 
Heschel points out that though we are alienated from God the narrative does not 
portray that alienation as the ultimate fact by which to measure the human 
predicament. He writes, “The predicament of man is a predicament of God Who 
has a stake in the human situation... The life of sin is more than a failure of man; 
it is a frustration to God.”79 God desires a living and emotional engagement, or 
encounter, with all persons and aims to promote loving relationships between 
persons. Human sinfulness frustrates God's intentions. However, God's intimate 
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concern for human beings is the fact that stands over and above the fact of their 
alienation from God. In a sense it provides the occasion to witness the character 
of God. The essence of God's moral character, Heschel writes, is God's 
“willingness to be intimately involved in the history of man.”80 And the depth of 
this is imaged by that which God is willing to undergo to reestablish personal 
fellowship with himself. The central images the narrative employs to picture 
God's efforts are those of incarnation and crucifixion. Jesus, as God's Son, 
willingly becomes man and willingly accepts death at the hands of humans in an 
effort to draw them into the loving relationship that he shares with his Father.   
 Jesus, according to the narrative, eternally co-exists with God the Father 
and God the Holy Spirit in a loving relationship. John's gospel states that the 
universe was brought into being through Jesus.81 It is from within this relationship 
that the Father gives the Son to the world. Jesus has been given the mission 
from his Father to draw people into a loving relationship with God. As we saw 
earlier this aim is a mutual one. It is not merely the Father's aim but it is also 
Jesus'. They each align themselves in support of the other's efforts to accomplish 
this purpose that holds such great import to them both. Incarnation is the word 
used for Jesus' entering the created order as a human person. God's profound 
care for human persons, his commitment to helping others enter into personal 
relationship with him, is imaged in God's willingness to give that which he loves 
dearly – his Son – to achieve that end. Concerning the importance of this 
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narrative image for the portrayal of God's love H.R. Mackintosh writes, “it is not 
that God cannot be known as Love apart from his Incarnation in Christ. It is 
rather that, apart from his Incarnation his love is not exhibited so amazingly.”82 In 
this act of sending the Father does not attempt to shield himself from the 
possibility that humans will respond to Jesus in a manner that impinges on the 
Father in painful ways. He desires others to know and honor his Son, not reject 
him. However, in order to encounter others personally the Father submits himself 
to the heart and will of those he seeks to encounter. In Farmer's terms the Father 
extends an invitation to human persons to enter the frontier of his heart. The 
possibility of intimacy requires vulnerability; it requires the willingness to be 
impacted by another's life. God demonstrates that willingness in the giving of his 
Son. 
 Jesus, in his act of willingly becoming a man, also images God's personal 
concern for human persons. .Nowhere is this decision presented as a difficult one 
to make though Paul does discuss its magnitude.83 It is presented both as 
something that he wants to do and as something he wants to do for his Father. In 
entering the world he too invites others to engage him in a manner that is 
personal. And as with the Father this requires a willingness to submit himself to 
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their responses. Though to us these actions of the Father and Son appear 
profoundly humble, likely because we find it difficult to imagine someone in a 
position of great power willingly giving it up, George MacDonald reminds us that 
it is just the sort of thing we would expect a great-hearted Father would do. It is 
the expression of who God is in himself as he faces the real needs of human 
persons, it is not a sacrifice or a burden for the Father and Son to love in this 
manner. Halliday writes,  
The sacrifice to one whose love was so utter, whose courage so 
great, and whose insight into man's need so complete would not 
have been the bearing of the Cross which secured God and man 
and all together, but in refusing and being derelict with a derelict 
and ignoble world.84 
  
The character of God's love as it faces the character of our condition – our need 
to be in loving relationship with God and our antagonism or indifference toward 
that – lead God to the incarnation and the cross. I do not deny, in what was just 
written, either that Jesus suffered in his death on the cross or that he was 
conflicted over the cost of faithfulness to his Father. It is clear from the 
Gethsemane story prior to his crucifixion that he agonized over his impending 
death.85 However, in facing the choice whether to escape suffering through 
infidelity or to remain faithful to the point of death he affirms faithfulness. Halliday, 
as I read him, is suggesting that when we talk about the cost of faithfulness we 
should not forget to consider what the cost of faithlessness would look like. 
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Refusing the cross, given Jesus' character, would have cost Jesus more – it 
would constitute a failure to express his love for his Father and for those they 
love. 
 The crucifixion of Jesus is one of the central images of the New Testament 
narrative.86 The first point I want to make is that Jesus' death on a cross is an 
example of the mutual identification between Jesus and God. It is not merely 
God's desire that Jesus submit to the decision of humans to put him to death, but 
one that Jesus also willingly embraces for himself. We saw earlier that the Father 
affirms the Son's authority to choose whether or not to lay down his life and that it 
is something that Jesus freely does for his Father.87 The second point is that the 
death of Jesus results from God's efforts to engage human persons in a personal 
manner and is instrumental in reconciling humans to God.88 God seeks to 
develop a relationship of mutual identification, one characterized by a reciprocal 
concern that is intimate or personal, between himself and each human person. 
Humans are to participate in a relationship with God like the one imaged between 
the Father and Jesus. We need to look further at how God's efforts to intimately 
identify with humans leads to Jesus' death.    
 To be in a mutual relationship with God that is personal requires that a 
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human person know God's identity and take it to heart. The narrative portrays 
God as love. For one to know God and the full extent of God's love requires 
knowing the full extent of one's own misshapen identity. The cross is portrayed 
as the universal human response to God's call in Jesus for our unreserved glad 
fidelity to God. Jesus, as fully loving, presents himself as “the final moral 
obligation” and in so doing draws the sinfulness of humans, their commitment to 
an unconditional self-determination, into conflict with his own character.89 As fully 
loving he aims to foster personal relationships between God and others as exists 
between the Father and himself. Human persons in their desire to maintain their 
independence, to avoid the demands of personal engagement, put Jesus to the 
death. The cross is presented as a judgment on the unloving character of human 
persons. Yet it provides an opportunity for humans to know the loving character 
of God as it exposes the kind of person humans are but should not be. Human 
character is revealed by the character of the one who they put to death and the 
manner in which he loves human persons and seeks fellowship with them even 
in the face of their hostility. Humans are to be like him and to love like him.  
 God seeks to awaken humans to the depth of their need for God by 
exposing the ugly destructiveness of their desire to live independently of God. 
God, in his Son Jesus, submits himself to humans in this way in order that they 
may know God as gracious, loving Father. He seeks to unveil humans to 
themselves and allure them to him through the loving character of Jesus. Sin is 
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revealed not as the breaking of an abstract moral law but in an indifference to 
personal fellowship with God or in a refusal or rejection of it.90 Halliday writes that 
humans are to be like the son in the Parable of the Prodigal Son who when he 
“came to himself, he awoke to the sense of his unworthiness, and the agony that 
was in the heart of the father became his own.”91 God's communication through 
the cross has begun to do its work when it awakens human persons to see and 
feel how their quest for independence has injured God as well as many others. 
And when in this awakening they accept responsibility for their failures and turn 
to God to ask for forgiveness and help. Wendell Berry ably captures the spirit of 
the New Testament narrative concerning the cross when he writes,  
It is a light that is merciless until they can accept its mercy; by it 
they are at once condemned and redeemed. It is Hell until it is 
Heaven. Seeing themselves in that light, if they are willing, they see 
how far they have failed the only justice of loving one another; it 
punishes them by their own judgment. And yet, in suffering that 
light’s awful clarity, in seeing themselves within it, they see its 
forgiveness and its beauty and are consoled. In it they are loved 
completely, even as they have been, and so are changed into what 
they could not have been but what, if they could have imagined it, 
they would have wished to be.92 
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Though much more could be written about the New Testament image of 
love it is time to take what has been put down and show how it helps explain 
some significant features of the human condition. As we do this it is important to 
remember that what the narrative provides goes beyond explanatory power. We 
have already seen how it addresses Becker's Concern of what it is to be vibrant, 
fully-actualized human person. The narrative presents Jesus in his loving 
relationship with the Father as the model of human life -  the human self is 
portrayed as one in which the capacities essential for personhood such as 
autonomy are not diminished through identification with God but instead are most 
fully realized. The narrative also may give a new depth or gravity to our 
experiences of harming others as well of our experiences of being harmed that 
may have only been hinted at in our past experience. If it does this it does so not 
merely by providing us with an explanation of facts already clearly understood 
but by providing us with a vision of life that illuminates our experiences and 
aspirations in ways we may not have considered before.93  
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 Before moving on to the next section it is important to note that the New 
Testament narrative itself does not purport to satisfy our deepest needs as 
human beings. It maintains that our deepest need is to be in a relationship of the 
kind that is imaged between Jesus and God. A narrative can give us a fuller 
picture of what that relationship should look like than can a discursive account of 
normative principles but engaging a narrative is not the same as engaging God. 
However important disciplined engagement with this narrative might be the 
narrative itself acknowledges that such an engagement can be a dangerous 
substitute for engaging God personally and participating in a loving relationship 
with God.94 
The Human Condition and the New Testament Image of Agape 
 The account of intimate identification that is rooted in the New Testament 
portrayal of agape constitutes a kind of personal knowing that is capable of 
addressing the existential problem of meaning or significance that Leo Tolstoy 
identified in Chapter Two. On this account the human hunger for meaning, or 
significance, is one that finds its satisfaction not in theoretical or explanatory 
knowledge but in intimate, personal engagement with God and, through God, 
with others. Significance is found in being significant for Another, that is, in being 
loved by One who is worthy of our fullest love and in receiving that love through a 
loving response. Tolstoy's religious testimony will be engaged to help support this 
view of the personal nature of meaning. His life gives witness to a hunger for 
                                                 
94
 One place where this is made strikingly clear is in John 5:39-40 where Jesus is reported as 
saying, “You search the scriptures because you think that in them you have eternal life; and it is 
they that testify on my behalf. Yet you refuse to come to me to have life.” 
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something that can meet the existential demands he finds within himself. He 
provides an account of why the explanatory knowledge of the sciences fails to 
meet these. In addition, I argue that Tolstoy embraces Christianity, at least in 
part, because to him it makes the best sense of the powerful existential demands 
he experiences. In doing so he employs a modest form of explanationism.95 The 
manner in which he gives witness to his deepest aspirations and to that which he 
has found to satisfy them models the character of discourse, or conversation, 
that best fits these issues of ultimate concern. He does not claim that he can 
demonstrate to others that his view is more reasonable than others but in sharing 
his experiences he invites others to investigate their own. 
 The approach here is modest in that it emphasizes the important role of 
personal judgment in the epistemological enterprise when it comes to issues of 
ultimate concern. When it comes to differences between persons concerning 
issues of ultimate concern, such as ascertaining the character of the good life or 
of life's meaning, one cannot demonstrate to another which of two competing 
accounts is better than the other merely by appealing to explanatory power. This 
is so for several reasons. First, people may differ on the phenomena that they 
deem worthy of explanation. Second, if they agree on the phenomena worthy of 
explanation they may disagree about the veridicality of those phenomena. Third, 
even if they agree on the importance of the phenomena and their veridicality they 
may disagree about which explanation of that phenomena is best. We saw the 
difficulty of adjudicating between broad explanatory frameworks in Chapter Two 
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as we explored E.O. Wilsons and C.S. Lewis' different accounts of the character 
of moral experience. Fourth, it is possible that not all phenomena are equally 
available to all people at all times.96 For example, in examining Tolstoy one might 
not find his conclusions about Christianity compelling because even after 
consulting one's own experiences or aspirations one is aware of no profound 
personal hunger for meaning. Or, it may be the case that one lacks a sense of 
moral failure and a need for forgiveness.97 Of course, as we saw with E.O. 
Wilson and John Searle in Chapter Two, these phenomena can be interpreted as 
vestiges of our ancient human ancestry that at one time promoted our survival 
but are no longer helpful or necessary. Even though abduction, or 
explanationism, is limited in these ways there is still a role for explanatory power. 
An individual should assess the rationality of their own view on the basis of its 
ability to best explain the phenomena that that person judges to be the most 
significant to explain.   
 Albert Borgmann argues that when our discourse centers around a matter 
of ultimate concern, like life's meaning, we engage others “by inviting them” to 
consider and examine for themselves that which has moved us.98 In doing this 
                                                 
96
 For example, Paul Moser, in The Elusive God: Reorienting Religious Epistemology, argues that 
we should expect evidence of a perfectly loving God to be purposively available to humans in a 
manner consistent with God's all-loving character and God's purposes in self-revelation. The 
most important kinds of evidence may be available only to those who engage in a kind of seeking 
that is consistent with the character of such a God. His argument builds on Jesus' words that 
“Anyone who resolves to do the will of God will know whether the teaching [i.e., Jesus' teaching] 
is from God or whether I am speaking on my own.” See John 7:17. 
 
97
 H.R. Mackintosh writes, “the notion of forgiveness is only relevant to the alarmed or burdened 
conscience.” See his The Christian Experience of Forgiveness, p. 7. See also H.H. Farmer, The 
World and God, pp. 188-189 and H.R. Mackintosh, The Person of Jesus Christ, pp. 4-5. 
 
98
 Borgmann, TCCL, p. 178. For a thorough account see Ch. 21, pp. 169-182. 
250 
 
we also speak not only of our own experiences and aspirations but invite our 
readers or listeners to search their own.99 It is a non-coercive form of discourse. 
However, it remains contestable because it points to some feature of reality, one 
believed to address those aspirations, that is publicly accessible.100 Tolstoy is an 
example of one who offers such a witness in his essay, aptly titled, A Confession, 
and in his other religious writings. Though he does not explicitly present his 
testimony in terms of its explanatory value it does appear to be the case that he 
embraces a narrative account of agape because it enables him to make the best 
sense of certain of his own experiences. Relying on Tolstoy's testimony I will 
seek to show how the narrative account of agape, similar to that which has been 
developed in this paper, is embraced by Tolstoy to implicitly explain these 
existential demands that have also been common to many others as well. 
Tolstoy's Quest for Meaning as a Hunger for Intimacy 
 In his testimony regarding his deepest aspirations Tolstoy invites us to 
consider that not all phenomena present themselves to us as existentially 
equivalent. Some facets of our experience as persons demand our attention 
more than others. He describes at length how he was confronted by questions 
about his own existence in a manner that he could not escape.101 These 
questions, more than any others, asserted themselves and demanded a 
response. The central one had to do with the phenomenon of his own existence. 
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Within himself he experienced an urgent demand to resolve the question: Why 
do I exist?102 Sometime he phrases this as – What is the meaning of my own 
life?103 He also states this same question in the following ways: What am I? Who 
am I? Why do I live (or exist)? And, What must I do?104 Concerning this 
experience he writes, “the most important thing” is “my own personal question, 
the question of what I am with all my desires.”105 He found that the sciences 
provide no answers to his question but instead provide “a countless number of 
precise answers to things I had not asked.”106 The scientific response provides a 
description of the material character of one's life; it informs us that “you are a 
temporary, incidental accumulation of particles.”107 This answer fails to reply to 
the question he is asking.108 He hungers to know if his life has any meaning and 
not merely for an account of its physical characteristics. 
 As we saw in Chapter Two Tolstoy also dismisses as inadequate the 
response that the meaning he longs for can be found in the activity of studying 
“the infinite complexities and mutations of an infinite number of particles in the 
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infinity of space and time.”109 Intellectual pursuits, whether scientific, 
philosophical, or theological, are not capable in themselves of securing the 
significance he desires. We can better understand the character of his 
aspirations, that is, the character of the demand for meaning that he experiences 
within himself, by looking at three prominent features of his experience that he 
associates with this question. 
 The three features of Tolstoy's experience that surround his question 
about his own existence include a consciousness of his own aloneness, his own 
moral responsibility and moral failing, and the insignificance of his own 
existence.110 He observes that as humans we are alone in the world in our ability 
to recognize ourselves as “sentenced to death, to oblivion in the infinity of space 
and time” and in “the tormenting awareness” of our moral responsibility.111 Only 
humans have the capacity to act badly and to know they could have acted better. 
We are also alone or separate from one another. He recognizes that “death will 
come... to those dear to me” and will eventually come to him and that nothing will 
remain of their love for one another.112 Death cements our insignificance not only 
because it “obliterates” one's self but also one's work.113 We do not endure and 
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there is nothing we do that will endure. This is the case because there is no 
person to remember either our existence or our actions; there is no one for whom 
these would matter.114 
 Tolstoy argues that “rational knowledge” gives us no grounds for believing 
that we can overcome our aloneness or our insignificance. It is important to note 
that his view of what constitutes rational knowledge appears fairly narrow. 
Rational knowledge appears to be only that which has the empirically 
demonstrable character of the experimental sciences or mathematics.115 He 
reports that when he embraces the conclusions of science they evoke a sense of 
homelessness, loneliness, and abandonment.116 Even our moral aspirations 
themselves seem ill-fitting. These conclusions evoke profound despair.117 He 
concludes that if rational knowledge is the only knowledge we can have, then life 
is meaningless. Though these disciplines may provide a theoretical description of 
the material world that is true that description by itself is not sufficient to provide 
meaning. He argues that the dominant theoretical explanations of his day, 
particularly scientific ones, entail that life is meaningless. Tolstoy, as we saw in 
Chapter Two, argues that in the picture of nature as conceived by science there 
is no place for significance or worth. At one point he states, “I did not even wish 
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to know the truth because I had guessed what it was. The truth was that life is 
meaningless.”118 He indicates here that his hunger for meaning is a longing for 
something more than merely the correct or best explanation. There are 
explanations that appear intellectually satisfactory yet heighten his sense of 
aloneness and insignificance.119 
 The existential “why” question Tolstoy asks about his own existence is 
different in character than other types of “why” questions that can be asked. His 
question appears to fit best in what Pascal calls the personal order or the order of 
the heart. He is engulfed by this question; it haunts him. Everything hinges on it. 
He seeks to answer it not “half-heartedly, or out of idle curiosity, but tormentedly, 
persistently, day and night, like a dying man seeking salvation.”120 The anguish 
and urgency in his question - Why do I exist? can be made more apparent by 
rephrasing it as - Is there any meaning, significance, or purpose to my life as the 
particular person that I am? As a question about his particular identity it cannot 
be answered in general terms. The understanding Tolstoy is looking for takes the 
shape of a longing to be understood or known as the particular “I” he finds 
himself to be. He is not looking for a solution to a puzzle – a diagram of how an 
assortment of facts, including his existence, fit together. There are other types of 
why questions, for example – Why does the earth revolve around the sun? - 
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where that type of explanation is appropriate. Instead he longs to know if he, that 
is, the particular person he finds himself to be, is significant. His perplexity, unlike 
mere intellectual curiosity, seeks relief in a form of understanding that is 
personal. His question might best be phrased Am I significant? Or, Is there 
someone I matter to and to whom I belong? Tolstoy, like Sebastian Moore, 
describes his hunger for significance in terms of being significant for another or 
meaningful to another.121 That significance is not found in an explanation.  
  We are in a position to see why Tolstoy would say that someone like the 
biologist E.O. Wilson misses the import of his question.122 Wilson observes that 
millions seek “...to find the godhead, or to enter the wholeness of nature, or 
otherwise to grasp on to something ineffable, beautiful, and eternal...” otherwise 
they “...feel lost, adrift in a life without ultimate meaning.”123 Because of this, he 
continues, “People need a sacred narrative. They must have a sense of larger 
purpose... They will refuse to yield to the despair of animal mortality.”124 Wilson 
thinks that the scientific story can provide this larger purpose. He writes:  
The true evolutionary epic, retold as poetry, is as intrinsically 
ennobling as any religious epic. Material reality as described by 
science already possesses more content and grandeur than all 
religious cosmologies combined.125  
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Tolstoy would disagree. He does not merely need a sacred narrative nor will just 
any purpose do. Tolstoy testifies that reality must be of a personal character in 
order for meaning to be possible because the meaning he aspires to is found in 
loving personal fellowship with God and others. He is emphatic that ontologies 
like Wilson's lack that which could make his life meaningful.126 The impersonal 
grandeur of nature, beautiful as it may be, is such that it cannot take notice of his 
existence – to it he could not matter. Nor could his existence possibly matter to 
an eloquent scientific description. If Wilson's view is true, if material reality is all 
that there is, then life is meaningless precisely because there is no room for 
relationships that are personal – there is no room for love. It is unclear whether 
Bertrand Russell would agree with Tolstoy that the naturalistic evolutionary epic 
lacks the resources to make sense of, or address, our hunger for personal 
connection however, he is familiar with the longing. Russell writes, “…the 
loneliness of the human soul is unendurable; nothing can penetrate it except the 
highest intensity of the sort of love the religious teachers have preached.”127 
Tolstoy thinks that it “eliminates any possible meaning” if he is nothing more than 
a “temporary, incidental accumulation of particles” or a “randomly united lump of 
something” that will eventually “disintegrate” and “cease” along with all its 
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questions.128 Given his aspirations for loving, personal relationships such a 
conclusion is a source of profound despair and leaves no room for joy.129  
 C.S. Lewis offers testimony similar to Tolstoy's that provides further 
support to the view that Tolstoy's hunger for meaning is a hunger for personal 
relationship with God. Lewis writes that he experiences within himself something 
much more than a desire to enter the wholeness of nature or to otherwise grasp 
on to something ineffable, beautiful, and eternal. He writes that the beauty of the 
universe as a material and impersonal reality is not enough to satisfy the desire 
he finds within himself. Concerning his experiences of beauty he writes, “Beauty 
has smiled but not to welcome us” and in our encounter with beauty we discover 
“we are but mere spectators.”130 This spectatorship stands in sharp contrast to a 
longing he finds within himself to be noticed. His experiences underscore for him 
that, “We have not been welcomed, accepted, or taken into the dance.”131 We do 
want to enter into beauty, as Wilson observes, yet we find it does not 
acknowledge us; it is indifferent to us. In a world that is inanimate through and 
through there is no one to whom we matter – in such a universe we are “treated 
as strangers.”132 More to the point, he writes, “Nobody marks us.”133 There is not 
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a person to take note of us. Lewis describes his hunger as a desire to be 
delighted in by God, like a father takes delight in his son, and to be a part of 
God’s gladness. He refers to this ache to be found special in this way, along with 
the fear he experiences in admitting to this, as his “inconsolable secret.”134 In 
expressing this publicly he writes that a part of him feels that he is “committing an 
indecency.”135 He is tempted to take revenge on it and call it names like 
“Nostalgic”, “Romantic”, and “Adolescent”.136 Similarly, Tolstoy initially felt the 
pressing existential demands within himself and the questions they forcefully 
asserted as “stupid, simple, and childish.”137 Lewis, like Tolstoy, does not merely 
want to grasp beauty or the ineffable, he wants to be grasped by love.  
Longing for Meaning or Fearing Non-Existence? 
 Some might argue that Tolstoy's writings reflect not a hunger for loving 
relationships with God and others - a longing for personal relationships that 
endure beyond death - but instead a terrible fear of non-existence. There is 
considerable evidence from his work that Tolstoy is not concerned primarily with 
non-existence but hungers for a particular kind of meaning that is not possible if 
death is final. A death of this character would put to an end that which makes life 
meaningful and makes life worth living. We have already seen that Tolstoy is 
pained by the awareness that “death will come... to those dear to me” and will 
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eventually come to him and that nothing will remain of their love for one 
another.138 It is not the idea of not existing that is so painful but that he and his 
loved ones will not remain in loving relationship with one another. Personal 
relationships are integral to life's meaning for Tolstoy. He wants to participate in 
loving relationships, and wants these to endure, more than he fears death - death 
just makes clear a facet of this longing – and further evidence to support this is 
found in his remarks on God. 
 Tolstoy describes his heart as being “agonized by a tormenting feeling” 
that he could only describe as “a quest for God.”139 He describes this as an 
emotional experience as it did not arise from his stream of thoughts but from a 
feeling of “fear, abandonment, loneliness... and a sense of hope that someone 
would help me.”140 Earlier he describes the sense of homelessness he 
experiences when faced with the inadequate answers to his pressing questions 
that are provided by the experimental sciences, mathematics, and speculative 
philosophy.141 This passage serves as a hint, or prelude, to the description of his 
feelings of abandonment that I present below. There he describes being 
overcome with grief because there is no God to whom he can turn to be heard 
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and find mercy.142 He writes of his experience so tenderly it is important to quote 
him at length. He writes: 
I kept coming to the same conclusion, that I could not have come 
into the world without any cause, reason, or meaning; that I could 
not be the fledgling fallen from the nest that I felt myself to be. If I lie 
on my back crying in the tall grass, like a fledgling, it is because I 
know that my mother brought me into the world, kept me warm, fed 
me, and loved me. But where is she, that mother? If I am 
abandoned, then who has abandoned me? I cannot hide myself 
from the fact that someone who loved me gave birth to me. Who is 
this someone? Again, God.143  
 
Tolstoy describes his hunger as having a personal character – he longs to be 
found and cared for by a loving God. He concludes that to know God, and to 
search for God, is “to live” and claims that this is what keeps him from taking his 
own life. He speaks of returning to that will that has “given birth to me and which 
asked something of me.”144 Meaning is attributed to a volitional encounter with 
God. He writes that “the force of life rose up within me” - with joy overcoming 
despair - as he recognizes that this God places demands upon him and that he is 
“to live according to this will.”145 Upon this recognition he compares himself to an 
oarsman in a boat who seeks for the shore, that shore being God, and that his 
freedom is to be used like oars to “row towards the shore and unite with God.”146  
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To be loved like this overcomes both his sense of insignificance and aloneness. 
 There are two other reasons why I think Tolstoy's writings reflect a hunger 
for personal engagement with a loving God and not a fear of non-existence. First, 
like Lewis he expresses an embarrassment at admitting his questions. Initially he 
calls them stupid and childish. To admit publicly to wanting to be loved requires a 
degree of vulnerability that admitting a fear of non-existence does not require. 
People do not seem to be embarrassed at admitting they do not want to die or 
that they would like to live forever. Becker, like Tolstoy and Lewis, also identifies 
the fear associated with the ache to be found special in some cosmic sense.147 
He writes, “All that religious and psychoanalytic genius has to tell us converges 
on the terror of admitting what one is doing to win his self-esteem.”148 Moreover, 
among men even speaking of a longing for intimate personal relationships with 
other men can evoke ridicule. Some of Cicero's contemporaries claim that the 
need for friends is a sign of weakness and support this in a variety of ways 
including suggesting that intimate friendship is something that only women 
need.149 Second, his desire for death in the face of life's meaninglessness is not 
compatible with a fear of non-existence. If life is meaningless, he writes, then it is 
proper to conclude “Happy is he who was never born. Death is better than life”150 
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He terribly desires that his existence have meaning and if it does not he thinks it 
is not worth living. An indefinitely long existence by itself is not sufficient to 
provide meaning. To escape that “horror of the darkness” of a life without 
meaning he describes how he “wanted to kill” himself.151 His inability to commit 
suicide need not be attributed to a fear of non-existence. The desire for death is 
not compatible with a fear of non-existence, that is, it is not an intelligible 
emotional response for someone whose primary fear is not existing.152 Surely, it 
would be odd for one who finds non-existence to be terrible to wish for death and 
to advocate suicide so forcefully.153   
 Based on my argument it should be apparent that when Tolstoy despairs 
over the meaninglessness of life he is responding emotionally to a particular view 
of reality that – as he believes it to be true - leaves no room for relationships that 
are personal. It seems to me that this makes the best sense of the textual 
evidence that Tolstoy provides. On Wilson's account there are no personal 
selves to know and love one another because there is no room for purposive 
activity initiated by an I or a self. There are only complex happenings. If we are 
                                                                                                                                                 
fundamental human craving is to belong” and that we are more afraid of “not-belonging”, “not 
counting”, or “not being wanted” than of death. See The Spirit and the Forms of Love, p. 146.  
 
151
 Ibid., p. 33. 
 
152
 See my section “Fidelity, Autonomy, and Identity” in Chapter Three for more on the rational 
interconnection of emotions. To experience an emotion is to be committed to the import of its 
focus. When two or more emotions are rationally interconnected what makes the connection 
between the emotions intelligible is their shared focus. Without a shared focus we would not say 
the emotions are connected. Regarding Tolstoy's desire for death and his alleged fear of non-
existence it is difficult to see what could constitute their shared focus. There does not appear to 
be a connection between these emotions and in light of the plausible explanation that I provide  
this makes the position that Tolstoy is driven by a fear of non-existence less plausible.   
 
153
 For more on his view of suicide see pages 33, 47-48, 54, and 63-65 from his essay “A 
Confession” in A Confession and Other Religious Writings.   
263 
 
just a complex pattern of physical events in an even more complicated pattern of 
physical events pushed forward by a bottom-up causality that began before we 
came into being and pushes right through us that leaves us with no room for 
personal agency where we initiate actions, then there is no room for connection 
with others that is personal. If our existence is truly personal, but you become 
convinced that there is no room in this world for love, because there are no 
personal selves, it would only be right to be lonely. Terribly so. Tolstoy's despair 
is a fitting emotional response to the hopelessness of this situation. That which is 
of import to Tolstoy and makes his despair intelligible is the inescapable demand 
for interpersonal connection that asserts itself within him, that is, a hunger and a 
hope for relationships that are personal and that death does not obliterate. It is 
the great emotional import that this holds for him that makes intelligible the 
greatness of his despair.154 With this in mind it is understandable why he said to 
people like Wilson – your answer proves that you fail to understand the import of 
the question that I am asking.155 If one has a longing for enduring relationships 
with God and others that are personal in character, to be told that the universe is 
impersonal through and through will not strike one as ennobling. It will evoke 
profound despair. Tolstoy testifies that such a conclusion leaves no room for 
joy.156 The heart of Tolstoy's longing for meaning is not merely to have some 
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intellectual grasp of an overarching explanation but to be grasped in love. The 
demand for meaning he finds within himself is the demand to matter to One to 
whom it would be worthy to matter. His question is searching for the personal 
response of Another.  
 We can also better understand the character of Tolstoy's aspirations, that 
is, the personal character of the meaning he hungers for, by looking at his 
account of his moral failings. He is tormented by the awareness of being 
responsible for his actions and the awareness that in many situations he had 
acted badly and could have acted better.157 He describes these failings in terms 
of not responding appropriately to the demands of the loving Will that gave him 
birth.158 He writes that “the meaning of life” is not found “in the fulfillment of 
personal ambitions, or the ambitions of any aggregate of people, but solely in 
service to the Will that created him... for the purpose of achieving not his own 
aims, but the aims of that Will.”159 Tolstoy's moral failures torment him as they 
are failures of personal fellowship with God. Morality is not about conforming 
oneself to an abstract moral law but rather about loving volitional fellowship with 
God. Moreover, it is plausible given the character of his testimony that he would 
agree that there is a kind of aloneness or alienation caused by one's failures to 
faithfully respond to the loving demands of God. 
 The account of intimate identification that is rooted in the New Testament 
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portrayal of agape constitutes a kind of personal knowing that is capable of 
addressing the existential problem of meaning or significance that Tolstoy faces. 
This relational conception of agape – as imaged in the person of Jesus as he 
relates to God and others - contains the conceptual resources to help Tolstoy 
make sense of his experience of aloneness, his moral responsibility and moral 
failing, and his desire for significance. However, it is important to note that 
employing an account like this one as an explanation is not that which satisfies 
his hunger for meaning and moral wholeness. Satisfaction is found in a faithful 
response to a loving volitional encounter with God. In addition, this account also 
provides an explanation for the interrelatedness of these three features. These 
experiences make sense in light of the view that the purpose of our existence is 
to participate in a community of mutual affection and joy that is drawn together by 
the Father and Son. It pictures humans as being intended for the highest form of 
personal fellowship or intimate friendship with God and, through God, with 
others. Meaning is primarily found in a loving volitional encounter with God. As 
hunger pangs indicate a need for food, Tolstoy's pangs of loneliness and 
abandonment indicate this need for personal communion. This narrative depicts 
this as the central need built into humans by God. It is a need reflective of the 
loving character of God as imaged in the Father-Son relationship. The conviction 
that death is final, that it puts an end to all relationships, evokes profound 
loneliness and despair because death is incompatible with this need.160 Such 
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death is “irreconcilable with love.”161 As Macmurray observes when we love 
someone we want to know them better and better and to enjoy them for who they 
are.162 However, if death is final, it puts an end to this kind of knowing that is 
intrinsic to love.    
  If the materialist picture of reality holds and death is final not only is 
Tolstoy alone in the sense that those he loves will no longer exist but he himself 
will no longer be known personally and will no longer matter to anyone. Under 
this view his life appears unbearably insignificant. From the perspective of the 
New Testament narrative there is an intelligible connection between his 
experience of aloneness and his desire for significance. Tolstoy's hunger for 
significance is to be met in a loving relationship with God as imaged in the 
Father-Son relationship. The New Testament pictures humans as created to 
receive the kind of love the Father has for Jesus for themselves.163 In trying to 
capture this C.S. Lewis writes that we were created “to be loved by God, not 
merely pitied, but delighted in as an artist delights in his work or a father in a 
son.”164 Moreover, as we have seen, knowing God personally requires God's 
redemptive work because of our sinfulness. The aim of God's effort in the 
incarnation and the cross is to make possible a joy filled reunion between God 
and human persons as is pictured in the parable of the Prodigal Son. Being 
identified with God as a son or daughter provides significance as it overcomes 
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aloneness through intimate, personal fellowship. If we are created to be in a 
relationship with God marked by mutual affection and joy, that is, if we are made 
to be intimately identified with God – and if this need is somehow in the structure 
or constitution of our very being as persons – then Tolstoy's profound despair 
over his aloneness and insignificance in the face of an impersonal universe 
makes good sense. Our deepest needs are personal, that is, our deepest needs 
have to do with giving and receiving love that is personal. 
The Reasonableness of Tolstoy's Position 
 Some people object, as does Paul Edwards, that Tolstoy's position in his 
religious writings is unreasonable. Given Tolstoy's own description of faith as 
“irrational” and that “meaning lies in irrational knowledge” this might seem like a 
reasonable conclusion.165 Moreover, if such religious knowledge is irrational, then 
it cannot be used by him as a basis for the explanation of his experiences. In 
response, I think the textual evidence suggests that Tolstoy employs a modest 
form of explanationism concerning his religious beliefs. He appears to embrace 
Christianity, at least in part, because its narrative provides an explanation that 
makes the best sense to him of critical existential phenomena with which he is 
confronted. For example, he implicitly argues that meaning requires purposes 
and purposes require persons and persons and their purposes do not fit in a web 
of material causation and material phenomena. To act purposefully involves a 
form of agency or causation, one he calls “final” or “ultimate”, where an event is 
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initiated by a being capable of doing so in order to bring about a particular 
purpose or end. In contrast, the experimental sciences study material 
phenomena that are constituted by a form of causation where an event is caused 
by a series of physical events that preceded it – no purposeful action is 
necessary to initiate or cause any event in the natural world as science pictures 
it.166 He is aware of such purposeful activity from his own moral experience. He 
writes of being aware of being responsible for his own actions and also, in cases 
of having acted badly, knowing that he could have acted differently, that is, he 
could have acted better.167 What accounts for this ability? Given the acuity and 
curiosity of his mind he surely must have wondered what might ground his ability 
to act purposefully, if it is not more than mere delusion, since the scientific picture 
of nature (including humans) as a system operating only with physical causes 
leaves no room for this kind of agency. 
 Being able to act purposefully also gives him the grounds to ponder if he is 
created with a purpose or end in mind. He searches for something that would 
help him to answer the question – Who am I? Or, What is the meaning or 
purpose of my life? As I have argued, at the heart of these questions, is another 
question – Am I loved by God? His hunger for meaning takes the shape of 
feeling alone and abandoned and compels him to ask: “If I am abandoned, then 
who has abandoned me?”168 He acknowledges that there must be a “cause, 
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reason, or meaning” that explains why he wants to be loved personally.169 The 
evolutionary story can provide a causal explanation for how his question might 
arise, but it cannot answer it, that is, it cannot tell him if he is loved. Moreover, it 
would be odd if Tolstoy's aspiration for a personal loving encounter with God did 
not lead him to question the adequacy of the materialistic account of how such a 
pressing question arose within himself.170 It was likely he asked something like: 
How did a material system of cause and effect create a material entity – namely 
myself - capable of conceiving of, and longing for, a personal form of 
engagement with other persons that requires a kind of causation completely 
foreign to it as a material system?171 It must have struck him as odd that a 
physical system would long for a personal existence. Of course, the ill-fit of this 
phenomenon with a materialistic explanation is not a demonstration of the truth of 
Christianity. However, his longing is part of a range of phenomena that he 
experiences and for which there is evidence that he wants an explanation that he 
thinks makes the best sense of these phenomena. He embraces Christianity, at 
least partly, because he finds it provides that explanation. I say partly because it 
is evident that it is not merely Christianity as an explanatory framework that he 
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finds compelling but also the person of Jesus.  
 It is evident in Tolstoy's work that he finds the person of Jesus, who he is 
in himself and the love he manifests in his life, to fit his deepest experiences and 
aspirations.172 He realizes that there is no way to prove “that it is better for a man 
to give his life in service to others than to compel others to serve him” but that “it 
must be shown.”173 He thinks Jesus' life shows this. Given the content and tone 
of his work I think Tolstoy would argue that the person of Jesus is the best 
evidence we have of the existence of a personal God. I think he would agree with 
his contemporary H.R. Mackintosh who writes,  
We need... a substantial and significant existence which confronts 
us as an irrefragable element in history, and to which our noblest 
aspirations and hopes can be fastened. This reality, it is plain, must 
needs be a Person; for only a Person can show us the personal 
God.174 
 
Mackintosh thinks that the person of Jesus is the Divine answer to the kind of 
longing of which Tolstoy himself gives witness. Should the word irrational, or 
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unreasonable, be used to describe Tolstoy's position? If the standard for 
rationality is set by the experimental sciences and mathematics, as Tolstoy 
seems to suggest at places, then religious and moral knowledge is irrational. 
However, there is evidence in Tolstoy's work that he employs a modest form of 
explanationism in his embrace of the Christian faith. Tolstoy, as does Pascal, 
seems to regard the Christian narrative as one that affords the best explanation 
of a range of existential phenomena that he considers supremely significant.  
Moreover, it appears that Jesus' life for Tolstoy, though not a theoretical 
demonstration of God's existence, is suggestive in itself of a reality worthy of 
engaging.175 With these things in mind there are grounds to conclude that Tolstoy 
is neither being unreasonable nor advocating irrationality.  
Conclusion 
 In this dissertation I have presented an alternative account of autonomy to 
that view common in contemporary Western culture that holds that the autonomy 
necessary for mature moral agency or for the realization of one's unique personal 
identity is diminished by the influence of other persons. In contrast, I argued that 
the relational image of love, or agape, in the New Testament narrative presents a 
conception of personal identity in which autonomy is found in and through 
intimate, personal relationships with God and others. Our identity is ultimately 
personal, that is, we are not fully who we are apart from being in relationships 
with others that are personal. This account of the New Testament image of love 
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reveals a portrait of the self as one in which the capacities essential for 
personhood such as autonomy are not diminished through identification with God 
but instead are most fully realized. I argued that this identification involves a 
personal form of caring, one that is distinctly intimate, that when mutual 
constitutes a personal form of knowing. This personal knowledge is constituted 
by a particular pattern of engagement between persons and is more than the 
intellectual apprehension of propositions that are true about another person.  I 
argued that directly engaging the New Testament as a part of a philosophical 
project is justified, in part, because adequately describing this love requires a 
narrative. Only a story or exemplar can image in depth the volitional, 
desiderative, and emotional qualities of this love as well as its relational 
character. The narrative is also needed in order to present a portrait of the self as 
one in which the capacities essential for personhood such as autonomy are not 
diminished through intimate identification with God but instead are most fully 
realized. Jesus was presented as the primary example of how participating in an 
intimate, personal relationship with God, given God's character, requires and 
nurtures the development of the autonomy necessary for the full realization of 
one's person. In his unparalleled capacity to engage God and others in a 
personal manner, Jesus is presented as the portrait of how to live a vibrant life. 
His identity is not diminished or obscured, but instead finds its unique expression, 
in identification with the God he calls Father. I also argued that joy is an essential 
emotional and desiderative component of this love that shapes its moral 
character and is necessary for intimate, personal knowing. Lastly, I also argued 
273 
 
that this kind of personal knowing is capable of addressing the existential 
problem of meaning or significance that Tolstoy identifies. On this account the 
human hunger for meaning, or significance, is one that finds its satisfaction not in 
theoretical or explanatory knowledge but in intimate, personal engagement with 
God and, through God, with others. Significance is found in being significant for 
Another, that is, in being loved by One who is worthy of our fullest love. 
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